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Introduction
T    research into two contradictory accounts of theprocess by which an Irish State replaced the British State in Ireland. On the
one hand there is Kevin O’Higgins, a minister in the Provisional Government,
describing Ireland in 1922 thus:
there was no State and no organized forces. The Provisional Government was
simply eight young men in the City Hall standing amidst the ruins of one admin-
istration with the foundations of another not yet laid, and with wild men scream-
ing through the keyhole. No police force was functioning through the country, no
system of justice was operating, the wheels of administration hung idle battered
out of recognition by the clash of rival jurisdictions.1
On the other hand there is the magisterial calm of Joseph Brennan, who had
been a senior civil servant in Dublin at the handover. In 1936, in remembering
the transfer of power, he wrote:
The passing of the State services into the control of a native Government, however
revolutionary it may have been as a step in the political development of the
nation, entailed, broadly speaking, no immediate disturbance of any fundamen-
tal kind in the daily work of the average Civil Servant. Under changed masters the
main tasks of administration continued to be performed by the same staffs on the
same general line of organisation and procedure.2
O’Higgins described a failed State collapsing into ruin. Brennan, on the other
hand, described a smoothly running State machine handed over intact into
new hands. Can both these contradictory accounts be both correct and accu-
rate? Which is closer to the truth?
Traditional nationalist interpretations of the process of State-building tended
toward the O’Higgins view of smoking ruins and revolutionary violence. The
modern Irish State emerged out of revolution and State-building in indepen -
dent Ireland was from the ground up, starting anew. Depending on how the
Treaty is interpreted this process is seen as being either ultimately successful or
ultimately thwarted. Revisionist interpretations of the process give considerable
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significance to the Brennan view of essential continuity. According to this view
the independent State ensured its stability by abandoning the chimera of revo-
lution and merely assuming control of the levers of power of the existing
regime. Thus it is argued that what happened was hardly in fact a revolution at
all, merely the transfer of the existing State from one political authority to
another; very much a case of business as usual.
This book sets out to answer these questions of revolution or continuity
through a close examination of the role and fate of the civil service in the
process of State-building. It questions whether the new government did simply
retain the same civil service, given that every other institution of the British
State in Ireland was abolished – parliament, executive, judiciary, police and the
military. If that was the case, as many historians argue, then why did the new
Irish government readily accept what was described as an anti-Irish, extrava-
gant, corrupt and rundown apparatus? Had the civil service that was con-
demned in May 1920 as unworkable been successfully rebuilt into a modern
and efficient machine in a mere eighteen months? That transformation would
in itself be remarkable. If so, how was it achieved? What sort of relationship
bound the civil service firstly to the British State and then to the new Irish State
which replaced it? What did the civil service of the Dublin Castle regime itself
think of the new government and what was its relationship with the infant civil
service of the underground counter-State of the revolutionaries? Finally and
simply, what was it like for the civil service to be embroiled in a revolution, or
even a counter-revolution?
The rhetoric of the Irish revolutionaries of this period was focused on the
‘nation’, an appealing trope that was modern, vague and abstract. The Irish
State, unlike the nation, was a concrete, ancient and visible institution.3 The
Irish State, which had its beginning in the twelfth-century lordship of Ireland,
was centralised in the sixteenth-century Kingdom of Ireland. The 1801 Union
of Great Britain and Ireland incorporated the Irish State into the new United
Kingdom under the sovereignty of Westminster. However, the continuance of
a separate Irish executive and administration quickly emerged as an anomaly.
Despite the legislative Union and the presence of Irish MPs at Westminster, the
administration of Ireland was ‘distinctly colonial in form and function’.4 In fact
the truly anomalous element in the relationship between Ireland and Great
Britain became the presence of Irish MPs at Westminster. Strip away this
redundancy and the unequal and colonial nature of the relationship is clear.
Typical of a colonial administration, control relied more on coercion than on
consent.5
In Ireland, physically and metaphorically, the State was identified with its
location, Dublin Castle. In Ireland the representative of the Crown lived in a
lodge, bishops lived in a palace, and the State resided in a Castle. At the head
of the Irish administration was the Lord Lieutenant, representing the Crown.
2 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
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The Lord Lieutenant had all the trappings of a monarch with a court and
 gentlemen-in-waiting, but he did not preside over a parliament. Unlike the
Crown the Lord Lieutenant was a political appointment, taken up and vacated
with the ruling political party at Westminster. Again, unlike the non-political
Crown, the Lord Lieutenant occupied several politically powerful posts as head
of the government boards, he exercised independent political judgement and
he gave an account of his ministry to parliament. The Chief Secretary Ireland
was also a political office and one whose authority overlapped with that of the
Lord Lieutenant in the government of Ireland. He was, however, secretary to
the Lord Lieutenant and did not function with the authority of the Scottish
Secretary, created in 1885. Usually but not invariably the Chief Secretary
Ireland, and not the Lord Lieutenant, sat at the cabinet. The actual running of
the Irish administration was split between Dublin Castle and the Irish Office
in Whitehall.
Reform of the Irish administration was taken by some to mean the abolition
of the lord lieutenancy, regarded as an obsolete ‘Irish Court’, and its substitu-
tion by promoting the Chief Secretary to the cabinet as a powerful Secretary of
State for Ireland. The abolition of the Irish lord lieutenancy achieved the status
of a hardy perennial regularly proposed in parliament.6 The posts of Under-
Secretary and Assistant Under-Secretary were developed as essentially civil
service posts where the Assistant Under-Secretary in particular was to be thor-
oughly acquainted with the whole of the detailed arrangements of the admin-
istration of Ireland office. The Under-Secretary was considered head of the
Irish civil service.7
‘Castle Government’, the generally used metaphor for British administra-
tion in Ireland since at least the time of Edmund Burke, suggested medieval-
ism, secretiveness, a fortress of tyrannical and unaccountable power exercising
a malevolent influence from within its labyrinthine corridors. Political dis-
course on Castle government was consistently critical. Whitehall was the butt
of good-natured satire, the Castle of bitter invective. For all shades of political
opinion the Castle symbolised everything that was wrong with Irish govern-
ment.
Administrative reforms that imposed examination entry, formal qualifi -
cations, promotion by merit and hierarchies of responsibility had transformed
the British civil service into a discipline of non-political bureaucratic practices
available equally to whatever party happened to be in power. The State became
an organised machinery of policy-making in response to demands in society,
which was the role of elected politicians, and policy-enactment, which was the
role of properly appointed civil servants. By impartially applying policies
determined by their political masters the civil service negotiated the complex
interaction between State and society and legitimised the exercise of power by
elected politicians. The civil service was bound to the State as a discipline of
Introduction 3
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policy advice and policy execution. In return the State granted permanent and
secure status for its civil servants with a pension at retirement. A professional,
non-political civil service drawn from the best in the British education system
and available to the government in power regardless of its political complex-
ion became a British national institution.
In contrast, the space between the civil servant and the politician, and
between the State and society, remained ill-defined in Ireland. Under the
Union Ireland had developed a strong bureaucracy that acted as the conduit
for British influences and ideas. Though increasingly complex, the civil
service in Dublin Castle remained highly politicised by the sectarian divisions
in Irish society and by the political divisions on the Home Rule question. It
was also distant from the source of its authority in London. Though Ireland
had all the apparatus that signalled a powerful State – a militarised police
force, a legal-judicial system and an administrative complex of government
departments run by a civil service housed in Dublin Castle – the State as rep-
resenting the whole of civil society, the community, was weak. The British
State in Ireland received only the tacit consent of most Irish opinion. The
Irish civil service could successfully deliver all that was demanded of it in
applying policies on land transfers, regional development in the impover-
ished west, local government and public health reform, educational develop-
ment and all the other tasks set by an interventionist British State. What it
could not do was make that State accepted as the legitimate government in
Ireland.
This book, therefore, is a history of the relationship that bound the civil
service and the State in Ireland to each other in the period from the beginning
of the third Home Rule crisis in 1912, through the years of revolution and par-
tition and the establishment of the Irish Free State under the 1921 Anglo-Irish
Treaty, to the enactment in 1937 of Bunreacht na hÉireann, the constitution of
the independent State of Ireland and the 1938 Anglo-Irish agreement. The
book examines the relationship between the State in Ireland and the civil
service under, first, British rule, then under the Provisional Government that
took control within the terms of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty and defended its
authority in the Civil War, then under the Cumann na nGaedheal and the
Fianna Fáil governments of an independent State. Each chapter maps out the
organisational response of the civil service to each of these changes in the State
and how the civil servants succeeded or failed in shaping the changes in the
State. The book sets out to explain how the civil service responded to, and was
able to influence, the process by which the British State withdrew from Ireland
and two Irish States came into being.
The State is usually treated as the empty stage on which the struggle for
power is enacted. This leads to the assumption that the civil service was an
automaton, a machine waiting passively while others decided its fate. But the
4 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
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civil service had interests of its own and had developed the organisation and
the ability to control its own destiny at least in some degree. In a revolution
every interest that has a stake in the existing structures and is identified with
the existing State is under threat. But revolution also offers new opportunities
to organised interests that, by acting quickly, can enhance their prospects. The
Irish civil servants, embodying the State, were able to identify, articulate and
defend their own interests. The Irish revolutionaries took control of the civil
service, not on the terms that they had wished, nor on terms dictated by the
British, but rather on terms that the civil service itself had shaped. By recon-
structing the experience of civil servants in the period of State-collapse, revo-
lution and State-building the work seeks to locate them as active agents in those
processes of change.
Much of this book is taken up with details of discussions on pay and condi-
tions for civil servants. This is because these issues were the language in which
deeper issues of good faith and loyalty were negotiated. In order to facilitate
Home Rule the British government proposed to empower the Irish govern-
ment to dismiss the entire civil service in Ireland and appoint a new one. Civil
service traditions gave it as understood that so long as they faithfully served the
State, even if they disagreed with government policy, civil servants would have
secure employment, would receive sufficient salary to maintain a middle-class
standard of living, be offered promotional opportunities and retire with a
decent pension. Thus Home Rule, so far as it provided for the civil service, rep-
resented a profound breach of the good faith that had bound the civil service
to the British State. While negotiating with skill and considerable endurance
the terms on which the civil service would be treated, the objective ultimately
was to establish a contractual relationship to bind the new State more firmly to
its civil service. Although some within the civil service continued to be attached
to the idea of a relationship of trust binding it to the State, especially in the
independent State, for most it was understood that good faith was no longer
good enough.
R.B. McDowell, Ronan Fanning, John McColgan, Eunan O’Halpin and
Lawrence McBride have previously examined the administrative system in
Ireland and its fate in the revolutionary period.8 McDowell’s is a descriptive
history of the array of government departments in Dublin Castle from the
Union to 1914. McColgan analyses the administrative history of partition
between 1920 and 1922, including a chapter on the civil service. However,
McColgan does not fully recognise the extent to which the Irish civil service
was already different to the rest of the UK service. Nor was it as resigned to
accepting whatever decision the British government made as he suggests.
O’Halpin details the actual working of the Castle system, noting the links
between failed administrative reform and failed political reform. His work is at
the level of high administrative politics, dealing with the senior officials and
Introduction 5
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not the lower ranks. McBride looks at the changing policy of recruitment to the
Irish bureaucracy, from one dominated by Protestant unionists to one domi-
nated by Catholic nationalists. He suggests that this change gave the stability
necessary to found the new State out of civil war. Only Fanning deals with the
civil service of the independent State. However, Fanning accepts the view that
for the civil service it was business as usual. This is a view that this book chal-
lenges. Arthur Mitchell has written on the revolutionary government of Dáil
Éireann with great detail and insight.9 But he concentrated on the elite of that
administration. This book seeks to add to his work by reconstructing the expe-
rience of the ordinary men and women who found themselves acting as the
civil service of the revolutionary government.
This book seeks to build on what has been done already, by utilising new
sources and advancing new interpretations. Firstly, most of these histories have
stopped at the moment of the creation of the two new States in Ireland. This
book takes the history forward to the de Valera government and the 1937 con-
stitution. Secondly, these histories have generally viewed the Irish administra-
tion from a ‘top-down’ perspective. By looking at the experience of the civil
servants themselves this analysis offers a ‘bottom-up’ perspective. The empha-
sis will therefore be on the previously under-used records generated by the civil
servants themselves. It also uses the records of the Irish government made
available by the opening in 1986 of the National Archives Ireland, which were
unavailable to the previous historians of the subject. The records of the British
State in Ireland held in London and those of the Northern Ireland government
held in Belfast are used. The civil service sources that are utilised are the records
of early Irish organisations still retained by their later descendants, the civil
service trade unions. Also used are the records of the Irish branches of the
British civil service associations held at the Modern Records Centre at Warwick
University. A new source is an uncatalogued collection of early establishment
material of the Irish Free State amounting to some thirty boxes and covering
the period 1922–25. This includes the records of the Wylie committee on the
discharged and retiring civil servants of the former British regime. Personal
records include not only the papers of government ministers and civil servants,
but also the recently released witness statements of the Bureau of Military
History, which offer many insights into the everyday working of the revolu-
tionary Dáil administration. The unpublished and witty memoir of Michael J.
Gallagher provides an invaluable insight into the response of a key civil service
trade unionist to a period of revolutionary State transformation. By investi-
gating in detail the experience of revolution from the perspectives of both the
State and the civil service and by treating the revolution as a ‘State’ rather than
‘nation’ event, this book offers a fresh perspective on the civil service, the State
and the Irish revolution.
6 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
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1The civil service and the State in Ireland,
1912–18
Introduction
F    servants Dublin Castle represented dead-end depart-mentalism. Political influence and personal connections were the avenues
to advancement in an administration that was a byword for nepotism. The
failure of examination entry to open up the Irish higher posts to genuine com-
petition and the continuance of patronage, whether ‘Green’ or ‘Orange’, in
the elite division of the Castle became amajor source of dissatisfaction. Even
nationalist and Catholic civil servants preferred a meritocratic system to the
corruption of preferential patronage.1 Frustrated by the narrow field of
 opportunity offered in the Castle, the Irish civil service sense of corporate iden-
tity was based on a general and widespread feeling of shared grievance and
 disappointment.
Although presented primarily as political reforms, the Irish Home Rule
bills introduced by Gladstone in 1886 and 1893 were also shaped to deliver
administrative reform. The separate Irish executive in Dublin Castle was, in
Gladstone’s view, operating without the restraint of a popularly elected assem-
bly. The result was an inexorable growth in the size and cost of the Irish admin-
istration, a cost that was borne by the British Treasury. Home Rule proposed
to address this by cutting the bonds that attached the civil service to the British
State and by transferring it to the authority of an Irish assembly which, it was
implied, would have to make drastic cuts. The Irish civil service was unpre-
pared for the 1886 bill and failed to act. But it responded to the introduction
of the 1893 bill by organising under a single all-service committee to agitate
and lobby for the security of their positions, salaries and pensions under a
future Home Rule assembly. This committee, led by the senior members of the
Irish civil service, represents the most significant mobilisation of the entire
Irish civil service. The committee adopted public and political tactics that ordi-
narily would have been treated as rank insubordination or even subversion of
the established relationship between parliament and the civil service. Both bills
failed but the question of Irish Home Rule was now embedded in both Irish
and British party politics and in the consciousness of the Irish civil service.
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The Home Rule Bill, 1912
Though Ulster Unionist resistance eventually overwhelmed the third Home
Rule Bill, it was the financial question that initially dominated the debate. In
1912 government spending in Ireland, boosted by enormously expensive
developments in national insurance, land transfers, congested districts relief,
regional development and an old-age pension, had exceeded Irish revenues by
£2 million and was continuing to grow. The immediate and, it seemed, insur-
mountable problem was how to grant executive and financial autonomy to an
Ireland that was technically bankrupt.2 Herbert Samuel, the Postmaster-
General, was given the task of drawing up the financial aspects of the Home
Rule Bill, thus separating the financial from the constitutional aspects of Irish
self-government. His financial proposals were so complex that it was said that
only he himself could understand them fully. What he proposed was that
Ireland should be given a grant of £6 million to meet national expenditure,
including administrative costs, and would be then expected to live within that
budget. The Liberal government thus hoped to use the financial provisions of
the bill to encourage the Irish to stop looking to London for money and learn
to govern themselves cheaply.3 It was therefore generally accepted that a Home
Rule government would be compelled to reduce its administrative costs by
reducing its civil service. The Castle civil servants had no involvement in
drawing up the 1912 bill nor did Francis Greer, the parliamentary draftsman
for Ireland, prepare it.4 Home Rule as shaped by the 1912 bill was a system of
indirect rule with local administrative responsibility. Initial Ulster Unionist
opposition to what constitutionally speaking was a very modest proposal con-
centrated on objecting to the control of the Irish civil service being handed
over to the Irish government. Fears were expressed about the future of
Protestant civil servants and the potential for administrative rather than leg-
islative  discrimination.5
However, as Ulster exclusion came to dominate the proceedings the clauses
relating to the civil service in the 1912 bill generated little debate in a ‘sparsely
filled and languid house’.6 The assumptions that underlay the contributions
to the debate by Augustine Birrell, the Chief Secretary Ireland, and John
Redmond, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party and probable prime min-
ister of an Irish Home Rule assembly, were of broad continuity in the civil
service allied with necessary reductions in its size and cost. The reason that the
civil service clauses generated so little debate was the Irish civil service had not
waited for the Home Rule proposals but had itself seized the initiative at the
earliest opportunity. In May 1911, when it was clear that the Liberal govern-
ment was committed to bringing in a Home Rule Bill, three senior civil servants
– A.R. Barlas, secretary to the Local Government Board (LGB), P.E. Lemass,
secretary to the National Education Board (NEB) and Alfred Beckett, chief
The civil service and the State, 1912–18 9
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clerk to the General Valuation Office (GVO) – circularised the staff of the gov-
ernment departments with a proposal that the Irish civil service should imme-
diately organise in readiness for the Home Rule Bill. In the circular these civil
servants explained how they had attempted to meet with Birrell to discuss the
implications of any Home Rule legislation for existing officers, but that he had
refused on the grounds that a meeting would be premature in advance of a
definite bill. Nonetheless, rather than wait for the Home Rule Bill to emerge
they had decided to press ahead with the formation of a general committee
 representative of the government departments. This general committee would
draw up an authoritative statement of the views of the officers as to the safe-
guards they considered necessary in the event of a Home Rule Bill being
 submitted to parliament.7
This was a revival of the strategy adopted by the civil service during the
debate on the 1893 Home Rule proposal. The civil service had formulated a
united response and used vigorous political and public agitation to win guar-
antees for their security under a Home Rule executive. Both Barlas and Beckett
had been active on the 1893 committee so it might be supposed that the 1911
initiative represented simply the reactivation of that committee. However, the
new committee was in several respects different to that of 1893 and represented
an innovation in strategy in three areas: its representative nature, its eschewal
of political lobbying at parliament in favour of influencing the key adminis-
trative and political figures, and in setting the terms of the civil service clauses
of the 1912 bill at the drafting stage.
The initial circular emphasised that any committee must have the authority
to represent the views of the entire service. It therefore suggested, as a prelim-
inary, the formation of a ‘provisional committee consisting of one delegate
from each department to determine the proportion in which the several classes
of civil servant in each office should be represented’. The provisional commit-
tee, made up of a representative delegate from each department, then decided
the number of delegates that each department and class should return to the
general committee. Although the Irish administration defied any attempt at
precise analysis, the 1911 committee had close to full saturation with repre-
sentatives from all departments.8 The only substantial section of the civil
service not represented on the committee were the postal workers; however, as
they had their own organisation, and previous Home Rule bills excluded the
postal service as an imperial service from the authority of the Irish executive,
their absence was not significant. The committee did have representatives from
the GPO, the administrative core of the postal system in Ireland.
The general committee was also carefully constructed so as to represent not
only each government department but also all grades within each department.
The intent was not that it should be strictly proportionate to the relative size of
each department, but that it should be fully representative of each grade within
10 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
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each department. The number of representatives for each department reflected
the complexity of the grades within the department rather than simply its size.
This was innovative inasmuch as civil service organisations usually confined
membership to particular grades. The 1911 committee was simultaneously a
vertical and a horizontal organisation. The land commission was represented
by its professional, higher grade, second division and clerical officers, all sitting
around the same table. At the same time the professional officers of the land
commission were working with the professional officers of the other govern-
ment departments. For many civil servants the 1911 committee was an intro-
duction to later civil service trade union organisation. The committee was
financed by a levy of 6d (2.5p) for every £50 of annual income of each civil
servant member to create a fighting fund. An executive committee of the
GCICS was then formed from the general committee. The executive commit-
tee drew from all the civil service grades, preserving the cross-class nature of
the general committee. The single representative of the lady clerks marks the
hesitant emergence of women civil servants’ organisation.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the 1911 GCICS committee was that
across a wide spectrum of grades and departments it succeeded in securing
agreement on a response to the implications of Home Rule for the civil service.
The explanation for this emphasis on cross-service, representative mobilisa-
tion lies not only in the previous mobilisation of 1893, but also in the growth
of trade union or quasi-trade union organisation and consciousness within the
civil service. That the committee could demonstrate its representative base
proved vital in the committee stage of the debate on the civil service clauses.
Just a week before the debate a section of Belfast-based civil servants denied
that the Dublin committee was in any sense representative of Irish civil ser-
vants. Barlas, who suspected that this was a ‘mud-slinging operation’ inspired
by elements in the Orange Order, was able to detail to Francis Greer the fully
representative membership of the committee and to underline the consider-
able financial outlay made by each civil servant’s donation as illustrative of the
commitment of the vast majority to its success.9
In assessing the innovatory aspects of the 1911 GCICS, we may turn next to
the method of agitation. In contrast to the public agitation adopted in 1893,
the 1911 committee preferred to exercise influence within the administrative
system to make their views known and win concessions. Birrell placed a lot of
emphasis on the many meetings he had held with the Irish civil service com-
mittee and the extent to which he had endeavoured to meet their fears.10 The
‘Preliminary Statement’ of the civil servants, initially sent to Birrell, found its
way to Greer and the legislation was generally shaped to meet their points.
Barlas kept Greer informed of civil service sentiment at each key stage. His
letters suggest a frank relationship in which Barlas felt that Greer could be
trusted with confidential disclosures. In December 1912, when the key civil
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service clauses were coming up for debate in the committee stage at the House
of Commons, Barlas wrote to Greer to assure him (and Birrell) that though ‘a
lot of stupid amendments have been put on the order paper . . . they merely
expressed the views of individual civil servants in very small sections’.11 During
the debate the committee of the Irish civil service met to pass a motion express-
ing support for the government on the clauses in the Home Rule Bill touching
on the civil service, support which Birrell used to good effect.12
The civil service clauses of the Home Rule Bill
The final innovatory aspect to the 1911 committee was its decision not to wait
for the legislation and then react to it, but instead to shape it before it emerged
into the political arena. In November 1911 the committee was ready to issue a
preliminary statement of their position and demands. This statement began by
setting down a clear and unambiguous commitment; the Irish civil servants
wanted it to be clearly understood that as a body they ‘were anxious to con-
tinue to work under the new Government of Ireland to be established under
the Bill, provided that their interests are safeguarded as regards tenure of office,
remuneration, prospects of promotion, and pension rights’. What the civil ser-
vants wanted was assurance that the status quo would be preserved and that
civil servants would be ‘liable to perform the same duties as heretofore or duties
analogous thereto, and should continue to receive the same salaries, gratuities
and pensions, paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom’. Having
established that the civil service would wish to continue to serve so long as it
was bound to the Irish State under the same terms as before, the committee
statement then concentrated on securing the best terms for those civil servants
either compelled to retire by the new Irish government, or who choose to retire
voluntarily. The usual protest that what induced civil servants to enter State
service was security and the promise of a pension, was made more firmly con-
tractual rather than moral by extensive quotations from the official Civil
Service Commissioners’ circulars. These circulars promised to successful can-
didates for civil service posts secure salaries starting at specific amounts, rising
to certain maxima by definite yearly amounts and with rights to standard pen-
sions on retirement. Many of the Irish civil servants would regard these as
definite promises contingent only on good behaviour. The breach of such
promises deserved better than usual compensation.
The position of professional civil servants also demanded better compensa-
tion than the usual abolition of office terms. These were men that had entered
the service of the Crown late in life and, in some cases, after abandoning private
practice in favour of what they had been assured was a secure civil service
 position. Other professional and permanent officers serving in Dublin were
there simply because it happened that they had been assigned to Ireland
12 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:09  Page 12
though recruited to the United Kingdom civil service. These officers (mostly
Englishmen), the statement argued, should in fairness be offered the opportu-
nity to transfer to Great Britain and be compensated for the expenses con-
nected with removal. The claims of the temporary civil servants were pressed
with high moral outrage. Many of them too old to secure other employment,
they had served the State well and faithfully in poorly paid posts in the belief
that so long as there was government work to be done, and they did it well, they
would continue to be employed despite their temporary status. It should be
borne in mind that the key practical difference between temporary and estab-
lished civil servants was that the latter were entitled to a pension and the former
were not. The case that the committee was making was that temporary civil
 servants not retained by the Irish government ought in fairness to be offered
a pension, even though in strict regulation they were not entitled to one.
Compulsory retirement would also mean that civil servants who, by implica-
tion, had been promised annual increments would suffer the loss of those
increases and also the increases that would have followed any promotion. The
committee wanted compensation not only for loss of salary but also for loss of
prospective increases and promotions.
Just as it is an article of faith in common law jurisprudence, precedence is a
fetish in the civil service. Conflating these, and no doubt drawing from its own
reserves of legal expertise, the committee statement detailed the many prece-
dents where far higher than statutory compensation had been conceded on
abolition of offices. These ranged from the obscure to the obvious but the most
telling precedent cited was the Act of Union itself. Under the Act of Union all
displaced officers were pensioned on full pay. These precedents supported the
civil service case that those compelled to retire should not suffer ‘undue loss’.
It then remained to set out what the civil service committee regarded as undue
loss. Having set out their case that the Irish civil servants had an implied con-
tract with the ‘imperial’ government and that in order to facilitate a constitu-
tional change those contracts were to broken, the committee then devoted the
remainder of the statement to suggestions for better than usual compensation
for those civil servants either compelled to retire, or who volunteered to retire,
in order to facilitate the constitutional change. The structure of the suggestions
in the 1911 statement supposed that the 1893 bill would provide the model for
the anticipated legislation. The statement listed what were in effect fourteen
suggested changes to the scheme of the 1893 bill with alterations made neces-
sary by the intervening 1909 Superannuation Act. The 1909 Act offered civil
servants the option of accepting a reduced final rate of pension in exchange for
a payment of one year’s salary to his representatives if he died in service, or a
lump sum payment on ordinary retirement. The rate of pension under the
1859 Act was one-sixtieth, under the 1909 Act one-eightieth, of final salary,
multiplied by the number of years of service. Most of the Irish civil servants
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had opted to change over to the 1909 Act in the belief that they would be
working to the normal retirement age and that the new scheme offered
some security to their families. However, if the civil servants were to be com-
pelled to retire at an earlier age they would suffer a loss by being on the lower
rate of pension. The civil service committee wanted any officer compelled to
retire to have the option of reverting to the terms of the 1859 Act. Other sug-
gested changes were added years for professional officers in recognition of
qualifications; facilities for exchange between Great Britain and Ireland; that
the vague term ‘officers in the service of the Crown’ should be clarified so as to
offer temporary officers the same pensions as ‘officers in the permanent civil
service of the Crown’; that commutation terms based on the Irish Church
Disestablishment Act, which were more generous than the usual Treasury com-
mutation terms, be allowed; and that a committee should be established to
settle the retiring allowance rather than leave it to the tender mercies of the
Treasury. 13
In summary, the ‘Preliminary Statement’ of the Irish civil service staff rep-
resentatives offered to transfer allegiance to the new State provided that those
civil servants continuing service with the new Irish government ‘should be in
no worse position as respects tenure of office, terms of service, salary, or
pension’. As some civil servants may be dismissed to facilitate constitutional
changes, and not because of any failure or incompetence on their own part, the
statement argued that they were entitled to expect more generous compensa-
tion than the usual abolition of office terms. Based on a presumption that the
1912 bill would follow the terms of the 1893 bill, the statement suggested what
those more generous terms ought to be.
The Irish civil servants could not have been unaware of the example and
precedent of the treatment of the civil servants in the Transvaal in the after-
math of the Boer War. The Liberal government elected in 1906 inherited a
defeated and abysmally administered Transvaal and Orange River Colony, the
former Boer republics.14 The Liberal government’s Transvaal Bill established a
self-governing Transvaal with a government responsible to a parliament and
assisted by a permanent civil service. So successful were the Liberals in recon-
ciling the former Boer republicans that in 1910 all four South African provinces
were able to come together in the Union of South Africa, apparently uniting
English and Boer while securing British imperial interests. For the Milnerite
imperialists this was a brilliant achievement, which no doubt also provided a
practical example of the reconciliation of imperial and local interests that
could be applied to Ireland.15 However, for the Irish civil service the Transvaal
example, far from being exciting, was deeply depressing. Within a year of the
granting of self-government the defeated Afrikaners dominated the Transvaal
parliament. Legislation was passed making Dutch of equal status to the English
language and, most significantly to the Irish civil service, securing control of
14 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
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the Transvaal civil servants. Under the guise of retrenchment there followed a
purge of English civil servants and their replacement by Boers.16 Most alarm-
ing to the Irish civil servants was that the British government accepted without
question the Transvaal government’s bland assurance that the retrenchment
was necessary and that there was no victimisation of British civil servants. A
few of the retrenched officers, ‘Milner’s Kindergarten’, managed to secure
employment in the other colonies. Lionel Curtis found himself within a few
years at the centre of what must have seemed oddly familiar negotiations
on Ireland. For the remainder there was an inadequate gratuity and some
 sympathetic noises from London but little else.17
In gauging the success of the Irish civil servants’ committee in shaping the
relevant clauses of the 1912 bill, it must therefore be borne in mind that no civil
servant held office by any sort of secure tenure; all were ‘during pleasure’ and
civil servants had no legal rights arguable in courts of law. The demand that the
status quo be preserved was a demand, in reality, for very little. As Greer
reminded the Chief Secretary, the security of the civil service ‘merely rests on
the good faith and practice of the Government of the United Kingdom’.18
Nevertheless when the bill was published it was clear that the civil servants had
been able to exercise considerable influence on the shape of clauses 33 to 36 on
the civil service and the attached schedules. The previous Home Rule bills of
1886 and 1893 had assumed that within a five-year transition period there
would be a clean sweep of the entire existing service, with officers either resign-
ing, being compelled to resign, or managing to make a completely new agree-
ment with the Irish government. The civil service in 1886 and in 1893 faced the
certainty of dismissal with only a possibility of re-employment. The 1912 bill
instead offered the certainty of continued employment with only a possibil-
ity of dismissal. The bill, in terms taken from the Irish civil servants’ state-
ment, proposed to transfer the existing Irish officers of the civil service to the
Irish government with the ‘same tenure and upon the same terms and  con -
ditions (including conditions as to remuneration and superannuation) as
heretofore’.19 The 1912 bill guaranteed continuity of tenure as to salary, condi-
tions of employment, and pension on like terms as those in existence on the
day appointed for the transfer of authority. The third schedule offered com-
pensation for removal from office, or for retirement due to material alteration
in the nature of the duties to be discharged. An officer in the Irish civil service
retained the right to retire within a five-year period, but only if he could con-
vince a Civil Service Committee that he was retiring because the duties were
neither the same as nor analogous to the duties under the old regime, or
his conditions had materially altered to his detriment.20 This Civil Service
Committee, consisting of one Treasury representative, one representative of
the Irish executive and a chairman appointed by the Lord Chief Justice of
England, represented a dilution of Treasury authority, though not necessarily
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to the advantage of the civil servants. An officer opting for retirement, as
opposed to being required to retire, could only expect a pension such as he
would get if retiring on medical grounds rather than on the more generous
abolition of office terms. These terms could be, and were, interpreted as being
formulated to allow the Irish government to economise by driving out expen-
sive senior officials on cheap pensions and filling the vacancies with lower-paid
officials, though Redmond denied this. However, the insistence within the bill
that the cost of any pension would be deducted from the Irish budget does
underline the assumption of continuity in the civil service.
Allied with the assumption of continuity remained an insistence on the need
to cut the numbers of civil servants. To take an extreme example, if the Irish
government dismissed the entire existing civil service and recruited a new staff
on starting salaries, it would immediately reduce its expenditure on adminis-
tration by about one-third – the difference between the salaries of new officers
and the pensions of dismissed officers. The implication persisted that the Irish
administration was overstaffed and wasteful and that Home Rule would lead to
considerable savings. This was particularly so, according to Birrell, in the case
of ‘the large number of non-established officers, quite out of proportion to the
rest of the United Kingdom’ recruited to the new departments ‘which had been
somewhat hastily created by the House of Commons’.21. A great many of these
were professional civil servants whose status was sometimes doubtful. To meet
their case Birrell proposed an innovation in empowering the three-man Civil
Service Committee to define whether any particular officer was or was not a civil
servant (a power normally reserved to the Civil Service Commission), what was
an ‘Irish’ as opposed to an ‘imperial’ officer, and to determine the claims or
pension to which such an officer was entitled. The opposition contribution to
the debate in the Commons on these clauses lacked focus and was easily dealt
with. Clearly the Conservatives were concentrating on Ulster opposition to
destroy the bill and had lost interest in the administrative details of Home Rule.
When the Home Rule Bill was published the GCICS committee welcomed
it, but suggested a series of amendments that would ‘render the terms of com-
pensation satisfactory to the service generally as well as to safeguard interests
not covered by the Clauses as they stand’.22 The most important change the
civil servants asked was that the normal age of retirement mentioned in the bill
should be sixty-five (as was customary in Ireland) and not sixty as regulated by
the Treasury. The reason was to prolong the period of employment of the
retained civil servants and therefore increase their final retiring salary.23 In the
case of premature dismissal, which it was anticipated would be the case for a
great many officers, the compensation for anticipated loss provided for in the
bill would also be greater by the increments of an additional five years of
notional service – the so-called ‘abolition years’. The Statement also asked that
the scale of abolition years should be altered so as to benefit second division
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officers recruited at age eighteen. This would involve simply tinkering with the
age at which abolition years could be added. The bill provided that an officer
under thirty-six years of age should get additional seven years and for an officer
under thirty the additional years should be five. The civil servants’ statement
asked that the ages should be reduced slightly to thirty-three and twenty-eight
years. This would in effect automatically grant all younger officers recruited at
age eighteen ten additional years’ compensation on abolition. Greer wrote to
Birrell that these changes were reasonable and, if conceded, would give general
satisfaction. Greer was content to urge concessions to the persistent though
discreet pressure from the Irish officers, so long as the concessions did not offer
markedly better conditions to the Irish officers than to British officers. For
Greer this was a fundamental principle and one that made sense when it is
borne in mind that there would still be in Ireland some sections of an ‘Imperial’
civil service.24 A cynic might note in passing that Greer had no difficulty in
imposing on the Irish government charges that would never be imposed on a
British government.
The implications of Ulster exclusion
In early 1914, as Home Rule was being put through its final passage in the
houses of parliament, it became clear that an amendment to deal with Ulster
exclusion would be necessary, further confusing an already complicated
measure.25 The GCICS immediately pushed for further concessions. Arguing
that the division of the Irish departments, which must follow the amendment,
represented a serious and detrimental alteration to their conditions of work,
the committee requested that the terms for voluntary as opposed to compul-
sory retirement should be liberalised and improved. Instead of five years of a
transitional period they asked for seven years, along with additional added
years in the case of those with long service, which would bring them within the
compensation terms attendant on abolition of office. In addition, to compen-
sate for the lack of promotional opportunities in a diminished Irish civil
service, they asked for special facilities for exchanges between the imperial and
Irish service.26
These negotiations and discussions were conducted against a background of
political crisis as the Tories and the Ulster Unionists combined to destroy the
Home Rule Bill and the Asquith government. With the bitterness of the debate
sharply dividing British and Irish society it would have been impossible for the
civil service to escape its influence. The British civil service tradition had no
difficulty in giving unswerving loyalty to the government in power. In Ireland
the third Home Rule debate plumbed deeper loyalties of religion and national-
ity and the civil service could not but be influenced by the opinions of their own
families, relatives and upbringing.27 The inevitability of Home Rule and the
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growing threat of civil war over Ulster overcame professional impartiality and,
in the general anticipation of the transfer of power, self-interest demanded hard
thinking about where personal security lay. George Chester Duggan, a first divi-
sion clerk in the Chief Secretary’s Office (CSO) concluded that he would have
to resign if the Ulster crisis ‘reached a climax of force’.28 Maurice Headlam, the
Treasury Remembrancer in Dublin Castle, thought the crisis was so grave that
he was justified in leaking government memoranda to the opposition.29 The
inability of the government to offer clear direction to the civil service also added
to the sense of disarray. The pusillanimous response of the Asquith government
to the arming of the loyalist paramilitary force the Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF), which was committed to resisting a Home Rule government by force,
followed by the humiliating dismissal of the assistant commissioner of the
Dublin Military Police (DMP), W.V. Harrel, after his heavy-handed response
to the landing of arms by the nationalist Irish Volunteers was clear enough
warning of the danger of showing initiative.30
The MacDonnell Commission on the civil service
The 1912–14 royal commission on the civil service chaired by the former Irish
Under-Secretary Sir Antony Patrick MacDonnell provides a last insight into
the culture of the Irish civil service before war and rebellion swept over it.31
MacDonnell had already experience of the Irish civil service and had very
strong opinions on the need for reform. When he arrived in Dublin Castle as
Under-Secretary in 1902 he arrived with a clear objective to reform the Irish
administration.32 MacDonnell was of the view that Ireland required the disci-
pline of self-management more than it required self-government. The keystone
of his policy was not to abolish but rather to strengthen the position of Dublin
Castle by giving it real control over the many independent boards and depart-
ments. This model of administrative reform had been first circulated by David
Harrel, Under-Secretary in 1898.33 MacDonnell’s pursuit of administrative
reform was embodied in the 1904 devolution proposal and the even more
ambitious Irish Council Bill of 1907. In both cases his model was India, where
he had blazed a dazzling trail with the autonomous provincial councils that he
had set up there.34 His ambitious plans for reform of the Irish administration,
with a greatly strengthened CSO with financial autonomy, working in co-
 ordination with locally elected representatives, brought down the two Chief
Secretaries Wyndham and Bryce and ended the policy of constructive union-
ism. Because he thought administrative reform was a non-political question he
assumed that everybody else would think the same. In his view the Irish admin-
istration system was unco-ordinated, irrational, profligate and inefficient.35
The Irish Council Bill failed and MacDonnell retired but he never lost faith in
his own wisdom and, in his contribution to a series of essays on the 1912 Home
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Rule Bill, returned once again to his argument that the problem with the Irish
government was the lack of centralised control over the many State agencies
working in the country.36
MacDonnell’s method on the royal commission was to examine the heads
of departments first and then to listen to representations from that head’s
departmental staff. His first witness was his successor as Under-Secretary Sir
James Brown Dougherty. The confusion as to the authority exercised by the
Lord Lieutenant over the Castle apparatus is evident in the presentation of
Dougherty. Their inability to agree on which departments were inside and
which outside the control of the Lord Lieutenant underlines the fact that
despite the decades of debate the Castle was still a labyrinth of dispersed
authority.37 MacDonnell quickly took up where he had left off on his departure
from the Castle and he and Dougherty debated at some length the pros and
cons of the diffusion of authority within the Irish government. Dougherty was
willing to concede that though the Chief Secretary answered to parliament for
most of the Irish departments the Castle actually exercised very little control
over the departments; he had responsibility but no authority. The Department
of Agriculture and Technical Instruction (DATI) was independent of the
Chief Secretary and the Congested Districts Board (CDB), the autonomous
western development board, acted as if it was independent of everybody. The
LGB answered to the Treasury and was outside the jurisdiction of the Lord
Lieutenant, as were the various educational boards, the Commissioners of
Public Works, the clerical establishment of the Four Courts and of course all
the Whitehall departments which operated in Ireland. These were all govern-
ment organisations that operated in Ireland but were free of Castle control.
However, Dougherty was not prepared to concede to MacDonnell on the
implied irrelevance of the Castle. Noting that the ‘young gentlemen’ of the
Treasury (and perhaps by implication MacDonnell) could never grasp that
the Irish executive was in fact a ‘quasi-separate government’ and that ‘the
people of Ireland look to what they call “The Castle” despised as it is by many,
for advice and guidance, and above all, they make it the repository of their
complaints’, Dougherty emphasised the symbolic importance of the Castle in
Irish government.38 For all its faults it alone embodied the State in Ireland,
apart from the army and the paramilitary Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC).
For Dougherty the main problem in the Irish government was not the dis-
persal of authority but rather the power of a tight-fisted Treasury. He had only
five first class clerks to handle the entire judicial, financial and administrative
work of the office and two of these were in London during the parliamentary
session. Despite repeated appeals to the Treasury for more first class officers
it had actually attempted to cut Dublin’s higher establishment. The paucity
of first class posts meant that ambition was stifled. Dougherty was utterly
opposed to the Treasury’s preferred option of appointing temporary clerks to
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deal with extra work but he did agree with MacDonnell that there was no
marked line of division between the work of the first and the second division
men in his office.
Sir Henry Robinson, head of the LGB, was one of the Castle unionists who
ran a frankly sectarian department disguised as a mix of ‘sensible’ English,
‘accurate and cautious’ Scottish and ‘brilliant and resourceful’ Irish. Robinson
ignored the Treasury gradations of first and second division clerks, retaining
his own upper and lower division and abstractor class. He made no bones
about preferring English and Scottish in his upper division, men who ‘looked
upon our political dissensions with a certain amount of indifference’. 39 His
main complaint was against the Treasury attitude that maintained pay scales in
the Irish LGB substantially below those in the English LGB, frustrating his
desire to see his department as a first division office. Lemass confined himself
to answering MacDonnell’s queries with points of information on the staff
of his office, though he did offer an opinion that the clerks of his department
were doing well. On this he was in agreement with Sir John Barton of the
Commissioners of Valuation. T.P. Gill represented the DATI, the most modern
of the Irish departments. Gill had a strong dislike of the first division civil ser-
vants who ‘come in with a notion from the manner in which they have been
brought in and the privileged position in which they are placed in the service
from the first, that they are, so to speak, of superior clay to the men of the other
divisions they find in the office’. He preferred a single entry grade with pro-
motion to the top of the service through ability and time.40 In this he was close
to the opinion of the civil service representatives. Gill probably saw himself as
embodying the virtues of the self-made man. Energetic, multi-lingual, cosmo-
politan, a journalist who had served as a nationalist MP for Louth South until
the Parnellite split, Gill had made his mark as assistant to Horace Plunkett in
the co-operative movement, on the Recess committee and as secretary to the
DATI.41
It has been said that it takes three things to fit out a civil servant; a bowler
hat, an umbrella and a grievance.42 The Dublin Castle civil servants who gave
evidence to MacDonnell were exceptionally well fitted-out with grievances.
These were the lack of promotional opportunities and the related problem of
patronage appointments in a Castle rife with sectarianism, lower grades doing
work indistinguishable from the higher grades’, and the chronic insecurity of
the temporary clerks. The memorial from the staff of the Register General’s
Office complained that the work they were doing was not routine but required
highly technical and specialised knowledge that would be more properly
described as the work of first division officers. They were also unhappy that
posts that formerly were promotional posts open to the second division had
been professionalised and turned into patronage appointments in the gift of
the departmental head. T.W. Smith, representing the second division officers
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of the GVO, echoed the complaint of promotional posts being closed off by re-
grading them as professional grades. Smith was an Englishman who had been
transferred to Dublin and found himself in a promotional dead end. The lack
of promotional opportunities was also the complaint of the second division
officers of the education boards, the land commission and the DATI. These
officers all placed the blame for this at the door of departmental heads exercis-
ing patronage by professionalising former promotional posts. The outdoor
posts of the LGB were a notorious case of patronage as all were in the gift of
Robinson. MacDonnell got quite annoyed at the repeated reference to profes-
sional posts as patronage posts and the implication that corruption was at
work. In his view the increasing professionalisation of higher posts was exactly
the sort of direction he favoured the Castle administration taking. The alter-
native was an amateur service in which, by merely waiting long enough, the
passage of time would deliver the higher posts. The assistant clerks of the LGB
also complained that there was no distinction between the work they did and
the work of the second division men, that they were all examination entry and
therefore there ought not to be any distinction of pay or rank. Another block
on promotion alluded to, and one that in some sense contradicted the picture
painted by the civil service witnesses, was the popularity of the Castle among
the Irish civil servants working in England who all competed for any Dublin
posts that came available.43
Most of the Irish civil service witnesses represented departments and grades
within departments and none claimed to speak on behalf of a permanent
organisation. The grades that did make such a claim were the most marginal
within the service – the temporary clerks and the women clerks of the Post
Office. The temporary clerks occupied a difficult position, and perhaps because
of this were the best organised. The Irish Temporary Clerks’ Association
claimed to represent 250 of the 400–500 temporary clerks in Dublin Castle.
Their demand was for permanent status, a demand that was bound to be resis-
ted by both the permanent staff and the Treasury. As temporary clerks they had
entered the civil service without any examination. The permanent officers
assumed that they had all got their posts either by political influence or through
the patronage of the departmental heads and saw them as a further block to
promotion. The Treasury reluctantly allowed temporary appointments as a
compromise with the demands of the Irish government for increased staff.44
Not only was the Association of Post Office Women Clerks the only women’s
association to represent Irish opinion to the MacDonnell commission, it
was also the only British-based one to do so. Women were employed in large
numbers by the Post Office. In 1903 the women clerks had responded to a cut
in pay by organising the association. The association later amalgamated with
the Federation of Women Clerks to form the first women civil servants’ trade
union, the Federation of Women Civil Servants.
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MacDonnell recommended that all of the administrative, formerly first divi-
sion, class of civil servants should be recruited on common scales of salary with
a strict adherence to the principle of open competition and that the Irish
administration should have more administrative officers. He also recom-
mended an inquiry into the question of trade union organisation within the
civil service with formal machinery for assessing staff grievances on pay and
conditions. These recommendations were suppressed with the outbreak of
war in August 1914 but they established a benchmark for the civil service
organisations.
By a happy coincidence four of the more prominent civil servants in the
Castle wrote memoirs of this period.45 The memoirs of Robinson betray his
condescension toward the Irish peasantry whose dependency on his largesse
affirmed his own bloated sense of self-importance. His memoirs are a striking
contrast to those of W.L. Micks of the CDB, which reveal a passionate advocate
of local autonomy who valued local initiative, though he was unpopular with
both his staff and the Treasury. Andrew Magill’s memoir is relentlessly anec-
dotal and largely unaware of the larger forces at work within the State admin-
istration, a characteristic that he shares with Maurice Headlam. Headlam’s
reminiscences reveal a functionary for whom the business of administration
was an unwelcome interruption to his fishing expeditions. The impression
conveyed by these several memoirs is of an administration crumbling under
the pressure of sectarian suspicions and the corrosive effect on the State of
politicised civil servants. With officials like these Dublin Castle could no longer
facilitate political or administrative development, in fact it acted to obstruct it.
The First World War and the civil service
The First World War intensified the presence of the State in British society as it
took on the task of mobilising the entire resources of the nation to win the war.
This new role dwarfed the previous expansion of the State under the Liberal
government of 1906 and the British civil service was tested to near-destruction
by the demands of ‘total war’. New tasks could not be accomplished by old
methods and the Treasury lost control of staffing in the new departments
created to fight the war, especially the vast Ministry of Munitions which grew
from nothing to a staff of 25,000 by 1918, controlling 250 factories and employ-
ing two million workers. Administrative revolution also occurred at the other
end of the scale with the creation of the inner cabinet office.
A new British army was quickly recruited, as hundreds of thousands volun-
teered. By war’s end five million men had enlisted. The uncontrolled volun-
teering of 1914–16 rapidly distorted the labour force and necessitated the
industrial employment of young boys, women and temporary and part-time
workers. These were rapidly ‘skilled-up’ as trade unions were forced to relax
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demarcation boundaries, though these new workers continued to be paid
unskilled labourer rates. The long war caused inflation in food prices and rents.
Inflation in turn led to wage militancy with waves of strikes in 1917 and 1918.
It was apparent to workers that the war was profiting the owners of the war
industries with guaranteed prices and markets and a skilled workforce on
unskilled wages. The government was forced to intervene by introducing food
rationing, price controls, and centralised wage bargaining. These controls
led in turn to a further expansion in the size of the civil service. One of the
most striking changes in the culture of the civil service due to the war was the
growing employment of women in every department as they were substituted
for enlisted men. Segregation between men and women broke down and most
departments had some women working alongside men by war’s end. The rapid
and uncontrolled expansion of the service also led to a big influx of temporary
civil servants who were far less deferential and respectful of the civil service tra-
ditions than those they replaced.46 For all grades of workers, not least the civil
service, the pervasiveness of State control meant that the highest gains were to
be made by a closer engagement with the State and a race developed to exert
the greater pressure on the government.
The wartime growth in the size and complexity of the State in Great Britain
was not matched in Ireland. This was an era of bold experiment in the organ-
isation of the State in Britain, but not in Ireland, where any attempt to improve
the administration ran the danger of being interpreted as an attempt to pre-
empt the decisions of the now imminent Home Rule government. The general
expectation of Home Rule and the marginal importance of Ireland to the war
economy meant that in an era when the strong State emerged, the Irish State
atrophied. Many of the professional civil servants in Ireland were transferred
to war work. The DATI enjoyed a new status as it led the drive for increased
food production.47 Branches of two new departments were established in
Ireland, the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of National Service.48 At the
same time, as expenditure not related to the war effort was severely curtailed,
most of the other Irish departments faced paralysing cuts, in particular the
CDB land redistribution plans, though the government remained aware of the
political dangers of too severe an economy drive.49 Eventually, even the DATI,
which initially was so important in the drive to increase food production, faced
cuts in budget and staff.50
The most immediate result of the outbreak of war was the passing and then
suspension of the Home Rule legislation. John Redmond, anxious to counter
the view that Irish nationalism was anti-imperial, urged all Irishmen to enlist
and play their role in defending the empire. His support for the war split
the nationalist paramilitary force, the Irish Volunteers. The majority joined the
newly named National Volunteers and enlisted, leaving only a minority in the
now evidently separatist and anti-imperial Irish Volunteers. As the war dragged
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on and the Ulster Unionists entered the war cabinet in May 1915 the likelihood
of Irish self-government diminished. However, that Home Rule was not likely
was never admitted and the Castle remained in the limbo of anticipated change
that forever receded. As war transformed the British State the Castle became
anachronistic because it remained the same.
Sir Matthew Nathan and Dublin Castle
In September 1914 the new Under-Secretary, Sir Matthew Nathan, arrived to a
difficult situation. A protégé of Joseph Chamberlain, Nathan had served on
the Imperial Defence Committee and arrived in Ireland with a list of steady
achievements as a Royal Engineer and administrator in the Sudan, Sierra
Leone, the Gold Coast, Hong Kong and Natal Province. Nathan was also Jewish
and therefore, being neither Catholic nor Protestant, was an unfamiliar exotic
in the sectarian hothouse of Dublin Castle. His new duties in Dublin ‘proved
more difficult than any he had yet undertaken’.51
Although Home Rule had passed into law the outbreak of war had led to its
immediate suspension ‘for the duration’. From the beginning Nathan was
unpopular with the Castle civil servants not only because he was a Liberal
Home Ruler among die-hard Tories but also because he brought G.P. Kurten
with him from London as his own private secretary, snubbing the established
staff in the Under-Secretary’s department for whom this was an eagerly sought-
after promotional post. In the world of Dublin Castle, with limited opportu-
nities for promotion, civil servants usually distinguished themselves by acting
as private secretary to the permanent head of a department, or to a minister,
or by acting as secretary to a commission or departmental committee.52 As
soon as he arrived Nathan was the recipient of complaints at the lack of oppor-
tunity that Dublin presented and requests to be transferred to London where
prospects were better.53 Brennan, who as first division officer in the CSO was
effectively passed over, was warned by J.P. Crowley, a fellow Corkman in the
London service, to act with circumspection because a private secretary brought
in to the Castle ‘is . . . a dangerous person to talk to with any expansiveness’.54
This advice neatly illustrates the contradictions that were undermining the
Castle administration. The fundamental basis of the relationship between the
British civil service and the government was that a minister would always be
clear as to what his senior civil servants thought on any issue, even if he chose
to disregard their views. Walter Long sent Nathan a ‘friendly’ warning to avoid
the fate of Lord MacDonnell who tried and failed to reform the Irish civil
service and succeeded only in destroying the confidence of the ordinary civil
servant.55
Nathan’s job as Under-Secretary was twofold; firstly to cut expenditure in the
Irish administration and secondly to prepare it for transfer to a future Home
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Rule government which would come to power after the war.56 The former was
achieved by delegating the duties of retired officials to lower-ranking civil ser-
vants, and by freezing recruitment and promotions. Leave was suppressed to as
few days as possible.57 The Irish Land Commission (ILC) was instructed to end
the temporary contracts of barristers working on land transfers as the com-
mission had its moneys for land purchase cut off by the Treasury.58 But there
were some limits to the economies that Nathan could enforce. Sir Henry
Robinson reacted with alarm to the news that Nathan claimed only the third
class fare for journeys undertaken for official purposes. Robinson nervously
queried whether the journey had in fact been in the third class carriage or
whether it was only the claim that was made at this rate. He was relieved to be
assured that although Nathan himself always travelled third class he was not
intending to lay down any rule for the civil service generally in the matter.59
To prepare for Home Rule and to brief them on the mechanics of govern-
ment (on which, to the amusement of Nathan, they were wholly ignorant), the
Under-Secretary had a series of meetings from February to September 1915
with John Redmond, John Dillon his second-in-command, and the Irish
Party’s financial expert J.J. Clancy. For some of the meetings Francis Greer
accompanied Nathan.60 These meetings had to take place in Dillon’s own home
such was the almost pathological hatred of the Irish nationalist leaders for
Dublin Castle.61
The discussions were principally concerned with rationalising and reducing
the staff in the many and varied departments of the Irish government. Nathan
had little interference from Redmond or Dillon as he pushed forward with his
own plans for a drastic reduction and reshaping of the Castle. These would
have brought the Irish government into line with the evolving British model of
each department of State being under a political head answerable to parlia-
ment, advised by his permanent officials. David Harrel had suggested these
changes earlier to Wyndham when he took up the post of Chief Secretary, so
they were well known and uncontroversial.62 Nathan suggested a government
of eight ministries: prime minister, finance, justice, local affairs and public
health, lands and agriculture, trade and industry, education, with posts and
telegraphs run on an agency basis. The Ministry of Finance was to assume
immediate responsibility for civil service pay and conditions and departmen-
tal administration.63 As Francis Greer pointed out the Home Rule Act did not
transfer any of the existing departments to the Irish government. Instead it
empowered the Lord Lieutenant to establish new departments for the admin-
istration of Irish services except those for which the Irish government had no
power to make laws. However, as many of the existing Irish departments per-
formed both Irish and imperial services, it would be necessary for the two gov-
ernments to make agreements to divide up the work hitherto performed by a
single Irish department.64 This would of course be of vital concern to the civil
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servants in those departments, who could end up working for either govern-
ment. Would they be allowed choose? The secretary of the Board of Works had
already signalled his bafflement as to how he could allocate the work of the
board between transferred and reserved services. His best estimate was about
one third imperial for the work of the surveyors, the engineers could be taken
as wholly Irish as were the land loans staff, but the drainage engineers were
wholly imperial. The puzzle was how it could be possible to transfer services
without transferring staff.65 Nathan expected the heads of the departments to
co-operate in the transfer of authority and reshaping the administration. He
asked the heads to supply him with confidential memorandum on what adap-
tations would be required in their departments in order to bring them into line
with a more streamlined administrative system of seven departments under an
Irish prime minister sharing responsibility with the London administration.66
The CDB refused to co-operate, taking the high view that it had nothing to do
with Dublin Castle and should answer only to the imperial parliament.67
At these confidential meetings Redmond and Dillon brought no ideas of
their own, they simply reacted to those of Nathan. In some respects this was
the usual relationship between a political head and his senior civil servant.
Redmond had signalled for years that he wanted cheaper and more efficient
administration and an end to the ‘ridiculously extravagant’ Castle system.68
Nathan as a senior civil servant was bringing forward ideas to accomplish that
objective, but Redmond and Dillon had the final determination. However,
the suspicion that Nathan’s advice may have been shaped by British rather
than Irish interests did not seem to have crossed the mind of Redmond or
Dillon. The emphasis of Nathan’s advice was always on avoiding conflict
between the Irish and the British governments and little thought was given to
the relationship between the new Home Rule executive and the existing civil
service. Even in the case of the completely new finance department Redmond
and Dillon were oddly passive, Dillon merely enthusing that they regarded
the British system of Treasury control as the ‘best in the world’. Nathan
advised that the new department be staffed on ‘necessarily economical lines
rather than on the past extravagances of the Irish administration’. In this he
was merely echoing nationalist rhetoric. The only intervention was when
Dillon disagreed on the appropriate salary scales for the departmental heads.
Dillon interpreted Nathan’s suggestion of a rate below that of London as a
slight on the status of the Irish government and insisted on London rates of
£2,000 for the secretary of the Department of Finance and £1,500 for all other
departmental heads.69 Nathan strongly urged Redmond, who did not demur,
not to appoint ‘civil service types’ to represent Irish interests on the joint
British-Irish Treasury board, on which they would have two members, but
apart from the permanent head of the Irish Treasury to ‘go for someone to
speak with authority for the industrial and manufacturing section of the
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community’.70 These qualifications would have been taken as spelling out a
Protestant Unionist.
Nathan also got Redmond to agree that the Irish government would con-
tinue to use the British civil service commissioners for recruiting and examin-
ing candidates for employment in the Irish civil service.71 This would mean
perpetuating the stranglehold of the Oxbridge colleges on the elite adminis-
trative division and higher posts in the civil service. That Redmond did not
demur signals his utter fixation on the representative aspects of Home Rule
along with a disregard for the reality of executive authority. The main argu-
ment in favour of Home Rule advanced since the days of Isaac Butt, the founder
of the Home Rule party, and repeated by Redmond himself when he described
the Castle administration as a school of experimentation for English ‘shake-
beggars’, was that Ireland was grossly misgoverned by the very system that he
now blithely agreed to perpetuate.72 This was precisely the response of Maurice
Headlam who was hugely amused at being asked by Nathan to suggest suitable
staff for an Irish department of finance:
one of the chief arguments for Home Rule has always been the necessity for gov-
erning Ireland according to ‘Irish’ ideas. The Treasury is regarded here as the
embodiment of ‘English’ ideas. Hence it is not without humour that you should
ask a Treasury official for guidance for an Irish Treasury and that the politicians
should be unable, or unwilling, or forbidden by the government which has
encouraged the ‘Irish ideas’ theory to evolve any scheme of their own.73
In fact Nathan was deeply pessimistic as to the viability of an Irish Treasury.
The insurmountable problem for an Irish department of finance was the elab-
orate safeguards of the Home Rule Act securing the status of the Irish civil ser-
vants. The finances of the Home Rule scheme were premised on reducing the
size and cost of the administration of Ireland, yet if the Irish government was
to observe the safeguards attached to the civil service that guaranteed no wors-
ening of conditions it would be fatal to economies. If the Irish government, in
pursuit of economy, violated the conditions of service of the civil servants it
would entitle the officers to the ‘most liberal compensation payable’.74 Before
it even came into existence the Irish government had lost the battle of the
economy because the Irish civil service had already won it. If the 1914 Act had
in fact been put into force the British exchequer would have had to come to the
immediate rescue of an Irish Treasury.
In November 1915, following the establishment of a similar committee in
Britain, an Irish retrenchment committee was established. The function of the
committee was to generate savings in the government of Ireland, savings that
would go to the war effort.75 This committee soon proved as much a failure as
previous attempts to cut Irish expenditure. When the Irish Party realised that
the savings in the Irish administration were not going to be applied in Ireland
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but were to be transferred to Britain they boycotted the committee. Redmond
was also afraid that allowing Whitehall complete freedom of action in Dublin
Castle might create difficulties for a future Home Rule administration. The
retrenchment committee retreated behind the hope that Dublin Castle would
‘carry still further the scrutiny of expenditure which has already taken place’.76
Enlistment and the Irish civil service
The British civil service had, like the rest of British society, been swept up in
the initial enthusiasm for the war. Departmental heads, fearful of the disrup-
tion that would follow a mass exodus of staff into the ranks for a war that
‘would be over by Christmas’, simply refused permission to enlist on the
grounds that the staff member was essential to the war effort. But the failure to
win by Christmas and the pressure on recruitment meant that the civil service
had to be seen to be carrying its share of the burden. In June 1915 the War
Office called on civil servants to enlist, promising they would continue to
receive the same salary and that they would not lose out in seniority or years of
service. This call was taken up by the heads of the government departments in
Dublin Castle who circularised every man of military age on their staff, urging
them to join up.77 The Irish civil service proved reluctant recruits, particularly
when compared to the English and Scottish officers. A return of the Irish civil
service, prepared but never published, shows that of the 3,004 civil servants of
military age in the Irish civil departments at the outbreak of war, excluding the
postal and revenue departments, only 823 had enlisted by April 1916. That is,
about 27 per cent. In comparison 54 per cent of the English and 62 per cent of
the Scottish civil servants had joined up.78 The only department of the Irish
government to show any degree of enthusiasm for volunteering was the Lord
Lieutenant’s household, made up of military men for the most part.79
The Northcliffe newspapers led the campaign on the recruiting question and
the alleged cowardice of the civil service. These featured farcical accounts of
unlimited numbers of ‘young shirkers’ hiding in government departments,
labelled ‘funkholes’. These were to be ‘rounded-up’ and ‘combed out’.80 Civil
servants who had applied to join up in 1914 but were refused permission as
‘indispensable’ were increasingly resentful at the press campaign, the attitude
of the War Office and the failure of their departmental heads to defend them.
Denied the privilege of volunteering when they had a choice of units and
having endured the white feathers of ‘patriotic young misses’, they now faced
compulsory conscription into the infantry and the certainty of being pushed
up to the trenches and the front line.81
Nathan was a keen supporter of the drive to recruit civil servants of military
age in Ireland. He dismissed their work in Dublin Castle as essentially elemen-
tary for the most part and said that they would be of better service to the State
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enlisting to defend the empire.82 He put pressure on the temporary second divi-
sion clerks to enlist by threatening them with discharge at the end of their
period of employment. It was implied that should they be lucky enough to
survive the trenches they would be certain of a permanent position after the
war. Dillon was unhappy at Nathan’s bullying offer of enlistment or dismissal,
especially as the Castle had not established equivalents to the British military
tribunals empowered to determine exemptions to military service.83 That
Nathan was issuing the threat suggests both that the second division men were
refusing to enlist and that he regarded the refusal as unacceptable in any servant
of the Crown, even a temporary one. Most significantly, it signals the extent to
which the lower-ranking Irish civil servants regarded the British State as simply
their employer, to whom they owed no more than the contractual loyalty due
to any employer.84 Most Irish civil servants were of the opinion that the war in
France was ‘not our war’, and, with Home Rule imminent, ‘the better part of
valour was to stay at home and await developments’.85
The 1916 Rising
However, among the Irish civil service there was a minority for whom opposi-
tion to enlistment was an expression of deep-seated hostility to the British
State. As well as bearing the usual metropolitan scorn for the Dublin Castle
administration, Nathan quickly became deeply suspicious of the loyalty of the
Irish civil service.86 Shortly after his arrival he reported that there were ‘a good
number of the lower officials in this undesirable organisation Sinn Féin . . . and
we shall have to put a strong check on their increased Activity’.87 Sinn Féin was
a minor political party formed in 1905 by the nationalist journalist Arthur
Griffith. Sinn Féin, meaning ‘Ourselves Alone’, argued that Irish Nationalist
MPs, instead of asking the British parliament to permit Irish self-government,
should simply assemble in Dublin and declare themselves the legitimate Irish
parliament. The Irish people would recognise and obey the native government
and its institutions, making the British State in Ireland an irrelevance. With the
passing of the Home Rule Act it seemed that Redmond’s strategy of relying on
the British parliament had been vindicated. On the outbreak of war, when
Redmond had urged Irishmen to enlist in the British army, Sinn Féin had dis-
rupted recruitment platforms and had opposed the war as being of no concern
to Ireland. Within Dublin Castle ‘Sinn Féin’ had become a general term for all
anti-war opinions and for Nathan covered all anti-recruitment and nationalist
organisations.88
During the Hardinge Commission hearings into the Easter Rising of 1916
Nathan suggested that many in the Irish civil service had a ‘pious dislike’ of
England arising from the opinion that England had treated Ireland badly.89 The
move from a dislike of government to actively participating in a revolutionary
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attempt to overthrow that government does require explanation. Civil servants
acquired a deep identification with the State as part of their training and some-
times came to regard themselves as a better guardian of the public interest than
their political masters. The motivation of those civil servants who joined a rev-
olutionary movement actively working against the State therefore goes against
the grain. For many civil servants their introduction to separatism was initially
cultural rather than political. The progress of a section of the civil service
from the cultural organisations like the Gaelic League, or sports clubs like the
Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), to the political organisations like Sinn Féin,
and ultimately to revolutionary organisations such as the Irish Revolutionary
Brotherhood (IRB) and the Irish Volunteers is a barometer of the growing
alienation of these Irish civil servants from the British State.
The Gaelic League, organised to revive Gaelic as the spoken language of the
Irish people, was formed at a meeting held in Martin Kelly’s civil service grind
school at 9 Lower Sackville Street. Civil servants dominated the first executive.
Eoin MacNeill, founder of the Gaelic League, was a clerk in the Accountant-
General’s office at the Four Courts, the only Catholic on the permanent staff of
the office.90 The membership of the premier Keating branch of the Gaelic
League was mostly civil servants and teachers. The Gaelic League and the GAA
were typical of the sort of self-improvement society that always proved attrac-
tive to the middle-class ethos of the civil service. Moreover, membership of cul-
tural nationalist movements initially did not mean an automatic sympathy
with political nationalism. James Kavanagh, a clerk in the Board of Works
in Dublin Castle, 1916 Volunteer and later secretary of the Dáil Éireann
Department of Local Government, reckoned that many of the teachers and
civil service members of the Keating branch of the Gaelic League were antago-
nistic to his separatist politics. He recalled that on one occasion the Keating
branch was riven by a dispute when a woman member insisted on playing ‘God
Save the King’ on the piano as the king being above politics, it could not be a
‘ “political’ song.91 But for many civil servants these cultural movements were
the initial introduction to ‘ “Irish-Ireland’ ideas that then led to the more
advanced separatist politics of the Irish Volunteers, the IRB and Sinn Féin.92
Take out the civil servants and the separatist movement looks a lot less formi-
dable: Michael Collins, Richard Mulcahy, Ernest Blythe, Liam Archer, Eamon
Broy, Alf Cotton, Con Collins (who was arrested in Tralee trying to make
contact with Roger Casement), Patrick J. Daly (who rose to become assistant
secretary, Department of Local Government), Hugo Flinn, Diarmuid Lynch,
Dr Conn Murphy, Joe O’Reilly (one of ‘the Squad’ assembled by Collins to
assassinate key figures in police and military intelligence in Dublin Castle) and
Diarmuid O’Hegarty. The civil service, by separating them from home and
community, gave them independence and a cosmopolitan and critical outlook
on Irish life.93 What it did not do was create any identification with the State.
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However, if the ‘exile’ from Irish life was too extended it diminished rather than
increased the radicalism of the young civil servant. Michael Gallagher felt that
he was well on the way to being ‘poured into the mould of an ordinary
Englishman’ during his service in London, had he not secured a transfer to
Dublin.94 Michael, John and Maurice Moynihan were the sons of a prominent
IRB man in Tralee. Michael was successful in the civil service exams in 1910
and joined the Inland Revenue in London. His correspondence with his
brother John shows a gradual decline in radicalism and an absorption into the
ethos of the British civil service. He eventually joined the Civil Service Rifles
and then the King’s Liverpool regiment and was killed in June 1918 at the front.
His brothers John and Maurice, both republicans, had equally distinguished
service in the civil service of the independent Irish State. What made the
difference between Michael and his brothers was his years of independent
living in London.95
When the Irish Volunteer Convention of October 1914 rejected Redmond’s
call for the Volunteers to enlist in the British army, it also adopted an openly
revolutionary policy that included ‘the abolition of the system of governing
Ireland through Dublin Castle and the British military power and the estab-
lishment of a National Government in its place’. Nathan used this declaration
to forbid members of the government service ‘to belong to an organisation of
which the avowed object was to thwart and injure that government’. 96 He pre-
pared a circular to be sent to any civil servant suspected of associating with the
Irish Volunteers but there is no evidence that the carefully drafted memoran-
dum was ever actually distributed.97 Joseph Devlin, MP for West Belfast, cau-
tioned Nathan against suppressing the anti-war press but was prepared to
support action against civil servants taking part in ‘pro-German’ meetings, by
which he meant anti-enlistment activity.98 As late as February 1916 Nathan was
assuring the Irish Unionist Lords Midleton and Barrymore that he was taking
action against civil servants who were taking part in ‘Sinn Féin’ activities.99
Dismissals occurred in the Inland Revenue, Ordnance Survey and the Post
Office. Many of those dismissed were to prove significant revolutionary figures,
a confirmation of Nathan’s assessment. They included Austin Stack and Robert
Monteith. Stack, a significant figure in the Irish revolutionary movement, was
dismissed from the Inland Revenue. Monteith, dismissed from the Ordnance
Stores, went to America and from there to Germany where he met with Roger
Casement whom he secretly returned with to Ireland aboard a German U-boat
in advance of the 1916 Rising. Dismissal was one response to civil service
disaffection, but deportation under the guise of redeployment was more fre-
quent. Ernest Blythe, a clerk in the DATI, and Liam Mellows, a Post Office engi-
neer, were both deported to England. P.S. O’Hegarty, the postmaster of
Queenstown, was deported to Welshpool in Wales.100 John Cox, an excise-man
in the port of Dublin, and P.F. Burke, excise-man in the Monaghan-Louth area
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and an IRB man, both of whom were to be arrested after the 1916 Rising, were
identified as ‘active Sinn Féiners’ and were pensioned off in order to be rid of
them.101 Other dismissals were petty. The postmistress of Dalkey was deprived
of the post because her daughter was active in Cumann na mBan.102
In the aftermath of the 1916 Rising Nathan, however, could recollect only
eight or nine men being actually dismissed because most civil servants when
asked whether they were members of the Volunteers would say ‘we do not
deny it’, which was not quite an affirmation of membership. The Volunteers
remained a legal organisation and therefore civil servants who were members
were not breaking the law, only regulations. To enforce discipline would
require either specific evidence of membership or an admission, and in many
cases Nathan had neither. It was believed by Nathan that the Volunteers took
especial care to safeguard civil servants from observation by the police while on
route marches.103 Hugh Hehir, a civil servant in the ILC and later registrar of
the Dáil Éireann courts in Co. Clare, who had progressed through the usual
cultural initiations of the GAA and the Gaelic League to the political circles of
Sinn Féin, the IRB and the Volunteers, was ordered by Sean MacDermott to
publicly sever connections with the movement after he had been identified
by the secretary of the ILC as active in the Irish Volunteers.104 Mortimer
O’Connell, an excise officer and IRB man, was another civil servant directed to
withdraw from Volunteer parades. O’Connell believed that Sean MacDermott
had several IRB informants among the Castle departments besides O’Connell
himself, that kept him informed on government policy changes.105 Eugene
Smith, a Volunteer and civil servant who escaped detection, claimed to have
passed many sensitive documents over the years to the Volunteer executive,
including plans for conscription, arms raids and the German Plot arrests.106
The only senior civil servant prepared to speak in defence of the lower ranks
was A.H. Norway, secretary of the Post Office, Ireland. Norway had been alert
to the growth of separatist movements within the civil service, but he had been
shrugged off by the Castle.107 Vexed at the prominence given to allegations that
the Irish Post Office was a hotbed of Sinn Féin agitation, Norway used the
Hardinge Commission to detail the steps that he had taken to forbid civil ser-
vants to join or remain in the Volunteers. In the period leading up to the 1916
Rising, as Irish Volunteer activity grew more intense he issued the following
letter to every member of the postal staff alleged to be a member of the Irish
Volunteers:
Sir,
The attention of the Postmaster General has recently been called to the fact that
you are a member of the Irish Volunteers under the leadership of a committee
presided over by Mr John McNeill. The Postmaster General has also been apprised
of the open hostility of this organisation to recruitment in the Forces of the
Crown and generally, to the Government under which you are serving. Of this,
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the public utterances of the leaders of the organisation and matter contained in
the newspaper which purports to be its official organ are sufficient evidence.
While it appears to the Postmaster General that an openly hostile attitude towards
the Government, such as is indicated by membership of the body referred to, by
taking part in its exercises and by association with its leaders in its business would
at any time be improper in a member of the Civil Service, such an attitude in the
time of war on the part of persons entrusted with business of the State is fraught
with risk to the country which no Government is justified in incurring. In those
circumstances I am directed to call on you to cease all connection with the Irish
Volunteers or any similar organisation or face dismissal.108
In the aftermath of the 1916 Rising the loyalty of the Irish civil service to the
State while it was at war could not be taken for granted. But what can be done
with a disloyal civil servant? At one extreme it could be argued that disloyalty
in a servant of the Crown was equivalent to treason, and the penalty for treason
is death. In fact disloyalty in the civil service in Ireland was treated with con-
siderable leniency. Every opportunity to retreat from separatist actions was
offered. The incorrigible were simply dismissed, facing no other charge.
Nathan called for a full statement from civil servants of their movements
including where they stayed each night from noon on Saturday 22 April to noon
on Monday 1 May, the period of the Rising. The statements of the staff were cor-
roborated by checking details with the DMP or the military.109 This may appear
particularly pointless as those civil servants who were active in the rebellion were
by then in British gaols and the rest had been confined to their homes, but the
statements were intended for future use to weed out those that had escaped
detection and also the passive sympathisers. Each head of department was
directed to ensure that all staff supplied a statement. These were then forwarded
to the CSO. Officers missing or failing to provide a detailed statement were
pursued. When the two clerks Francis Shouldice and Thomas Cotter of the
National Health Insurance Commission (NHIC), both already suspected of
involvement in the Volunteers, failed to return to work after the Rising two
senior clerks called to their homes where they were fobbed off with vague
answers to their queries.110 DMP detectives came to the offices of the ILC looking
for Hugh Hehir. Hehir, who had avoided public associations with the Volunteers
after March 1915, remained a member of C Company under Thomas McDonagh.
He also successfully resisted efforts to transfer him to London where he would
face conscription. Ironically Hehir was in the dark about the Rising and spent
Easter 1916 on holiday in Co. Clare. Nevertheless he was arrested on his return
and sent to Frongoch.111 Of course there were also the usual anonymous letters
informing the Castle about the suspicious behaviour of certain civil servants: ‘I
beg to inform you that a young man named John Roche of Seville Place
employed in the Land Commission Office is a Sinn Féin Volunteer and was with
them during the week of Rising in Dublin but escaped and got home.’112
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The Sankey committee
A committee was appointed under Mr Justice Sankey to investigate individual
cases of the thousand plus persons detained in the post-rebellion attempt to
crush Irish separatist organisations.113 About ninety civil servants were inves-
tigated, half of them in the Post Office.114 The possibility of servants of the
Crown being engaged in subversion created more excitement than the absolute
numbers involved, which were very small given the size of the Irish civil service.
The suspicion was that the few who were revealed to have been actively engaged
in 1916 were merely the tip of the iceberg of civil service disaffection and that
many more lay concealed below the surface. There were immediate protests,
especially from J.A. Pease in the Irish Post Office, at the deportation on the
flimsiest evidence of many postal staff.115 In some civil service cases it is
clear that Sankey’s inquiries were very brief. James Kenny, a civil servant and
member of the 4th battalion of the Volunteers active in the GPO garrison, was
simply asked if he had any knowledge beforehand of the Rising and, on denying
any such knowledge, was released.116 Internees who expressed defiance or
refused to co-operate were simply continued in detention.117 Thus, except
where there was evidence that the civil servant was in a leadership position, or
was defiant, they were soon released. Naturally enough they then returned to
their government offices, citing their release as evidence of their innocence of
any wrongdoing. T.W. Russell accepted that Sankey’s release of John Daly, an
assistant agricultural overseer in the DATI, exonerated him. He was reinstated
in his post and paid the back money due since his arrest. Home Secretary
Samuel immediately ordered his suspension dryly noting that ‘it does not nec-
essarily follow that because this man was released from internment in England
he is a fit person to be employed by the Crown’.118 The re-employment of these
ex-internees, naturally enough, provoked the Irish Unionist MPs. In July Major
Walter Guinness asked the prime minister about the clerks Patrick Kelly,
Patrick Sheehan and Robert Rooney of the ILC, who had fought in the rebel-
lion, had been released by Sankey and returned to the land commission, where
they were cheered as returning heroes, and were once again put in receipt of
government pay. However, the growing sympathy for the rebels was already
affecting the interpretation of the Rising and Thomas Lundon, the Nationalist
MP for East Limerick, immediately accused Unionists like Major Guinness
of using the rebellion to ‘drive Catholics out of every government post in
Dublin’.119
The cases of Sheehan, Kelly and Rooney illustrate the confusion that began
to surround the question of disloyalty in the civil service. Patrick Sheehan had
been arrested at his home in the immediate aftermath of the Rising by the mil-
itary when they found ammunition and a uniform at his home. The G Division
detectives in the DMP in fact considered Sheehan a member of the Redmondite
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National Volunteers. This difference was too subtle for the military authorities
and he was sent to Knutsford prison even though he had not participated in
the Rising. Patrick Kelly was unknown to the police but had been arrested as
part of the Jacob’s factory garrison. He maintained that he had simply gone to
Jacob’s factory out of curiosity and had been ordered inside at gunpoint by the
rebels. Rooney had been arrested by the military at his office but he was
unknown to the police and no evidence of any wrongdoing had been found. It
is possible that he was the victim of a malicious informer.120 Sheehan became
something of a cause célèbre. After Major Guinness’s parliamentary question he
was suspended from his department. Lundon used his case to make the general
point that Sinn Féin sympathy was growing in the Irish civil service because
they saw ‘day after day Protestants and Freemasons being appointed over their
heads to the positions which Catholics should enjoy’.121 Sheehan, he suggested,
was ‘fingered’ by lower-division clerks anxious to fill his position. Sheehan was
finally dismissed but found immediate employment as permanent secretary
of Sinn Féin. There is no doubt that Sheehan was in fact an active Irish
Volunteer.122 He, however, clearly felt that, although he was sympathetic to its
aims, as he was not active in the Rising he was entitled to retain his post. He
was exactly the sort of civil servant that Guinness wanted purged because in his
view the security of the State depended on having confidence in the unswerv-
ing loyalty of its civil service.123 To Irish nationalist opinion Guinness was
simply trying to start a witch-hunt against Catholics in the civil service and
was being egged on by malicious informants. This, in their view, had nothing
to do with State security and everything to do with sectarian ambitions. By
July Laurence Ginnell was asking the prime minister for the names of each
civil servant in Ireland dismissed, threatened with dismissal, reduced in
rank, denied normal promotion or transferred, due to connection with Irish
Volunteers from July 1914 to April 1916 when the Volunteers were not an illegal
organisation.124
The Wilson and Byrne inquiry
Sankey’s inquiry was in fact of the most cursory kind. He did a quick trawl to
sort out the 1,841 cases of internees and, having identified the 569 dangerous
cases to be kept in internment, allowed the release of the others. He did not in
fact attempt to determine guilt or innocence, simply the degree of danger pre-
sented to the State.125 The government therefore established an internal and
confidential inquiry to deal with the problem of the civil servants who had been
released by Sankey, but now remained suspended. In July Sir Guy Fleetwood
Wilson and Sir William Byrne, an English Catholic recently appointed as
Assistant Under-Secretary, began a discreet investigation to ‘consider the cases
of Irish Civil Servants who have been suspended from their duties owing to
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their suspected complicity with the recent Rebellion and to advise how they
should be dealt with’.126 These were not only those released by Sankey and sus-
pended but also those civil servants who had escaped detention but were sus-
pected by the departmental heads of Sinn Féin sympathies. Civil servants still
in detention were taken to have been proved guilty and were not considered. In
the growing reaction against the Castle regime and the prevailing spirit of rec-
onciliation, Wilson and Byrne deliberately avoided associating their investiga-
tion with the Castle. They dealt directly with the departmental heads, private
rooms were secured in Hume Street and secretarial and clerical assistance
 dispensed with. Working from lists of suspects forwarded by the heads of
departments along with departmental, military and police records, and after
interviewing fourteen of the departmental heads, the investigation looked
at the cases of forty-two men, mostly of the lower ranks. The accused were
encouraged to make the best possible case for themselves and were assured
that both Wilson and Byrne, as civil servants themselves, would find it ‘a
genuine pleasure’ to recommend reinstatement.127 The reaction of the accused,
however, dismayed their interrogators:
We had greatly hoped that no cases, or only isolated instances of evident disloy-
alty would come before us, but we regret to have to state that in a good many cases
we have felt it our duty to recommend removal from the service. The confession
of faith of the suspect was often tendered freely, frankly and unblushingly. Briefly
it amounted in many cases to a declaration that so long as the individual in ques-
tion discharged his official duties satisfactorily during office hours, he was fully
entitled to do as he pleased out of office hours, even if it involved violence which
might lead to the killing of troops or police officers. This view was expressed not
by the lowest ranks only. In more than one instance the allegation that a man
engaged in military operations had not actually fired at a soldier was advanced as
sufficient justification for re-instatement. We have been struck by the readiness
with which a considerable number of those inculpated air views quite incompat-
ible, in our view, with their position as public servants. In no instance were we
altogether satisfied that such Civil Servants as actually took active part in the
rebellion, under alleged compulsion, could not have withdrawn at an early stage
of it. . . . Owing to the peculiar political situation in Ireland, we did not, broadly
speaking, judge men only from the standpoint of their continued connection with
the Sinn Fein movement. We were guided by their activities, their explanations
thereof, by their mental attitude towards the rebellion, and by their expressed
intention in the future to subordinate or otherwise, their loyalty as public ser-
vants, to their political creed.128
The most senior civil servant dismissed was J.J. McElligott, a first class clerk
in the LGB, whose plea that he had been forced at gunpoint into participation
in the Rising did not save him, although participation, albeit reluctant, did help
to further his later successful career in the Irish Free State civil service.129 Of the
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forty-two cases dealt with twenty-three were dismissed, one pensioned, and
eighteen reinstated. No notes were kept and there is no evident rationale in
the decisions, which probably reflected the demeanour of the accused. It is
said that it is easier to sack the Pope than a civil servant, but by any reckoning
Wilson and Byrne may be considered very generous in their treatment.
However, it was very deliberately noted by them that their investigation found
no evidence whatsoever for Nathan’s assertion that civil servants had been cir-
cularised to withdraw from the Irish Volunteers, nor could any of those inter-
viewed recollect any such circular. Such a circular had indeed been drafted but
apparently never actually issued. Arguably therefore simple membership of
the Volunteers without active participation in the rebellion was, in their view,
excusable.130
At a more general level Wilson and Byrne were clearly worried by the evident
lack of identification with the State among Irish civil servants and the gulf
between the senior and junior ranks. The ethos of non-political bureaucratic
service binding the civil service to the State in Britain was non-existent in
Dublin. Their report recommended that
advantage should be taken of the present situation, by serious and combined
effort on the part of all concerned, to instil a higher tone in the ranks of the Irish
Civil Service and to require a more distinct recognition of the obligation which
properly attach to Public Service. We believe that much good would result if
increased interest were shown in, and if friendly advice were more freely tendered
to, young Civil Servants by their Chiefs.131
One idea that Wilson and Byrne advanced as a way to remind civil servants
of a sense of duty was that all civil servants throughout the United Kingdom
ought to be obliged to take an oath of allegiance to the Crown such as was
required of the armed forces. This proposal reappeared much later, in 1918,
though now with no reference to Ireland. Some MPs, Col McCalmont the Ulster
Unionist was prominent, managed to become convinced that British failures on
the western front were due to pro-German elements in the civil service either
leaking secrets to the German military command or deliberately sabotaging the
British war machine. Viscount Haldane, because of his admiration for German
scholarship, was an early casualty of Unionist xenophobia, being dropped from
government in May 1915.132 The solution was an oath of allegiance, which,
apparently, would reveal the traitors. In Ireland this demand for an oath was
seen as an attempted ‘combing out’ of nationalists. The oath was avoided where
possible, taken with bad grace in most cases, and in a few cases refused out-
right.133 Those who refused were F.X. Thunder, David O’Donoghue and E.
Cleary in the ILC, Diarmuid O’Hegarty and Michael McDunphy, both second
division clerks in the DATI, Tom McArdle, a second division clerk in the LGB,
and P. Cremins and Eamon Duggan in the Post Office. A protest meeting of the
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‘recusants’ was organised but they all remained dismissed.134 The newly organ-
ised Assistant Clerks’ Association (ACA) took up the case of the oath, which
they regarded as an encroachment on their civil rights, but failed to organise any
significant opposition to it. The ACA continued to financially support dis-
missed members until they found employment.135 Dismissal for refusing to take
the oath of allegiance was one of the criteria accepted by the committee for the
reinstatement of civil servants, set up by the Free State government under the
chairmanship of P.S. O’Hegarty. In all fifty-three cases were considered of civil
servants who could establish that they had been dismissed for sympathy with or
participation in the 1916 rebellion; or for refusing the Oath of Allegiance, or for
refusing to join the British armed forces.136 None of those actually dismissed in
1918 for refusing to take the oath were among those who made an application
to the 1923 P.S. O’Hegarty committee.
As the administration in Dublin Castle returned to what passed for normal-
ity the civil servants noted the few vacant places, none of them a surprise.137 For
the mass of the Irish civil service, the foot soldiers in the State apparatus, the
Rising had been a brief burst of excitement but apart from the dismissal of a few
colleagues one that brought no significant changes. One cynic described the
Rising as ‘the most exciting event in the Irish government since a senior clerk
was promoted, probably mistakenly’.138 The Irish National Aid Association,
formed by Collins to assist the survivors of the Rising and to re-mobilise the rev-
olutionary movement, which we might assume had the most complete list of
those affected, assisted seventy-two dismissed civil servants.139 However, as the
government investigation into the Rising deepened, its conclusions indicated
that the problem was more than a very few disaffected civil servants in the minor
grades. The suspicion lingered that the numbers detected concealed a far greater
number that remained hidden.
Dublin Castle after the Rising
Lloyd George reported to the House of Commons in the immediate aftermath
of the Rising that the existing system of government in Ireland had broken
down.140 The Hardinge inquiry into the Rising utterly damned the entire
Dublin Castle administration as ‘anomalous in quiet times, and almost
unworkable in times of crisis’.141 The most dramatic impact of the Rising was
therefore on the top ranks of the Irish administration.
Wimborne remained as Lord Lieutenant but both Birrell and Nathan
resigned and a military regime was instituted under General Maxwell.
Meanwhile Lloyd George tried and failed to inveigle the Irish Nationalists and
Unionists to accept an immediate implementation of Home Rule for the
twenty-six counties by promising the Nationalists that partition was temporary
while assuring the Unionists it was permanent. Meanwhile the opportunity to
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reform the administration, which all admitted was an urgent task, slipped away.
In the absence of any initiative the old administrative system reasserted itself as
H.E. Duke (a 61-year-old English barrister and Unionist MP with no ministe-
rial experience) was appointed Chief Secretary with Robert Chalmers, famous
for being the rudest man in Whitehall whose ‘pomposity and cynicism con-
cealed his many benefactions’, as Under-Secretary.142 Chalmers was one of the
most brilliant and ruthless officials in the Treasury. A liberal in his politics he
played a key role during the 1909 ‘People’s Budget’ struggle. Falling out of
favour with Lloyd George he was exiled to Ceylon in 1913. His return to Dublin
Castle signalled perhaps a step toward full rehabilitation and a return to
Whitehall. Duke was lauded by Asquith for bringing to the position a judicial
mind, a firm hand, administrative capacity, sympathy with the Irish people
and a strong desire to promote an Irish settlement. His first task, according
to Asquith, was to undertake a careful survey of the whole administrative situ-
ation with all its possibilities.143 There is no evidence that any such survey was
undertaken.
Both Chalmers and Duke made it clear to the staff in the Castle that they had
reluctantly agreed to come to Dublin and expected to be bothered as little as
possible.144 Chalmers was not going to waste his time and expertise on reform
of the Irish administration and by October had gone back to Whitehall. Castle
government returned to Ireland, advised and assisted by a civil service that only
some weeks previously had been condemned as useless. In October, after the
departure of Chalmers, Magill replied to Duke’s complaint that he, Duke, was
having to run the office on his own, with a description of the cuts that the war
had wrought on his staff. In 1913 the Irish Office in London had a staff of seven:
a private secretary, a parliamentary private secretary, an assistant private sec-
retary, one chief clerk, one second division clerk and two typists. It now con-
sisted of Magill himself and two typists, one of whom was about to be called
up by the military. Since the outbreak of the war Magill had had one week’s
leave, had worked on Sundays and holidays and had to constantly divide his
time between London and Dublin. Clearly Magill was feeling little sympathy
for his Chief Secretary. The only solution he could suggest was that Duke
should try and get Duggan and Hamilton, who had gone to the Admiralty, to
return. But the derisory salaries offered by the CSO would have to be improved
to attract them back. Magill once again struck what was now a familiar note
when he underlined the urgency of an inquiry into the staffing of the CSO and
the Irish Office.145
The overwhelming needs of the war were not only cutting a swathe through
the staff in Dublin Castle, they were also constraining the ability of Duke to
pursue an imaginative Irish policy. The summer of 1916 saw the disaster of the
Somme campaign, the failure of the British navy to win the Battle of Jutland
and the death of Kitchener, the symbol of the British war spirit. In comparison
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Ireland was parochial. Also, as Duke was reporting to a coalition cabinet
divided only by Ireland, it would be foolhardy to invite dissensions. Walter
Long revived once again the old idea of abolishing the viceroyalty and strength-
ening the office of the Chief Secretary to that of a full secretary of state, but
Wimborne resisted, determined to be important.146 The reforms that were
introduced were primarily personnel rather than structural. In a process of
‘Greening’ the administration John J. Taylor was passed over for the post of
Under Secretary for William Byrne, a Catholic (though English) and joint
investigator of the civil service participants in the 1916 Rising. The new head
of the RIC was also Catholic, General Sir Joseph Byrne; so was the new
Attorney General, James O’Connor.147 At a private lunch Duggan told Magill
that he was not ‘too eager to return to the intricacies of Irish policy and the
work of Dublin Castle’.148
By year’s end it was being complained that the Irish offices were under-
manned to the point of crisis and economy was being applied beyond the
bounds of common sense, yet the Treasury remained inflexible. The needs of
the war demanded that no new posts should be created, no promotions made
and that shortfalls would have to be made good by loans of staff from other
departments.149 The DATI was subject to an investigation by Maurice Headlam
and Sir John Irwin. Irwin, a minor figure in Dublin Unionist politics, was a
paper merchant who appeared regularly in Stubb’s Gazette as a defaulter. Their
investigation showed a complete inability to understand the organisation or
function of the DATI and was utterly worthless.150 The failure to restructure
the Castle, along with the failure to rethink Irish policy, was the end of any
 realistic attempt to engage with the problems of Irish administration.
The Irish Convention
The Irish Convention, which met from July 1917 to April 1918, was an attempt
by Lloyd George to rush an Irish settlement, partly in answer to American
critics and partly to rescue the Home Rule party, which was clearly losing
ground to Sinn Féin. However, even though it was apparent that the Home
Rule Bill would be amended, the general expectation was still that in the end
Ireland would be governed by some form of Home Rule with the supremacy of
Westminster intact. Overall, government policy remained one of Home Rule
with provision for Ulster exclusion.
As it became clear that Home Rule was once again subject to amendment
the GCICS seized the opportunity to present a position paper to the Irish
Convention requesting that any future proposals for an Irish government
would address deficiencies in the clauses dealing with civil servants in the 1914
Act.151 Under the operation of patronage by the Birrell regime in particular and
with the advance of competitive entry in general, the lower ranks of the civil
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service in Ireland, in what has been called the ‘Greening of Dublin Castle’, were
becoming more Catholic and nationalist.152 The membership of the 1917
GCICS, and the demands put forward in the statement, attest the dominance
in Irish civil service organisation that had been achieved by the lower (and
therefore Catholic) grades of the second division and clerical staffs since the
formation of the original 1911 committee.153 The continued expansion of the
State in Ireland is also reflected in the increase in the number of government
departments represented on the committee – thirty-four as opposed to the
twenty-nine of 1911. All of the new departments were Irish branches of British
departments. The 1917 committee also had delegates from twenty-one civil
service associations. The 1911 representative scheme of delegates from the pro-
fessional, higher, second division and clerical grades had not been sustained.
Instead, the 1917 GCICS was composed of quasi-trade union associations
 representing the clerkdom of the lower grades only, along with representa-
tives of departments. Of the 114 delegates on the general committee, 40 were
from civil service associations, many of which were Irish branches of British
organisations. In contrast to the general committee, which was still dominated
by departmental delegates, association delegates dominated the executive
 committee.
Not only did the clerical grades, the rank and file of the civil service, domi-
nate the representation on the general committee they also dominated its pro-
posals, and the demands of the professional and higher-grade officers were
added on almost as an afterthought. The demands of the civil servants for a
better retirement and severance deal would imply either an expectation or
intent of leaving the service of a Home Rule executive. Such were the demands
of the GCICS in 1912. The 1917 committee, however, while addressing issues of
a better severance deal, was primarily focused on security for meritocratic pro-
motion. This implies an expectation and commitment of continuous service to
a future Home Rule administration. The former demand for a severance deal is
implicitly unionist, the latter demand for security for promotion is implicitly
nationalist. By 1917 the Civil Service Committee, as it became dominated by the
lower grades and temporary clerks, had become implicitly nationalist. This also
reflected a generational difference. Older men were most concerned that the
terms for voluntary or compulsory retirement would be sufficient to secure
them continuity in the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. The
1917 committee wanted even better money terms for those compelled to retire
(and there was an even greater expectation of compulsion after 1916) as well as
better security for those who opted to retire. With the experience of wartime
inflation the statement also wanted a provision that pensions should match
salary increases in the relevant grade for a period of years.154
Loyal to the huge numbers of temporary fellow civil servants the statement
demanded recognition of temporary whole-time officers as permanent civil
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servants, recognition of temporary years for reckoning pension entitlements,
and an entitlement to added years in calculating pensions for those officers
with a professional qualification in recognition of their years of study. But the
key new demand put forward by the 1917 committee was not for better retire-
ment conditions but rather for guarantees for promotional opportunities for
the lower grades. The great fear within the civil service was that with the com-
plete disruption of structures and departments imposed by the war, and with
the local uncertainties of post-1916 Ireland, the post-war civil service would be
used to award the friends of those in power. The immediate demand of the civil
servants’ committee was for additional security regarding promotion within
the Irish service, ‘a question which is regarded by all ranks as a vital one’. They
asked for a provision in the bill to prevent the appointment of ‘outsiders’ to
posts that could be filled by fully qualified officers already in the service. The
committee in their statement did acknowledge that there might be some
appointments to posts ‘for which certain special technical or professional
qualifications are essential’ but did anticipate that such cases would be com-
paratively rare. Clearly the GCICS was very sceptical about the claims of
expertise made for the great majority of higher-grade posts and saw these as
sinecures and patronage appointments blocking the usual avenues of promo-
tion.155 The wartime halt to recruitment to the higher grades had created large
gaps in government departments that would have to be filled. The fear was that
these higher posts would become filled by a recrudescence of patronage under
a future Home Rule government.
Recognising that the Irish civil service would in all probability be a much
smaller service, with limited promotional opportunities, the 1917 statement
wanted legislation to allow for transfers and exchanges between the British and
Irish services, and for Irish civil servants to be allowed to continue to compete
for promotional posts within the British service. The British service had sup-
plied nearly 90 per cent of the promotional opportunities for Irish civil servants.
The loss of that opportunity opened up a depressing prospect of a lifetime of
assistant clerkship. This also suggests that the lower ranks of the Irish civil
service, though more nationalist, were not necessarily separatist.
In general the statement made it clear that it was expected that what it
described as ‘the natural channels’ of promotion from within the ranks would
be clearly laid down in any amended legislation, and followed. The statement
also strongly expressed the preference within the Irish civil service for the
extension of entry exclusively by open competitive examination. Where a
vacancy occurred for a post that required specialist qualifications the vacancy
should be publicly advertised with particulars of the qualifications required.
These posts could also be filled through promotion from within the service
by a limited competition or a qualifying examination. The 1917 committee
identified the Civil Service Committee established by the 1914 Act to deal with
42 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:09  Page 42
questions affecting the rights of existing officers as an important strategic
advantage, one that diluted Treasury power, and asked for increased represen-
tation on, and increased powers for, that committee. They asked that the com-
mittee be increased to five members with two members elected by the Irish civil
service, and that the quorum of the committee should be three. They also
wanted the Civil Service Committee to be empowered to act as a court of
appeal for any civil servant unhappy with his retirement terms.156
Attitudes toward the Irish civil service were generally less sympathetic with
allegations of shirking war service being bandied about. Also the 1916 Rising had
revealed that the Irish civil service had within its ranks a lower standard of loyalty
than was expected. The report of the Convention contented itself with pious
generalities rather than specific measures. The report suggested that an Irish civil
service commission, following as closely as possible English practices and with
Unionist representation, be established to regulate competitive examinations for
admission to the public services, to determine salaries appropriate to Ireland, to
decide on promotions and to exercise the patronage of higher appointments.157
Walter Long and the Irish civil service
On 9 April 1918 Lloyd George announced that Ireland was to have both con-
scription and a new measure of self-government. Walter Long was persuaded
to act as chairman of the drafting committee on the new Home Rule Bill.158 The
key figure on the GCICS was its chairman, Barlas of the LGB, a veteran of
every civil servant Home Rule committee since 1893 and a diligent worker in
the  corridors of political power. Edward Saunderson, second son of Colonel
Saunderson, the first leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, gave Barlas access to
the cabinet through his close relationship with Walter Long. Long had been
instrumental in getting Saunderson a permanent post at the LGB and then pro-
motion to the coveted and influential post of private secretary to the new Lord
Lieutenant French in April 1918. The LGB seems to have been a fertile source
for civil servants of impeccable ‘die-hard’ unionist opinion. From there Sam
Watt was parachuted into position as private secretary to the new Chief
Secretary Ian Macpherson in early 1919, over the heads of two better-qualified
Catholic candidates. Saunderson remained Long’s creature and as a unionist
‘die-hard’ he exercised a malign influence on Lord French.159
There was little prospect of a Home Rule measure being actually passed by
parliament in 1918 but any bill that was produced would help set out the terms
under which any future Irish settlement would be made.160 It was in that spirit
that Barlas immediately wrote a private letter to Saunderson, before a meeting
of the Home Rule committee. What Barlas asked was that Saunderson should
contact Long ‘who has always been sympathetic to the Irish civil servants’ and
pass on to him a copy of the 1917 statement with an offer to meet with Barlas
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who could convey the fears of the civil service and the hope that he might
address these in the bill.161
Long immediately replied to Barlas and, in an exchange of letters, Barlas
 outlined the principles that ought to guide the civil service clauses. Barlas
 complained that the Irish Convention had ‘contented themselves with a pious
expression of opinion that the rights of existing officers should be preserved’.
The only practical suggestion that had been made was the establishment of an
Irish civil service commission. The position of the Irish civil service would be
anything but secure under any Irish government likely to be elected in the cir-
cumstances of anti-conscription agitation. Barlas was himself quite fearful,
more so probably than the majority of the lower ranks of the service. ‘The
feeling in the greater part of the country is notoriously anti-British’ he told
Long, and ‘civil servants transferred will be in a much more precarious posi-
tion now than they would have been in had the 1914 Act come into operation
3 or 4 years ago’. It was his position that the GCICS statement of 1917 was no
longer sufficient to protect the interests of the civil service. While mindful of
the importance of the difficult question of loss of prospects and security
regarding promotion (at the core of the 1917 statement and mainly affecting
civil servants determined to stay on) Barlas was of the opinion that ‘the whole
thing narrows itself down to the financial penalties to be imposed on any new
government for removing civil servants without just cause or for alteration of
their present rates of remuneration and status’.162 He wanted the British gov-
ernment to legislate so that any future Home Rule governments would find
it not only administratively difficult but also financially crippling to impose
cuts on the civil service. Long then forwarded to Sir Robert Chalmers at the
Treasury an edited version of Barlas’s letter, containing the requested legislative
changes, along with a copy of the 1917 statement. The 1918 Home Rule pro-
posal petered out, but Walter Long was now entrenched as the cabinet liaison
with the Irish administration and the primary influence on Irish legislation.
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2Dublin Castle in crisis, 1918–21
Introduction
T       created new pressures on the civilservice in Britain. The government, alarmed at the rise in numbers of civil
servants created by wartime demands on the State, was determined to reduce
its size and cost. The civil servants focused on organising to resist the Treasury’s
attempt to reassert control of numbers and pay. An arbitration system, the
Whitley Councils, that acted as a powerful incentive to organisation, was no
sooner devised than it came under attack from the Treasury. Meanwhile the
demand of demobilised soldiers for State employment created another sort of
pressure as the civil service associations identified these men as potential
threats to hard won gains. The civil service responded to these pressures by a
wave of organisation and consolidation of associations. The Irish civil service
joined in this wave, but it also faced its own pressures. First and foremost were
the increasingly complex forms of Home Rule being devised by the cabinet
Irish situation committee under Walter Long. At the same time, opinion in
Whitehall began to find agreement with the long-standing view of nationalists
that saw the Castle government as itself an ‘Irish problem’. Within the cabinet
a consensus emerged on the necessity of administrative reform while disagree-
ment continued on political reform. Administrative reform meant applying to
the Castle the sort of reorganisation that was being proposed for the British
service. Whether that was what was required is a question that was not asked.
A further pressure on the Irish civil service was the victory of Sinn Féin in the
December 1918 election. Transformed into a mass party by the entirely erro-
neous des cription of the 1916 Rising as a ‘Sinn Féin’ rebellion, the party now
dominated Irish nationalist representation. In January 1919 the Sinn Féin MPs
met in Dublin and declared themselves to be, as Dáil Éireann [the Assembly of
Ireland], the legitimate government of the Irish republic declared in 1916. On
the same day an attack on the RIC by the reorganised Irish Volunteers, now
describing itself as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), launched the war against
the British State in Ireland.
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Post-war civil service organisation
The wartime expansion of government in Britain created both alarm at the
growing cost of administration and a consciousness of the defects of the
administrative machine.1 The entire British civil service that had been 73,000
in 1914 had grown to 193,000 by 1919. Of this increase of 120,000 about
72,000 could be laid at the new wartime departments and 48,000 at the older
departments. In Whitehall a consensus emerged on the need to reduce the size
and cost of government while improving the civil service.2 The single most
important administrative change to emerge out of these enquiries was the
formal strengthening of Treasury control of the civil service. In Whitehall the
post-war retirement of many senior civil servants created an opportunity to
reorganise the Treasury and impose the control of the civil service that had
eluded reformers. Between September 1919 and March 1920 the Treasury was
reorganised into three divisions of finance, supply and establishment. The
status of the permanent secretary to the Treasury as head of the civil service
was confirmed, as was the power of the Treasury to regulate and control the
departments of government.3 The collection of loosely connected depart-
ments that characterised Whitehall was reorganised into a highly centralised
bureaucratic apparatus. The organisation of the civil service was rationalised
and restructured. Departmental grades were to be abandoned and the entire
civil service was to be assimilated into the new and universal system of admin-
istrative, executive and clerical grades. This would facilitate the allocation of
staff between the different departments of the government and the most
efficient deployment of civil servants.
As the State transformed its own administrative structures that transforma-
tion in turn necessitated a change in the way the civil service organised to deal
with the State, its employer. These years comprise a period of the most rapid
organisation in the history of civil service associations.4 By 1920 British civil ser-
vants were organised in de facto trade unions that were using vigorous united
action, demanding collective negotiation and affiliating with the broader trade
union movement. The inhibiting effect of hierarchical structures, status and
competitive promotions evaporated under the pressure of rapid change. The
main objective of all civil service associations was to end Treasury dominance
and win some control over their conditions, preferably through a permanent
parliamentary committee or arbitration system.5
In Ireland the civil service joined this mobilisation. Despite the fact that
the wartime experience of the two services was so radically different, most
civil service organisations in Ireland were offshoots of British organisations.
Whereas the British service experienced a huge expansion the Irish service
largely atrophied, as Ireland was in many respects marginal to the war effort. A
few departments experienced a small growth in the number of temporaries,
52 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:09  Page 52
but these hardly matched the loss of permanent officers on military service.
Apart from some shell factories the Ministry of Munitions, the engine of civil
service growth in Britain, did not organise in Ireland. The other ‘mushroom’
ministry, the Ministry of Food, was irrelevant in Ireland where food produc-
tion and not rationing was the priority.6 For the Irish civil service there were
the added and very local issues of Home Rule, partition and the challenge of
the counter-State posed by Dáil Éireann, all problems of which the British
service had no concern. But as a result of the war the concerns and interests of
civil servants in Ireland on pay and conditions matched those of the British
service and, based on that shared concern, the wave of organisation in Britain
reached and transformed the Irish service. They shared the view that the main
problem facing the civil service was the Treasury with its apparent contempt
for all other departments of the State.
The civil service associations and alliances, formed under the pressure of
war and post-war conditions, were emphatically fighting organisations. Irish
organisation began as local branches of British associations, reflecting not only
a general trend in trade union organisation but also the development of general
all-service classes across the United Kingdom.7 A new civil service leadership
emerged from this period of organisation. The surge of organisation and the
new leadership that emerged reflects the fact that there was a great deal of dis-
content in the Irish civil service that had nothing to do with Home Rule. In fact
among many of the lower-grade Irish civil servants there was an expectation
that a national government would provide both better opportunities and better
redress for their grievances than the British Treasury.8
Irish civil servants participated in the wave of organisation, sent delegates to
meetings, joined in demonstrations and negotiated alongside their British col-
leagues. That the Castle administration in Ireland was a failure was axiomatic
for Irish nationalists. By the end of the war this also became the view of a
significant section of the British administrative and political elite. This realisa-
tion was born not only from the defects of the Castle apparatus but also of the
more penetrating scrutiny of the whole civil service as a result of the war.
The first and foremost issue driving organisation in both Britain and Ireland
was pay. During the First World War prices rose rapidly, leading to a general
agitation among workers for pay increases. In 1915 two million working days
were lost in strikes in Britain. Within the civil service the strict Treasury rule
that pay claims could only be considered at departmental level was over-
whelmed by the rapid inflation. After the Treasury rejected a pay claim by the
postal workers the government, fearing a strike, referred the claim to an arbi-
trator. The reward of the ‘war bonus’, a variable top-up to basic salaries, by the
arbitrator Sir James Woodhouse, announced in July 1915, not only marks the
first increase awarded to civil servants in compensation for the increased cost
of living, it also marks the wartime marginalisation of the Treasury in these
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matters. The increase was extended later in 1915 to all civil servants whose basic
salary did not exceed fifty shillings per week. The continued rise in prices led
to further applications for increases. As the bonus was initially small and
inflation continued all civil servants therefore had a common and immediate
grievance in the decline in real salaries.
The increased pressure of applications led to the establishment of the civil
service conciliation and arbitration board early in 1917, thus taking pay deter-
mination entirely out of the hands of the Treasury.9 The conciliation and arbi-
tration board issued thirteen awards in the period 1917–19, all of which took
the form of percentage additions (called war bonuses) to basic salaries in com-
pensation for the rise in the cost of living.10 Added to the issue of inadequate
pay were issues of grading structures and promotional opportunities. The
expansion of administration that had begun under the Liberal government and
mushroomed in the war had not led to an expansion of opportunity. Many of
the senior posts in the new departments were filled by nomination rather than
by promotion with patronage taking on new forms. 
The establishment of the arbitration board was a tremendous incentive to
organisation as it was only through associations or trade unions that represen-
tations could be effectively made. With inflation continuing the associations
had to return again and again to the arbitrator, using arbitration to perfect
organisation. The Treasury began to respond to Irish departmental claims with
offers. These offers were calculated to avoid the necessity of an arbitration
hearing and perhaps also to avoid revealing the incoherence of the Castle
administration.11 This in turn encouraged organisation. As the arbitration
system became established and as inflation surged ahead the number of civil
service associations more than doubled from 80 in 1913 to 194 at the war’s
end.12
Whitley Councils in the civil service
As early as 1916 the British government, recognising the changes that the war
had brought about in British industry and fearful of the growing militancy of
shop stewards, accepted that trade unions and collective bargaining had become
a normal feature of the workplace and looked to foster more co-operative indus-
trial relations in the post-war world. A committee of officials from employer
bodies and trade unions was appointed, under the chairmanship of the Deputy
Speaker of the House of Commons J.H. Whitley, to make proposals for ‘secur-
ing a permanent improvement in relations between employers and workmen
and to recommend ways of systematically reviewing industrial relations in the
future’.13 The Whitley report, as it became known, recommended the creation
of joint worker-employer industrial councils. Whitleyism was not intended to
extend beyond industrial employment but the civil service associations argued
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that the government ought to set an example by instituting a Whitley Council
for its own employees, the civil service.14 Sir Thomas Heath, Assistant Secretary
to the Treasury, was appointed to chair a sub-committee to draw up a scheme of
Whitleyism for administrative staffs. The Heath committee offered crumbs to
the civil service associations; consultation and a promise of a ‘greater share in
and responsibility for the determination and observance’ of their conditions of
work. But it restated the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which meant that
Whitley Councils could not diminish the right of a minister (read Treasury) to
accept or reject the conclusions of any joint council. These councils as envisaged
by Heath could never be more than advisory and consultative.15 More than
 anything it was the threatened recrudescence of unfettered Treasury control,
personified by Heath, that galvanised the civil service associations. At a packed
Caxton Hall meeting with Chancellor Austen Chamberlain, a meeting attended
by several Irish representatives, the civil service showed a remarkable discipline.
Led by the postal workers representative Stuart-Bunning, the meeting unani-
mously rejected Chamberlain’s plea to ‘give it a go’ and demanded that a provi-
sional joint committee of staff and official sides be directed to draw up a detailed
scheme for a Whitley Council in the civil service. The Heath report was con-
signed to the dustbin and on 3 July 1919, a mass meeting approved the resolu-
tions of the joint conference of official and staff representatives, jointly chaired
by Stuart-Bunning and Malcolm Ramsay (first controller of establishments
at the Treasury), proposing a two-tier National Whitley Council for the civil
service with departmental councils of departmental heads (not politicians as
the civil service wanted) representing the official side and representatives of the
civil service associations representing the staff side, and with an over-arching
national council representing the government and the staff associations.16
Notwithstanding its many limitations the National Whitley Council was a great
advance for civil servants. For the first time the civil service associations now had
a determining rather than a mere consultative role in their own work conditions.
The Irish civil servants had asked that the Ramsay and Stuart-Bunning com-
mittee establish a separate national council for Ireland. However, the commit-
tee concluded that it was not competent to make any definite recommendation
and merely expressed an opinion that ‘questions exclusively affecting the con-
ditions of service of Irish civil servants must be dealt with by joint bodies on
which Irish civil servants have full and direct representation’.17 The Irish civil
service delegates evidently had considerable sympathy among their British col-
leagues. The only amendment to the report of the provisional committee pre-
sented to the mass meeting of civil servants was that moved by the Irish
delegates and fully supported by the rest of the service. The amendment asked
for a concurrent meeting of Irish staff and official sides to frame proposals
for the setting up of separate machinery to safeguard Irish interests. The
Chancellor, recognising that some arrangement would be necessary to meet the
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situation in Ireland, where devolved government was imminent, accepted the
Irish amendment.18 Two weeks later a meeting of the Irish Provisional Joint
Council was held in the Privy Council chamber at Dublin Castle.19 The provi-
sional committee was to ‘frame proposals for the setting up of machinery to
safeguard Irish interests’.20 The official side was headed up by the Under-
Secretary James MacMahon and included most heads of departments. The
staff side represented the civil service grade associations rather than the depart-
mental associations.21 Most importantly, the Whitley Council staff side was
made up of the elected delegates of the associations. Therefore, because the
Irish civil service had few in the executive grades, the staff side of the Irish Civil
Service Joint Committee was dominated by the clerical grades, representing the
masses in the lower class of the service. James MacMahon was appointed chair-
man with Gerald Mulvin of the Irish Civil Service Alliance as vice-chairman.
Patrick Ryan acted as official side and Michael Gallagher as staff side secre-
taries.22 James MacMahon, because he was an Irishman who had risen through
the ranks from the second division, and also perhaps because he was Catholic
and sympathetic to nationalist aspirations for self-rule, was well regarded
by the staff side even though he was a wily negotiator who knew every ploy
available to the ranks out of which he had risen.23
A dispute arose immediately as to the power of the Irish council.
Chamberlain had ruled that the subjects that were proper for discussion by the
Irish council were those which, after reference to the National Council, are
agreed by that body [my italics] to be either (a) exclusively Irish questions, or
(b) exclusively Irish aspects of general questions. The staff side immediately
objected to giving the London-based national council prior authority to deter-
mine the issues that would be considered by the Irish committee, thus making
the Irish a sub-committee of the British body.24 The London officials of the
associations at the national council gave full support to the Irish demand for
an autonomous Irish Whitley Council, attending meetings alongside Michael
Gallagher, Gerald Mulvin and Thomas Murphy and reinforcing their argu-
ments.25 After several meetings through the autumn and winter, when it
seemed at times that the Irish committee would never come into real existence,
Chamberlain finally agreed to the deletion of the requirement for a prior ref-
erence to the national council. In March 1920 the national council delegated
power to the Irish committee to itself determine what were ‘exclusively’ Irish
questions or aspects of Irish questions, granting de facto autonomy to the Irish
body.26
The success of the staff side in securing autonomy for the Irish led to prob-
lems for the official side. In the confusion of authority that characterised the
Irish administration it was very difficult to determine which were the Irish
departments and therefore the appropriate departmental council to which
grievances should be brought. Staff members of the Inland Revenue belonged
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to an ‘imperial’ department. Should the officers of that department, who hap-
pened to be stationed in Dublin, participate in an Irish committee concerned
‘exclusively’ with Irish affairs? Should the staff of an imperial department be
allowed to bring ‘exclusively Irish’ problems to the Irish committee or should
they be brought to the departmental council in London? Giving the London-
based national council the power to determine what were ‘exclusively Irish’
issues would have secured the necessary control. Now that the Irish committee
had thrown over that control there was a real danger that civil servants in the
Irish departments would be able to secure double representation on the
Whitley Councils of Ireland and of Great Britain and use one to secure
gains that had been denied in the other in an administrative version of the
‘Midlothian Question’. MacMahon’s advice to the official side to use the
proviso ‘exclusively Irish’ to intervene if it was felt that the Irish committee was
straying into the territory of the national council was hardly adequate and
clearly this was an area ripe for confusion.27 The staff of the Irish branches of
British departments, conscious of the distance from Whitehall and the peculi-
arities of the Irish situation, were themselves pressing for local departmental
councils.28
The Irish civil servants now had two effective organisations for the service as
a whole: the ad hoc GCICS that had been around since 1893 representing the
entire Irish civil service, in the senior grades for the most part, well-connected
politically and accepted as competent to negotiate with the government on the
conditions attached to Home Rule; and alongside, a representative and formal
Irish Whitley Committee to negotiate on general service conditions, made of
nominated representatives of the different grades and classes but dominated by
the clerical grades and regarded with suspicion by the Treasury. The Whitley
Committee was the Irish expression of a British original, dominated like the
British organisation by the representatives of the quasi-trade union civil service
associations.
Organisation in the Irish civil service
The relationship between the Irish and British organisations was complex. The
Irish associations had considerable autonomy and took an independent line
on Irish issues. The Irish civil service was more militant than the British; its
demands for salary increases were usually set higher and conference speeches
were more pugnacious.29 The April 1920 strike in support of the Irish political
prisoners, which was supported by the Irish associations, was regarded with
some awe by the British civil service as was the decision by the Irish Civil
Service Alliance (CSA) to establish a strike fund. British civil servants hesitated
to even contemplate using the strike weapon.30 However, the Irish organisa-
tions tended to look to London for leadership and direction and were quick to
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criticise that leadership for any tardiness in responding to Irish issues. Even
as late as October 1921 the executive officers in the CDB looked to the London
leadership to help their claim for reorganisation.31 On the other hand the
London leadership were wary that too much attention to Irish issues would
raise the danger of fragmentation of the associations into geographic units
with the Scottish members taking their lead from Dublin.32
The emphasis on class and grade organisation of the British associations was
a break with Irish organisational traditions, which were emphatically depart-
mental and ‘all-Irish’. Because the Irish departments had in effect a single polit-
ical head, the Chief Secretary, the permanent heads had little interference in
how they ran their departments and so every civil servant’s career depended
to an uncomfortable degree on their head of department. The Irish clerical
grades generally held the official Treasury representative in the Castle, Maurice
Headlam, in contempt.33 Also, there was little movement of civil servants
between the Irish departments.
The movement toward large grade-based organisations was not welcome to
one small group, the professional civil servants. These, despite their title, were
the only civil servants not trained as civil servants. Rather, they were profes-
sionally qualified auditors, surveyors and engineers who happened to work for
the State. Discontented with the dominance achieved by the clerical grades, in
February 1920 a group of professional civil servants met in Dublin and formed
the Institution of Professional Civil Servants (Ireland) (IPCS).34 The creation
of the IPCS and the constitution it adopted closely followed on the foundation
of a similar Institution of Professional Civil Servants in England in January
1919. Just like the English institution the IPCS was essentially an alliance of the
associations of the professional and technical civil servants in the various gov-
ernment departments.35 During the summer of 1920 the IPCS canvassed the
possibility of affiliating with the English institution, but as the English institu-
tion was less than enthusiastic and as the constitutional situation in Ireland
became more uncertain the proposal was allowed to lapse.36 By the time of the
annual general meeting of March 1921, the first annual report of the IPCS
could record eleven constituent associations, 367 full members and 71 associ-
ate members.37
The Association of Staff Clerks and Other Civil Servants (ASCOCS) was
formed in 1916 to organise a ‘war bonus’ claim for civil servants with salaries
exceeding £300 per annum. The Dublin branch of ASCOCS (organising the
senior grades on salaries over £400 per annum) was an affiliate of the British
organisation along with Malta and West Africa.38 The Dublin branch was
organised by J.E. Highton who also acted as the staff clerks’ delegate on the 1917
Civil Service Committee on the Home Rule Bill. He represented Irish staff
clerks at a ‘war bonus’ appeal in November 1917, but the London organisation
seem generally to have had little contact with the Dublin members.39 By early
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1919 the Dublin branch was demanding separate representation at the general
meeting of all civil service associations at Caxton Hall, called to co-ordinate a
response to the Heath committee report.40 ASCOCS remained aloof from the
movement for cross-service unity. An invitation from the Civil Service Alliance
(CSA) to join in a campaign for the abolition of Treasury control and security
for promotion, an invitation supported by the Irish staff clerks, was rejected on
the grounds that the clerical grades alliance had a membership ‘of an essentially
different character from that of the Staff Clerks’, an example of the inhibiting
effect of grade snobbery on civil service organisation.41 ASCOCS instead joined
with the Society of Civil Servants (SCS), which was more a club than a fighting
organisation. The Irish membership expressed their dissatisfaction with the
SCS, criticised the failure of the London executive to keep the Irish members
informed on issues and, in 1920, demanded and got a seat on the executive
committee.42 The Irish chairman was Thomas A. Murphy, the Irish secretary
was Mr J. McInerney. The tendency through 1920 was for the Irish branch,
under the leadership of Dr. Cornelius (Conn) Murphy, Michael Smithwick,
Murphy and McInerney, to take an independent and more militant line on
reorganisation and re-grading. The Irish members seem to have been regarded
as a welcome ginger group by the London executive and the Irish membership
at 490 was not insignificant in comparison with the British figure of 1,249.43
With the fragmentation of the grade under reorganisation (all staff clerks above
£450 were automatically re-graded as higher executive, those in the range
£200–400 were to be graded individually) it was decided to amalgamate with
the Association of Executive Officers (AEO) and to leave the SCS and join with
the CSA. This represents a more militant attitude born of the failure of the
association to win better terms in the civil service reorganisation. It was a
course fully supported by the Irish members.44
The most shadowy group in the civil service were the temporary clerks.
Departments could employ temporary clerks to meet pressure of work without
bringing it to the notice of the Treasury. Once in a department they tended to
become fixtures and, if efficient, ended up doing higher work than they had
been originally recruited to do. In Dublin Castle Headlam noted that the assis-
tant clerks were extremely jealous of the temporary clerks, whom they regarded
as a patronage class recruited on a sectarian basis, undermining the conditions
of their grade and damaging their prospects.45
The most numerous civil service class was the assistant clerk, a Treasury
grade devised to fill the gap between the first and second divisions and one that
constituted a low-paid ‘submerged class’ of the service.46 In 1902 the assistant
clerks of the government departments in Dublin combined to present a united
demand for improved pay directly to the Treasury, bypassing their depart-
mental heads. The example of the Dublin clerks was followed in Edinburgh
and London and led to the founding of the Assistant Clerks Association (ACA)
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in 1904, under the leadership of W.J. Brown, the most militant of all civil
service organisers, along with David Milne.47 The aim of the ACA was to recruit
all clerical grade staff in the civil service and to win the right to deal directly
with the Treasury. The ACA campaigned for a ‘living wage’ and better promo-
tional prospects. From 1911 it published the journal Red Tape. Dublin assistant
clerks joined the ACA from its beginning but through their departmental
organisations rather than as specifically Irish clerks.48 In 1904 the Dublin
departments with members in the ACA were the GPO, the ILC and the LGB.
Each year a few of the other departments joined in; the Inland Revenue, DATI,
the Board of Works and so on. The growth in membership may well have
reflected the slow movement of individual assistant clerks through the depart-
ments bringing with them the habit of organisation.49 In 1921 the ACA merged
with the Post Office Engineering Clerical Assistants to form the Clerical
Officers’ Association (COA). In 1921 the COA merged in turn with the lower
section of the re-graded ASCOCS members to become the Civil Service
Clerical Association (CSCA).50
A key figure in the expansion of clerical organisation in Ireland was Michael
J. Gallagher. Gallagher entered the civil service through the competitive exam-
inations and worked in London in the GPO engineering section. Through con-
tacts in the Irish Parliamentary Party, the sort of backstairs influence that
(rightly) he was later to condemn, he secured a transfer back to the Dublin
NHIC office.51 His London experience, brief though it was, made him more
self-conscious of his status as Irish, Catholic and as a ‘black-coated worker’.
From London he also brought back a conviction of the need for civil service
organisation. The fight for a war bonus was the campaign that marked him out
as a natural organiser.
Tom Barrington of the DATI statistics section, who later was to exert a pro-
found influence on Irish administrative thought, wrote an analysis of wartime
rising prices and their impact on civil service salaries for the Irish CSA.52 This
short pamphlet had a revolutionary impact on civil service thinking on salary
claims and led directly to the indexing of the war bonus. Barrington, using the
rather homely metaphor of the dairy farmer diluting milk, proved that the
 government had been ‘adulterating’ the value of money by ‘watering it down’
through issuing paper pounds that were not backed up by gold reserves. In
effect this was a dilution of the purchasing power of the pound sterling. What
civil servants and other workers were demanding therefore was not an increase
in salaries but restitution by the government for the adulteration in the value
of money. Barrington had in fact produced a short and brilliant analysis of
inflation, a phenomenon unfamiliar to a generation used to stable prices.
Gallagher was able to use the civil servant’s habits of record keeping to sub-
stantiate Barrington’s argument. By collecting and analysing the grocery bills
of many civil servants, which tended to be the same items over the years, he
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could show that the pound in 1920 bought far fewer items than it had in 1914.
The cost of maintaining the same standard of living had increased and there-
fore the onus lay with the government to either restore the value of the pound
or offer a compensatory increase. Civil servants could no longer be apologetic
in demanding pay increases, rather the government should be apologetic for
causing the need for them.53
Whereas most Irish delegates of the other civil service associations seem to
have been relatively unknown in the London offices Gallagher was close to W.J.
Brown. Gallagher brought Brown to Dublin to ginger up the organisation and
assist in a recruitment drive. He attended the annual general meeting of the
ACA in London and on one occasion was chosen to second a militant motion
brought forward by Brown to the annual conference.54 Gallagher imbibed
some of the ideas of the guild socialists while in London and advocated the
‘control of the civil service by civil servants and the abolition of grades’.55 He
affiliated the 450–member Civil Service Assistant Clerks, Dublin branch, into
the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress (ILPTUC) in 1920, the only
civil service organisation outside the Post Office to do so.56 He was described
as the ‘Irish WJB’ with the appearance of a ‘mild-mannered pedagogue’ but
‘pugnacious if opposed’, whose aggression frequently made enemies but who
was also a ‘tireless worker for the interests of his class’.57
In 1919 the executives of both the Irish and British Second Division Clerks
Association (SDA) met, implying their essentially separate existence, and
promised a more sympathetic relationship in which the London executive
would do all that was necessary to defend the interests of the Irish membership
under any Home Rule parliament.58 In 1920 following the reorganistion of the
civil service, the SDA was renamed the Association of Executive Officers
(AEO).59 The AEO was relatively active in pursuing the case of Irish members
during the 1920–21 reorganisation of the Irish departments under A.J.P.
Waterfield (see pp. 00–00).60 There was a suggestion that the Irish AEO was not
paying its fair share of the overheads of the association, but the resolution
of that issue involved an even closer affiliation between the Irish and British
organisations. This does suggest that Home Rule was not regarded as a barrier
to continuing trade union organisation within the civil service executive grades
of a self-governing Ireland.61 The Irish organisers of the AEO were Mr R.
Clarke, Mr Attride and Michael Smithwick (formerly of ASCOCS), after his
transfer out of the Staff Clerk grade. The key figure was, however, Sam Sloan
of DATI, regarded already as a legend in civil service organisation.62 Sloan was
described as a ‘typical Ulsterman’; aggressive and blunt in negotiation. He was
exceptionally well-versed in the minutiae of regulations and unequalled in his
recall of commission and inquiry reports.63 He later transferred to Belfast and
ended up as establishment officer in the Northern Ireland Department of
Finance, a case of poacher turning gamekeeper. Within the broader movement
Dublin Castle in crisis, 1918–21 61
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:09  Page 61
of civil service organisation the AEO and the COA were to the forefront of the
movement toward a general organisation of civil servants.64
The civil service, while generating grade organisations, was also forming
federal organisations. In 1909 the Civil Service Federation (CSF) was formed as
a cross-grade movement.65 It was originally intended that it would act as an
all-service organisation to agitate for a standing committee of the House of
Commons to form a committee of appeals on civil service grievances. Under the
influence of the postal unions, always the most radical, the purpose of the CSF
then became explicitly political, demanding the right for civil servants to contest
elections. This turn from a campaign on pay and conditions to one on politics,
allied with the tendency of the postal unions to go it alone in fighting pay claims,
led to the disaffiliation of the clerical and second division associations.66
In 1916, building on the success of a joint campaign on hours of work, the
ACA, the Second Division Association, the Federation of Women Civil Servants
and the Civil Service Typists Association combined in the Civil Service Alliance
(CSA) with the objective of promoting the efficiency of the civil service and pro-
viding the ‘conditions of a good life’ for civil servants.67 As the CSA grew it
restricted membership to organisations representing civil servants of clerical
associations with similar conditions (and therefore grievances), thus lessening
the possibility of the sort of rifts that had weakened the Federation. The CSA
represented 15,000 civil servants in the clerical grades of the United Kingdom.
In 1921 the CSA and the CSF merged to form the Civil Service Confederation
(CSC).
As the larger federal structures emerged the Irish followed the lead of the
British movement forming Irish federations with affiliate or branch status to
the British organisations. The Irish CSA of thirteen associations totalled 1,500
in comparison with over 24,000 in the British Alliance.68 The Irish CSA, along
with the Irish Association of Post Office Clerks (IAPOC), organised the largest
mass meeting ever by the Irish civil service in November 1919. The meeting was
called to protest at the recent 10 per cent offer made by the arbitration board.
The meeting approved resolutions calling for closer and more effective organ-
isation and greater union with outside workers, along with a readiness to use
the strike weapon. Only thus, it was said, could the civil service hope to win
justice.69
The leadership of the civil service associations
Sloan, along with Gallagher of the assistant clerks, Gerald Mulvin, Michael
Smithwick, Conn Murphy, Thomas A. Murphy, and Ronald J.P. Mortished
formed the backbone of Irish civil service organisation. What united all these
across their several classes and departments was a shared conviction that grade
exclusiveness was the weakness of the Irish service. They all voiced at some
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stage their support for the syndicalist concept of the ‘One Big Union’ for the
entire administrative, executive and clerical grades. Among these activists there
were two distinct groups, reflecting two different analyses of the situation they
now faced. Some of the civil service leadership, such as Gallagher, saw the func-
tion of the Irish organisations as being no more than maximising membership
in support of the London leadership. They saw Home Rule as no more and no
less an alteration in the conditions of service than reorganisation of depart-
ments or recasting grades.70 Priority had to be given to the struggle for pay and
re-grading, a struggle that was shared with the British civil service. Along with
Gallagher we could list Sam Sloan of the executive officers, Thomas A. Murphy
of the staff clerks, William F. Nally of the postal workers and Gerald Mulvin of
the Irish CSA. However, among the activists there were some who pressed for
what they saw as the necessity for a consciously nationalist outlook within civil
service associations in Ireland. This group would include Mortished, Michael
Smithwick and Dr Conn Murphy.
Mortished, while remaining a member of the AEO, was a founder of the Irish
Civil Service Union (ICSU), a federal organisation ‘open to all civil servants,
working to promote complete unity of organisation in the service in Ireland’.
He was also editor of its journal the Irish Civil Servant.71 The origins of the
ICSU lay in the order in council of 1918 demanding that civil servants take an
oath of allegiance to the Crown. As has been noted this arose from a political
and newspaper campaign alleging that disloyal civil servants were sabotaging
the war effort. The oath was not regarded as controversial among British civil
servants but in Ireland it was seen as a manoeuvre by the loyalists in Dublin
Castle to get at nationalist-minded civil servants. Mortished was one of those
at a meeting in the Forester’s Hall called to establish a Society for the Protection
of the Rights of Civil Servants ‘open to established, unestablished and dises-
tablished civil servants’ out of which the ICSU was formed.72 Mortished had
already a reputation within the Treasury and the service for radical labour
views. Born in London of Irish parents, he was a graduate of the London School
of Economics where he was actively involved in socialist politics and where he
joined the Independent Labour Party. In 1909 he entered the civil service and
was sent to the Registry of Deeds in Dublin. He joined the Socialist Party of
Ireland and was close to Larkin and Connolly at a time of spectacular growth
for the syndicalist Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union (ITGWU).73 In
1914 he had been disciplined and forfeited two increments in pay for writing
articles in the Workers’ Republic critical of the war. He was again disciplined
during a Dublin dock strike of 1916 after a speech to a Liberty Hall meeting
condemning the clerical staff of the Dublin Steampacket Company as ‘black-
legs’ for continuing to work. He narrowly missed dismissal but did lose another
increment in salary. The speech was made in early April but the reaction came
in the aftermath to the Easter Rising. The site and the tenor of the speech
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 signalled sympathy, or even prior knowledge, of the Rising. Mortished was
eventually able to use his position as vice-chairman of the departmental
Whitley Council to win a restoration of his lost increments.74
Mortished used his editorship of the Irish Civil Servant to criticise the Irish
associations for merely imitating the British organisations. While ready to
acknowledge the achievements of Gallagher, Sloan, Murphy and Mulvin he
maintained that as much could have been achieved through the British associ-
ations, implying the redundancy of the Irish organisations. He urged the fusion
of all Irish organisations into a single national union, livelier and more aggres-
sive than the single-grade unions in Britain, imbued with class-consciousness
rather than grade exclusiveness, and ready to use the strike weapon.75 In his
writings he returned again and again to the theme that the Irish organisations
were being smothered by the ‘English’; and that an explicitly separatist agenda
was needed. By the summer of 1921 as ‘Carsonia’ (as he termed Northern
Ireland) was being established, he was writing that it was positively dangerous
for the Irish associations to give the British organisations the right to act on
behalf of the Irish civil servants.76
Mortished was unusual in that it was his labour activism that brought him
into civil service organisation. Other leaders emerged out of the cultural move-
ments. Michael Smithwick’s area of activism was the Irish language movement.
Both he and Conn Murphy were founder-members of the Gaelic League.
Smithwick (who gaelicised his name to Smidic) was close to Douglas Hyde, the
president of the League and Gaelic language scholar. Conn Murphy was a link
with the revolutionary movement. The first to be awarded a Ph.D from the
Royal University, he gave lectures on logic to civil servants, not to introduce
them to the beauty of philosophy but to prepare them for negotiation –
analysing arguments and spotting flawed logic. He was active in Sinn Féin
 politics. 77
For the civil service associations a significant achievement was that the reor-
ganisation of the civil service into the new administrative, executive and cleri-
cal grades was to be undertaken by the service itself through the Whitley
Councils and not by the Treasury. Whitley Councils of all the various govern-
ment departments were instructed to work out a departmental reorganisation
into the new grades, which was to be then submitted to the Treasury for final
approval.
Reorganisation necessarily opened the further question of assimilating civil
servants to new grades. The associations wanted ‘weight for age’ to apply; that
is any individual would be assimilated at the point of the new scale that he
would have achieved at his present age. The Treasury would only accept assim-
ilation at the same actual monetary point on the scale; that is a civil servant
would enjoy at best a modest rise in salary on assimilation even if the point of
assimilation represented far fewer years of service than actually served. A related
64 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:09  Page 64
issue was that of inflation continuing to erode wages at a steady rate. The ‘cost-
of-living committee’ established the 1914 cost of living as a baseline and
awarded periodic percentage increases to compensate for the rise in the cost of
living over that figure since 1914. In 1920 this stood at 130. The war bonus was
then calculated at 130 per cent over 1914 salary levels and was to be periodically
adjusted by the fall and rise of the prices index. This, it was hoped, would end
the perpetual battles with the Treasury followed by rounds of conciliation and
arbitration.78
The Government of Ireland Act, 1920
In October 1919 Walter Long was asked to chair the cabinet committee
on Ireland and to prepare a new Home Rule Bill for Ireland. The 1920
Government of Ireland Act, as shaped by Long, went through increasingly com-
plicated variations of devolution that provided for governments of Southern
and Northern Ireland, an Irish Council and a hypothetical future Irish parlia-
ment while retaining Westminster sovereignty. Long’s proposal for two limited
Home Rule assemblies, one based in Belfast for Ulster and one based in Dublin,
with an overarching Council of Ireland but reserving some services in
Whitehall, necessitated even further administrative confusion as it partitioned
sections of the civil service between north and south while retaining an impe-
rial service. Its only virtue was that, as it partitioned Ireland, it held the coali-
tion government together.79
The GCICS was reactivated, though the Dublin council of the CSCA now
regarded the Whitley committee as the better vehicle for defending the inter-
ests of the membership, referring to the GCICS as being no more than ‘useful’.
It was decided to continue representation on the general committee but there
is no record of any active engagement.80 The committee, based on years of
experience, used very different methods to those of the associations to put
forward and win its demands. While the associations were energetically using
the Whitley Councils to win the best deal on reorganisation and re-grading the
GCICS, or more accurately an inner coterie, was busy building up a network
of influence in the cabinet and the Treasury.
Barlas was again immediately in contact and supplied Long with a copy of
the ‘‘Statement by the General Committee of Irish Civil Servants as to their
position in view of further legislation affecting the Government of Ireland’.81
The victory of Sinn Féin in the December 1918 general election made Barlas
more pessimistic and even a little wistful for the comforts of the lost 1914 Act.
It was incontrovertible, he wrote, that
the position of Irish civil servants, especially those of fairly long service, will be
immeasurably more insecure now, having regard to recent developments, than it
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would have been if the Government of Ireland Act of 1914 had come into opera-
tion in that year. Civil servants not in sympathy with the views of any new gov-
ernment in this country will, almost certainly, have to vacate their positions and
the terms of compensation on retirement (either voluntary or compulsory) pro-
vided by the Act of 1914 should, therefore, be substantially improved.
He also feared that the power of the government in the 1914 Act to retain for
up to five years civil servants who might wish to retire would expose them to
intolerable pressures.82
Cabinet committee records and the relevant clauses of the 1920
Government of Ireland Act indicate that the GCICS executive committee,
exploiting the political access and status provided by the patronage of Long,
succeeded to a large degree in influencing and shaping the clauses on the civil
service.83 The 1919 statement asked that the concessions requested in 1917
should be granted along with additional concessions to meet the changed cir-
cumstances. The 1917 statement had concentrated on security for promotion
for civil servants continuing in the service of the new government. It had only
incidentally asked for improved terms for civil servants retiring either volun-
tarily or under compulsion. The 1919 supplementary statement was much
more focused on the terms of retirement, the special classes of civil servant on
the autonomous Irish boards and the consequences of partition. Barlas
wanted increased representation from one to three members for civil servants
on the Civil Service Committee established by the 1914 Act, which had the
authority to permit retirements and award pensions. He asked that the avail-
ability of the special terms of retirement be extended from seven to ten years
after the appointed day. The voluntary retirement terms had been limited in
the 1914 Act to officers under sixty years of age. He wanted the age limit
extended to sixty-five, reflecting the large cohort of senior officers approach-
ing retirement age. Under the 1914 Act the Civil Service Committee had the
power to postpone voluntary retirement indefinitely; Barlas wanted this
limited to two years.
Ian Macpherson, Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1919–20, adopted the cause of
the GCICS and supplied the cabinet committee with a brief in which he
endorsed Barlas’s pessimism. He wrote, ‘It is contended with some reason that
safeguards as to security of tenure, promotion, prospects and transfers, are
likely to prove of little practical value in the case at least of the South of Ireland
Government, and this consideration strengthens the claim for improvement of
the terms of retirement, whether voluntary, compulsory, or “permissive”. This
is the most important question that arises.’84 Macpherson was in favour of
adding to the power of the Civil Service Committee and of increasing the civil
service representation on it. He was at the same time mindful of the danger of
offering terms for retirement so generous they would strip the new govern-
ments of their entire civil service.
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Worthington-Evans, Minister for Pensions, was willing to extend the civil
servants representation on the statutory Civil Service Committee, though to
two members only and not to the three requested by Barlas. On limiting the
stay on voluntary retirement to two years, he was agreeable. He also supported
extending the upper age limit for the special terms to sixty-five but did not
support the extension of the option to retire under special terms to ten years
after the appointed day.85
The cabinet memoranda plainly stated that ‘in deference to representations
from the Committee of Irish Civil Servants’ the terms of compensation for
officers who retired were now more generous than those in the 1914 Act.86
Hitherto a ‘civil servant’ had been a person paid out of a fund voted by parlia-
ment. The committee proposed to define an ‘Irish officer’ in terms so broad it
included all and every person whether permanent or temporary, in depart-
ments of State or autonomous boards, paid by vote, fees or allowances. Pension
rights were also to be extended to categories that, up to then, had none, such
as the CDB officers, provided the Treasury processed the necessary regulations
before the appointed day. It would not do if Home Rule legislation imposed on
the Irish governments concessions that had been refused by the British gov-
ernment. Compensation for retirement was, however, the nub of the issue so
far as Barlas was concerned. Here the cabinet committee were prepared to meet
the civil service without reservation. The transitional period, it was proposed,
would be extended from five to seven years. This was not as generous as Barlas’s
ten years, but it still extended beyond the retiring age of a great number of the
senior civil servants. The terms of permissive retirement were equally gener-
ous. Under the 1914 Act the Civil Service Committee permitted retirement if a
civil servant could show that his position had been altered to his detriment.
Under the 1920 bill it was required only that the position had been materially
altered. Also, under the 1914 Act the question of permitting retirement arose
only after the transitional period of five years. After all, an officer, if he did not
like the new conditions but was not compelled to retire, could simply opt for
voluntary retirement during the five years. The difficulty for such an officer,
however, was that the terms of voluntary retirement were much less generous
than those for permissive retirement. The intent of the 1914 Act was to encour-
age civil servants to stay on for at least five years by offering security that con-
ditions would not get worse and might even get better after the transition. The
1920 Bill, in response to Barlas and the civil service representations, abolished
that distinction. An officer retiring without permission could expect the same
terms as an officer retiring with permission. By agreeing to extend the normal
retirement age from sixty to sixty-five, and by extending the transition period
to seven years, the actual sums of compensation (which were based on years to
retirement and transitional years) were greatly increased. The compensation
scale of the 1914 Act became the minimum of the new scale, with a maximum
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of two-thirds of retiring salary. The cabinet committee also proposed to allow
the civil servants two, rather than one, representative on the Civil Service
Committee. The two representatives would be drawn from north and south
and the committee was extended to seven.87
Clauses 54–9 with the eighth schedule of the 1920 Government of Ireland
Act were the achievement of the GCICS. This achievement was the result of
a long campaign that began with the 1911 overtures to the Home Rule Bill of
1912. The achievement was, for a while, overshadowed by the revolutionary
changes that swept Castle government into the dustbin of history. However,
those achievements were vital in allowing the civil service to negotiate the
shifting direction and speed of reform as the Irish administration, now in the
hands of an English ‘junta’ of elite civil servants, turned to face the challenge
of partition and a revolutionary State claiming true legitimacy. Since 1911 the
committee had succeeded in forging a combination that crossed classes,
grades, departments and the political allegiance of nationalist and unionist
civil servants. Sharing many of the same activists with the associations and
the departmental Whitley Councils it relied exclusively on personal and
private contacts and not at all on mass mobilisation or the fraternal support
of fellow officials. By persistent but discreet lobbying within the corridors of
power it succeeded in shaping and amending legislation so as to win better
terms and security for the status, pay and promotions and pensions of the
Irish civil service. Most significantly of all it succeeded in winning what was
in effect a ‘written constitution’. By 1920 the vested interests of Irish civil ser-
vants, who previously were employed ‘at pleasure’, had been transformed
into rights that were legal and parliamentary, and therefore defensible at law.
The relationship binding the new Irish State and its civil service would be
contractual.
Walter Long’s Government of Ireland Bill, which would establish a Council
of Ireland with two local parliaments in Belfast and Dublin, began to make its
passage through parliament. If, as appeared likely, it was accepted by the Ulster
Unionists but rejected by Sinn Féin then the government would partition
the country and rule the south by military government.88 A new dual policy
emerged of smashing Dáil Éireann while proffering the Government of Ireland
Bill as a final settlement. Greenwood’s Restoration of Order (Ireland) Act
imposed imprisonment without trial and courts martial in designated areas.
The ‘Black and Tans’ and the Auxiliaries bolstered the crumbling RIC as county
after county was put under martial law. It was also clear that the police and sol-
diers enjoyed considerable freedom in interpreting the law. Reprisals were
sanctioned and became official policy, destroying any legitimacy that the State
might have retained in British and international eyes. The only political policy
was the mechanical progress of the 1920 bill through parliament and the
 partition of the administration.
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The ‘Junta’ in Dublin Castle
Throughout the 1919–21 period, when the State in Ireland teetered on the edge
of collapse Sir Warren Fisher, Secretary to the Treasury and head of the civil
service, was deeply engaged in the most far-reaching reforms of the British civil
service.89 The entire civil service in Britain, from the senior to the most junior
ranks, through the departmental Whitley Councils, was now engaged in
 thinking about the problems of reorganisation and reform as part of post-war
reconstruction. It was inevitable that such thinking would influence policy on
Ireland. Since the failure of the 1917 Convention the Castle administration had
not come up with any politically creative ideas. The attempt to link Home Rule
and conscription in 1918 had proved a disaster and had boosted Sinn Féin. The
December 1918 general election results demonstrated that Sinn Féin now rep-
resented the majority of the Irish electorate. Concluding that no political solu-
tion was possible Dublin Castle turned to imposing coercion, a policy that
led increasingly to a militarisation of the administration.90 As H.A.L. Fisher
pointed out to Lloyd George, the strategy being pursued by the Irish govern-
ment would mean that Irish Home Rule, which was on the statute books,
would be accompanied by military law.91 A Castle clique of the new Chief
Secretary Ian Macpherson, the Viceroy Lord French, and the senior civil ser-
vants Sir John Taylor, W.P.J. Connolly, Edward Saunderson and Samuel Watt
supposed that everyone except ‘Ulster’, and all opinion that was not ‘loyal’, was
to be subject to indiscriminate coercion. Taylor, identified as the dominant per-
sonality in this centre of reaction, was unable to see that Dáil Éireann’s claim
to be the legitimate State presented a wholly different challenge than the ‘rick-
burning and cattle drives’ of earlier agitation.92 Under them the RIC was
further militarised and Sinn Féin, the political representatives of the majority
of the Irish people, was suppressed and its supporters punished. As the failure
of militarising the administration to deliver social order became evident, the
fault was laid at the door of the civil service administrators and not the policy.
The problem, it was alleged, was the unreliability or even incompetence of
 elements within the civil service. Lord French blamed the failure of his repres-
sion on the ‘weakness and inefficiency of some officials’ and moved to purge
the civil service of any officials with Sinn Féin sympathies, which meant all
Catholics in the administration came under suspicion.93 MacMahon, the
Catholic Under-Secretary, was marginalised as the ultra-loyalist Sir John Taylor
was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary, vaulting over the highly able Joseph
Brennan, a Catholic. Headlam was so determined to defend the status quo that
he secretly kept Unionist critics informed on the Irish policy of the govern-
ment, which is the most serious possible breach of civil service ethics.94 The
civil servants in the Castle split into two camps, those who backed MacMahon
and those who backed Taylor. The deepening politicisation of the bureaucracy
Dublin Castle in crisis, 1918–21 69
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:09  Page 69
in Dublin Castle fatally weakened the State as a culture of militarism expelled
anyone counselling dialogue with nationalism.95 The key role of the modern
civil servant, to inform, to advise and to warn, was a nullity. A culture of mili-
taristic machismo, revealed by the frequent accusation of ‘cold feet’ being
hurled against any who counselled caution, prevailed.96 Duggan remembered
this time as the ‘unhappiest twelve months of my civil service career’.97 General
Sir Joseph Byrne, the Catholic head of the RIC, was pushed out of office
because, Lord French alleged, ‘he had lost his nerve’ and was too soft on Sinn
Féin.98 Far from losing his nerve, however, he was in fighting form and com-
plained to the cabinet that the problem was the Castle government, which was
out of touch with all opinion save its own.99 As the challenge of the republican
forces grew the British government further militarised the administration.
Hamar Greenwood, who had no knowledge of Ireland and no cabinet
 experience, replaced Macpherson as Chief Secretary, now in turn accused by
Edward Saunderson of showing ‘cold feet’.100 Sir Nevil Macready was
appointed General Officer Commanding.
The soldiers appointed to govern Ireland in early 1920 – Colonel Ormond
Winter, chief of intelligence; General Tudor, head of the RIC; General
Macready, Commander-in-Chief of the army; General Boyd, head of the DMP;
and Brigadier Crozier, head of the Auxiliaries; all sent to Ireland to defeat
Sinn Féin by military repression – found themselves filling an administra-
tive vacuum. Macready confessed himself ‘fairly astonished’ at the chaos
and incompetence that prevailed in the Irish administration.101 Sir Hamar
Greenwood, the new Chief Secretary, reported to cabinet in May 1920 that his
real difficulty was ‘the inadequacy and sloppiness of the instruments of gov-
ernment’.102 After a blistering attack on the incompetence of the Castle appa-
ratus by Macready, Sir Warren Fisher was sent in May 1920 to Dublin to
investigate the Irish administration. Fisher, accompanied by Sir John Anderson
from the Inland Revenue board, visited Maurice Headlam. Headlam, after
expressing strong suspicions about some Catholic official to his visitors, was
rattled to be treated with something very like contempt.103 Headlam was also
puzzled as to the purpose of the visit but, as all heads of departments ought to
know well, visitations by the Treasury were always the prelude to great changes.
Fisher did not share in the Castle paranoia of Irish Catholics. A supporter of
Home Rule for Ireland, he liked the country and the people, besides which his
wife was half-Irish and a Catholic.104
The British government insisted that Fisher’s investigation into Dublin
Castle was merely to prepare the ground for implementing in Ireland the
recently approved recommendation of the National Whitley Council on reor-
ganisation.105 However, the signals that something more thorough was being
planned were already, in early April, sufficiently strong to thoroughly alarm
Robert Lynn a Unionist MP for Belfast. Writing to Bonar Law he implored him
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to ‘refuse to allow the betrayal of the faithful servants by an act of government
treachery’, or at least, if they were to be ‘thrown to the wolves’ to ensure that
they received adequate pensions.106 The Fisher report on the Irish administra-
tion was unequivocal, direct and plain-speaking in its condemnation:
The castle administration does not administer. On the mechanical side it can never
have been good and is now quite obsolete; in the infinitely more important sphere
(a) of informing and advising the Irish government in relation to policy and (b)
of practical capacity in the application of policy it simply has no existence . . . The
prevailing conception of the post of Under Secretary – who should be the princi-
pal permanent adviser to the Irish government in civil affairs – appears to be that
he is a routine clerk . . . The position at the present moment is seemingly that no
one in the Chief Secretary’s Office, from the Under Secretary downwards, regards
himself as responsible even for decisions on departmental papers, let alone for a
share in the solution of difficulties in the realm either of policy or of execution.
The Chief Secretary, for his part, appears to be under the illusion that a Civil
Servant – even though he has the position and emoluments of a permanent head
of the Irish administration – is entirely unconcerned with the exploration or set-
tlement of the problems which the Irish administration exists to solve.107
Warren Fisher’s view was that Macready, appointed as GOC, had in fact been
playing the role of Under-Secretary and had therefore hidden the fundamen-
tal weakness of the administration. He recommended that MacMahon, though
inadequate, should be left in the post of Under-Secretary not least because he
‘holds views more in keeping with 20th century sentiment than those expressed
by the ascendancy party and the supporters of indiscriminate coercion’. But
Taylor had to be got rid of and a new team of senior civil servants sent in to
thoroughly recast the administration.
In a supplement to the report Warren Fisher concluded that the government
of Ireland was ‘woodenly stupid’ and that the problems in the Castle adminis-
tration were not simply administrative but were political. The continuance of
government by ‘folly and brute force’ would lead to no alternative but military
rule in Ireland. Fisher recommended that any solution would need to be both
imaginative and one that showed the government seizing the initiative, offering
the maximum of both political and administrative reform. These would
include the abolition of the lord lieutenancy, ‘a pinchbeck royalty’, the aban-
donment of Walter Long’s Government of Ireland Bill, which had no friends in
Ireland, and an offer of Dominion Home Rule with safeguards for defence and
Ulster.108 The cabinet rejected out of hand his recommendations on political
reform but his recommendations on administrative reform were accepted and
a team of civil servants were sent to sort out Dublin Castle.109
Fisher executed a coup of the Irish administration. Taylor was ditched. His
claim for £11,070 compensation, pursued relentlessly with Walter Long and
Austen Chamberlain, was dismissed both by Malcolm Ramsay, who noted that
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nobody but Sir John Taylor could suppose he was that valuable, and by Warren
Fisher, who informed Long that Taylor had enjoyed advancement far beyond
anything that a modestly efficient English department would have given a man
of similar calibre. Eventually he gratefully settled for £3,000.110 Connolly, who
had moved into the Castle after the killing of Alan Bell, a civil servant too suc-
cessful in tracking down the hidden funds of Dáil Éireann, ran up a consider-
able bill at the officer’s mess and was moved to Bournemouth.111 Headlam was
moved back to an obscure department in the Treasury in London to serve out
his years to retirement.112 Interestingly, no other senior civil servants were
moved, not even Micks the head of the notoriously difficult CDB. Clearly what
was at issue was not efficiency but an over-zealous and uncritical identification
with reactionary policies which blinded Taylor and his like-minded coterie to
the collapse of the State civil machine.
The moment in May 1920 when the reins of the Castle administration
passed into the hands of a team of English civil servants is recognised as crucial
to the history of the Irish administration in the period of revolution. It is gen-
erally argued that this team of non-political experts transformed a demoralised
and outmoded administrative machine into an efficient and modernised civil
service, just in time for the Treaty settlement.113 This would be a remarkable
achievement and deserves further examination into precisely who they were
and what they did to the Irish civil service. It would also bring the civil service
and the State to the centre of the revolutionary struggle.
The team of English civil servants sent to Dublin were led by John Anderson,
forming a ‘junta’ in the words of George Chester Duggan, the superintending
clerk in the CSO at the time.114 John Anderson was chairman of the Board of
Inland Revenue. During the war he had served as secretary of the Ministry of
Shipping. In Dublin Anderson was appointed joint Under-Secretary with
the powers of a permanent head of the Treasury and given a free hand; ‘no
civil servant has ever wielded, or is ever likely to wield, such power as he
did during his twenty-one months of tenure of office as Under-Secretary’.115
Accompanying Anderson were A.W. [Andy] Cope, a customs detective who was
to play the decisive role in negotiating the Truce; Mark Sturgis, chairman of the
Treasury Selection Board, who left a racy diary of those years; Basil Clarke,
former war correspondent of the Daily Mail, director of Public Information in
the newly created Ministry of Health and seconded to Dublin as head of
Publicity (as propagandist he has had greater success with later historians than
he had with his contemporaries); Geoffrey Whiskard, of principal officer rank,
a crime specialist to co-ordinate civil and military forces; L.N. Blake-Odgers,
seconded from the Home Office; T.D. Fairgrieve, seconded from the Scottish
Office; Norman Gerald Loughnane, a Treasury principal officer; and Alexander
Percival Waterfield who was made Treasury Remembrancer with the power
of Assistant Under-Secretary; with William Thomas Matthews and Bernard
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Gilbert, both Treasury principal officers, appointed assistants to Waterfield.116
W.E. Wylie, the legal advisor to the government, was deeply impressed by the
group and, as his own analysis and prescription so closely mirrored that of
Anderson, he was absorbed into the team.117 The Anderson team constituted,
from the day of their arrival until the Treaty, a ‘super bureaucracy’ of compe-
tent and trustworthy civil servants in Ireland.118 Their status within the service
was signalled by Treasury circulars from Warren Fisher and from Johnson the
establishment officer, directing that all papers ‘dealing with, bearing on, or
arising out of the present abnormal Irish conditions’ were to be treated with the
‘utmost despatch at every stage’.119 Anderson brought one immediate advantage
to the Irish administration; there were to be no more humiliations at the hands
of the Public Accounts Committee for the heads of the Irish civil service. In 1920
MacMahon’s mild suggestion that many departments made expenditures in
anticipation of Treasury sanction flung the committee into a righteous fury.
Anderson had no such trouble as extra allowances were nodded through for his
English officials living in luxury hotels, travelling first class and enjoying special
allowances.120 As Duggan puts it, Anderson arrived ‘drawing forth a well-filled
purse’.121 As the ‘economy’ frenzy swept through Whitehall, Fairgrieve airily dis-
missed a Treasury demand for reductions in staff, writing that ‘ordinary condi-
tions applicable to Great Britain are not possible as regards Ireland just yet’.122
These ‘suave and sophisticated Englishmen’, with neither careers nor commit-
ments in Ireland, cosseted and believed to be receiving huge salaries, aroused
deep resentment in the old unionist ‘die-hards’ of the Castle establishment.123
The nationalist press, in the hope that it signalled the abolition of the hated
Dublin Castle, cheered their arrival.124
It is clear that both Warren Fisher and Anderson also interpreted the new
regime as signalling a new policy for Ireland. They were also clear what this
policy was to be: an immediate offer of Dominion Home Rule for Ireland, with
protection for Ulster and British defence interests, allied with unflinching coer-
cion. This was the policy that Macready, Warren Fisher, Anderson and Wylie
agreed and brought to the cabinet in July 1920.125 This was also the policy that
Wylie reported to Anderson had brought the southern Unionists, churchmen
and ‘political’ Sinn Féin ‘in with us’.126 However, despite the arguments of the
Irish specialists, the cabinet was not convinced and Churchill along with Tudor
won support for more coercion. Walter Long rejected the Fisher report and
insisted that Home Rule would be accepted; all that was required was for the
government to ‘stand up to the Irishman’ and he assured Lloyd George that ‘it
is dogged does it’.127 However, the Anderson team acted as if the cabinet deci-
sion not to offer Dominion Home Rule was a delay, rather than a rejection of
the policy. Cope continued to develop his own contacts with Sinn Féin, despite
the cabinet decision that no authority existed for any person serving the Irish
government to contact Sinn Féin except to convey government policy.128
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As well as referring to the failure of administration Warren Fisher also wrote
to Lloyd George on the failure of statecraft in Ireland and on the absence of an
understanding of the role of a modern civil servant – ‘to inform to advise and to
warn’. A civil servant is not a soldier, he may disagree and he should certainly
speak with complete frankness. In Dublin Castle none of the civil servants were
prepared to do that and all avoided responsibility. Irish government was in
danger of being overwhelmed by those who thought there was nothing more to
be done than to defeat the gunmen. The ascendancy party in Dublin Castle were
actually quite content with the status quo accompanied by additional coercion.
The Anderson team were sent to Dublin to deal with a technical problem of
administration, but also to provide the statecraft that was lacking. The danger
was that the Irish government was abdicating to the military and quite unwit-
tingly was creating the conditions in which the State in Ireland would come
under a military executive. The mission of the Anderson team was to prevent the
eclipse of civil government and to ensure that when the cabinet finally arrived at
the correct decision it would be possible to enact it. They understood the enor-
mous difference between civil government and military government and the
difficulty of going back to civil government. As Macready put it, enforcing rela-
tive peace by military rule was not difficult; it was what was done after that was
difficult.129 What this group also saw clearly was that the key republican force was
not the IRA but Dáil Éireann and that the actions of Dáil Éireann and Sinn Féin
in establishing the counter-State indicated a desire to maintain social order and
the rule of law, and a wise government would have encouraged this desire.
Warren Fisher and Anderson presented the cabinet with a clear choice – to
govern Ireland by a civil or a military government. In presenting this clear
choice they were not only arguing against the cabinet decision but also dis-
playing a deeper loyalty to the State. As Warren Fisher reminded Lloyd George,
‘there is all the difference in the world between a military machine and a civil
machine in circumstances such as now obtain in Ireland’.130 The military has
the means to enforce its decisions because it is not dependent on civil society
to execute its orders. Civil government requires the consent of society, military
government does not. A further difference that Warren Fisher did not draw out
was that whereas a soldier obeys an order, a civil servant responds to an order,
sometimes critically. That Ireland would eventually have to be given self-
 government was evident to all except the most hard-bitten, die-hard unionist.
The form of the State in Ireland after attaining self-government would be con-
tinuous with that of the last British regime, either civil or military. For Warren
Fisher in particular, failure to ensure continuity of civil government of the State
would be devastating. Hence his veiled threat to withdraw the Anderson team
if the policy of coercion was pursued to its logical ends.
Warren Fisher could clearly see the connection between civil service reform,
the crisis in Ireland and a threatened failure of the State. Although expressed
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in purely administrative language, the role of the Anderson team was clearly
political in the sense that they responded to the crumbling of British political
supremacy in Ireland. As Wylie pointed out, the people were either hostile or
neutral ‘because they no longer looked upon the government as the govern-
ment’.131 Sturgis put the same conclusion more colourfully: ‘the Irish may not
be fit to govern themselves, but neither were the English, nor the Welsh’.132 The
over-riding objective of the Anderson team was to ensure, first, that the civil
government of Ireland would not be swept aside by military government and,
second, that the civil government would provide continuity into a new gov-
ernment in Ireland. In pursuing these goals they acted outside the tradition of
the civil service, but with the confidence that their political masters simply
needed time to agree with the superior insight of their civil servants. Despite
the posturing of Greenwood and the generals, the civil service were agreed that
it was Anderson who was the ‘most powerful force in the British administra-
tion in Ireland’.133 The condition of Ireland and the infestation of the State
apparatus by the military justified the exercise of executive power by an objec-
tive civil service in order to ensure the survival of the State itself.
The group was selected not on ability alone but also because they largely
agreed with Warren Fisher on Ireland. Before transfer to Ireland Sturgis’s
briefing at the Treasury was a process of acquiring Warren Fisher’s views on the
failures of the old ‘Castle Gang’.134 Cope, the central figure in the secret con-
tacts and negotiations that led to the Truce and Treaty, was an anti-militarist
and a democrat.135 As civil servants they recognised that there was a lot more
to do in Ireland than simply beating an enemy.136 It was lucky for Dáil Éireann
that the cabinet resisted for so long. The IRA guerrilla campaign could ensure
its own survival, but it could not topple a State. It was the failure of the British
State in Ireland that created the conditions in which what might have been a
comic operetta of Dáil Éireann succeeded in taking State power.
Andy Cope, highly strung with a nervous energy, was then and is now recog-
nised as the key figure in securing the Truce and Treaty. For the mass of the Irish
civil servants Waterfield was the key figure, one very much less significant in the
bigger picture and not mentioned at all by Sturgis. But if the view that an
administrative apparatus on the verge of collapse was thoroughly modernised
within eighteen months is to be accepted, his achievement deserves recognition.
Treasury (Ireland), 1920–22
The creation of Treasury (Ireland) on 16 June 1920, with responsibility for ‘all
expenditure of all Irish departments, universities and colleges, including all
questions of supply and establishment’ with the authority to ‘advise and make
observations’ on the Irish branches of the ‘English’ departments such as the
Admiralty, Air Force, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Pensions and Revenue
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Departments; achieved in an instant the centralised control of the Irish depart-
ments that had often been proposed but never achieved.137 However, that
control now lay with a civil servant, not a politician. Waterfield, as Assistant
Under-Secretary at Treasury (Ireland), was now head of the Irish civil service
answering to Anderson himself.138
Some of the pressing administrative problems that Waterfield had to deal
with had nothing to do with the political crisis and were common to both
Britain and Ireland. Most immediate were the demands of the demobilised sol-
diers and sailors. Across Europe embittered demobilised soldiers, organised in
groups such as the German Freikorps and the Italian Arditi, were becoming a
dangerous and destabilising force in society. In the immediate aftermath of
the Armistice there was a general expectation of improvements in the British
economy. The release of pent-up savings and the backlog of unsatisfied
demands, allied with the end to the slaughter of war, created a public euphoria
encouraged by a government declaration promising a ‘land fit for heroes’. It
was anticipated that the post-war economy would easily cope with the dis-
charged soldiers, and that the government would do its bit by giving them jobs.
A committee of inquiry into the employment of ex-servicemen in the civil
service, headed by Lord Lytton, put a lot of pressure on the government depart-
ments to employ these men, especially the disabled. Apart from the few with
recognised qualifications most of the ex-soldiers were virtually illiterate and,
by repeatedly failing the qualifying examinations, had proved incapable of
achieving a basic acceptable standard. It became necessary to simply ignore
their failings and admit them on the recommendation of the departmental
heads. In Ireland these men were often rapidly promoted into permanent
posts, by-passing other temporary men who were better qualified but regarded
as less loyal.139 A particular animus of these veterans was the number of women
employed in civil service posts. The veteran associations were feared and hated
by the established civil servants; when they amalgamated to form the British
Legion and began recruiting ex-servicemen within the civil service W.J. Brown
of the CSCA attacked them as a union-breaking force and as a sinister move-
ment close in spirit to the fascisti of Italy.140
In Dublin the 4,600 ex-servicemen of the ‘Irish Federation of Discharged
and Demobilised Sailors’ and ‘Comrades of the Great War’ were well organised,
bitter, and vocal.141 The Federation had boycotted the official Peace Day cele-
brations of July 1919 in protest at the government’s lack of action on their
behalf.142 The ‘Association of Ex-Service Civil Servants’ alleged victimisation at
the hands of the Irish departments who, they claimed, were ignoring the claims
of those who had risked life and limb. They wanted new posts and promotions
reserved for ex-servicemen.143 They minutely scrutinised the departments for
the lists of women employees and bombarded the heads of those departments
with demands for their replacement by veterans.144 General Macready was
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 generally sympathetic and a willing conduit to Anderson for their grievances
about the Irish departments.145 John Anderson was anxious that the veterans
living in the midst of a hostile population ‘whose value to the cause of settled
government at the present time is very great’ should be have as many positions
as possible opened to them.146 The DATI was particularly anxious to please and
Gill assured Anderson that ‘where possible all professional and technical staff
are ex-servicemen’.147 The Irish Federation of Discharged and Demobilised
Sailors and Soldiers demanded representation on the departmental Whitley
Councils of the Irish government. Waterfield was nervous of this group and
wanted them excluded despite Anderson’s support for them, but he left it to the
civil service unions to keep them out.148 On the other hand Waterfield was quite
prepared to put pressure on the heads of departments to dismiss women in
temporary posts and employ the ex-servicemen in their place.149
The other main task that Waterfield faced was the application of the Whitley
report on reorganisation. The sub-committee, formed entirely of former and
serving civil servants, including Sir John Anderson, reported in February 1920.
The report recommended that the entire civil service, consisting of twelve
classes, should be re-graded into just four classes: writing assistants, clerical,
executive and administrative; with higher and lower grades where appropriate.
So far as the civil service associations were concerned the gains offered by the
reorganisation report were an end to the university monopoly on the adminis-
trative posts, a clear pyramid of promotion from the clerical to the administra-
tive class, the retention of the seven-hour day and the improved scales of pay
which offered a ‘marrying’ wage at age twenty-five. The disadvantages were the
creation of the new writing assistant class and the formalising of discrimination
against women who were doing the same work at the same grade as men but for
a lower pay.150 In Ireland the reorganisation report had been condemned by the
ILC assistant clerks because of the discrimination against women and the per-
petuation of a dead-end in the writing assistant grade. However, the rest of the
service accepted the report by an overwhelming majority.151
The civil service associations assumed that assimilation would be a straight-
forward process whereby the assistant clerks would become clerical officers and
the second division clerks would become executive officers. It was also assumed
that the transfer would be ‘weighted for age’, that is to say that a civil servant
would enter the new class at an increment corresponding to his age. Instead the
Treasury offered transfer at an increment equivalent to a slight increase on the
salary actually enjoyed at the moment of transfer. In real terms what that meant
was that while an assistant clerk aged forty years, with twenty-two years service,
might expect to arrive at a salary for a clerical officer with the same twenty-two
years of service, the Treasury might instead offer a salary equivalent to only
ten years of clerical officer service. Leading the reaction to reject these terms
were the Dublin civil servants. Furious at the chronic delay that accompanied
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the whole reorganisation process and disillusioned with Whitleyism, large
numbers of the Dublin civil servants were prepared to abandon Whitleyism,
establish a strike fund and revive the demand for an arbitration board under
parliamentary control.152 The Treasury relented and, by offering a guarantee
for a substantial increase in actual salary for all assimilated officers, did secure
agreement but at the cost of a great deal of suspicion and bad feeling.
As Waterfield established himself in Dublin Castle as Treasury (Ireland) he
faced the task of reorganising departments and assimilating a disgruntled and
suspicious Irish civil service to their new classes and grades. The procedure,
ideally, was that departmental Whitley Councils would draw up a proposed
reorganisation scheme for submission to Waterfield, allocating the work of the
department to a number of administrative, executive and clerical officers. He
would then evaluate and, if he thought it necessary, modify the scheme, usually
by reducing the proposed number of administrative and executive posts. The
departmental council could then reconsider the modified scheme, but as was
made clear the ‘fundamental principle of Whitleyism is that the Whitley
Council in no way detracts from the supreme authority of the head of depart-
ment and the Treasury and no proposal can be acted on without the approval
of the Treasury’.153 What this meant in reality was that the only real reorgani-
sation was the Treasury offer, which the staff was free to accept or reject. The
next stage was assimilation. Each individual civil servant’s immediate superior
would certify that he was fit for allocation to a certain class and grade; higher
clerical or lower executive for instance.154 On a date to be decided by Whitehall
the reorganisation would take effect and the entire service would transfer to the
new classes.
In doing this Waterfield at all times tried to act according to the principles
that were being followed in Whitehall and so had to constantly refer to the
Treasury. Waterfield soon found that, not surprisingly, the heads and staff of
the Irish departments saw him as an English interloper and tended to combine
against him. At the same time the civil service associations remained active on
behalf of individual civil servants and certain classes. As a background to all
these was the problem posed for civil service organisation by the passing of the
Government of Ireland Act, 1920 and the establishment of three or four exec-
utive powers of Southern Ireland, Northern Ireland, Council of Ireland and the
United Kingdom parliament.
In early October 1920 Waterfield met the heads of the Irish departments to
discuss the difficulties that the Whitley reorganisation posed and to set out
some general principles. It was an opportunity for the departmental heads to
put to him some of the difficulties they had encountered. A Treasury directive
had instructed all departments to appoint an establishments officer to deal
with all staff matters. These officers formed the official side of the departmen-
tal councils. Waterfield, however, dealt with the departmental heads only. This
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protected him from the rough-and-tumble of negotiation but ensured control
of the process.155
At this point Waterfield was attempting to board a moving train as several
of the Irish departments had already begun negotiations with Whitehall. The
staff side on the Whitley Councils interpreted the reorganisation report as
setting out a proportion of higher and lower classes and grades in each depart-
ment such as would offer a reasonable prospect of promotion. This was not an
unreasonable interpretation, but the Whitehall view was that such a propor-
tion represented an ideal, rather than a hard and fast rule. It did not follow for
instance that all departments must have an administrative class, they might
have to be satisfied with an executive class as the highest the department could
aspire to. This immediately created the suspicion that the only department that
would actually have an administrative class would be the Treasury. The ques-
tion also arose whether an exceptional civil servant of a clerical class might be
promoted to a higher executive class in another department, or were these
reserved for the clerical officers of that department.156
On all these and other questions Waterfield looked to his colleagues in
Whitehall for authoritative guidance before approving Irish reorganisation
schemes.157 Some of the cases were utterly inconsequential and must have tried
the patience of the Treasury. A second division clerk in the DATI was clearly
shell-shocked in the war and now was ‘un-nerved by the sight of figures’. Yet
Gill, the head of DATI wanted to promote him to the lower executive class.
What Gill most likely had in mind was providing that the unfortunate clerk
would be able to retire under the 1920 Act on a significantly improved pension,
albeit at the expense of the Irish taxpayer. Waterfield looked to London to
see whether there had been a similar case in England.158 At the same time
Waterfield was under pressure not to concede to the Irish service anything that
could be cited by the British service as a precedent in their reorganisation. He
was also under pressure from London to do no more or less than ensure that
each department was ready for handing over to the new governments ‘in good
working order with neither unfilled obligations nor arrears of maintenance’.159
Waterfield enjoyed considerable autonomy so long as he was not creating
precedents or encouraging civil service expansion, but his constant reference
to the Treasury for guidance and the often brusque responses he got suggest
that Waterfield felt himself to be on a tight leash held by Whitehall.
In early 1921, confident that he was not deviating from the approved
Treasury norms and armed with the Government of Ireland Act, Waterfield
grew more assertive in his dealings with the reorganisation committees and the
pace of change accelerated. The reorganisation process began with the depart-
ments themselves coming up with a proposal. Waterfield would then review
and revise the proposal and send it back to the department for agreement.160
Waterfield’s method of officious and minute investigation of departments
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alienated the departmental heads. Refusing to accept the view of either the
establishment officer or the departmental head, Waterfield swept through each
department ‘looking at the work as it is performed’ asking ‘how we should
grade the department entirely afresh’.161 It is probable that Waterfield was fol-
lowing through a personal directive from Anderson to use reorganisation as
an opportunity to simplify and reduce the cost of the Irish administrative
machine, the same task that Warren Fisher was pursuing in Whitehall.162 It was
generally expected that the Irish administration would lose a lot of its civil
service after Home Rule through voluntary and compulsory retirement. The
last salary scales before retirement would determine pensions, whether they
had been enjoyed for one week or one year. A high burden of pensions would
allow the Irish governments to negotiate a cut in the £18 million contribution
to the British war debt. It was therefore in the interests of the Treasury to ensure
that the salary levels in Dublin were as compressed as possible.
It was possible for a department to refuse to play along and attempt to
shorten the process by asking Waterfield to come up with a reorganisation
scheme, as happened with the always difficult CDB. But Waterfield resolutely
refused, insisting that his job was to review, not initiate, schemes. Eventually, as
Micks dug in his heels, it fell to the staff associations in the CDB to force a reor-
ganisation scheme through the departmental Whitley Council.163 Sometimes
the staff and official sides on a departmental committee would combine against
Waterfield. The staff side would put a proposal on the agenda and send a copy
to Waterfield inviting him to the next meeting. At the next meeting, with no
objection noted from Treasury (Ireland), agreement by the official and staff
sides would be recorded and forwarded to Waterfield, who would promptly
reject it. The staff side would then refuse to attend any further meetings until
the Treasury made a prior undertaking to accept any agreements reached by
departmental Whitley Councils – a ‘preposterous manner’ of settling reorgani-
sation according to Waterfield.164 The least troublesome reorganisation was
effected where the head of department sounded Waterfield out first, as did
Stevenson of the Board of Works. Waterfield soothed Stevenson with assurances
that these discussions were not a matter of bargaining but rather of ‘each doing
what is best for the public service as a whole’.165
The area of disagreement was always in the proportion of administrative,
executive and clerical posts in the department. Most heads of departments, for
reasons of status, wanted the greatest number of higher posts possible. Generally,
but not always, this was supported by the staff side. Waterfield, on the other
hand, looked to reduce the cost of each department by classifying its work
as suitable for the lower class. Where a departmental head proved obdurate
Waterfield was unsparing in his contempt. Dilworth of the NEB was told that his
superintendents did no actual work, that much of the work of his office could be
handled by writing assistants, and that the examiners had no ‘professional’
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qualifications and their position ought to be opened up to the clerical officers as
a promotional post.166 Butler of the Intermediate Education Office was told that
the work of his office was inferior and quasi-routine, suitable for writing assis-
tants rather than clerical grades, with overly generous salary scales.167
Generally speaking the heads of the Irish departments found reorganisation
to be a humiliating experience. Required to act as the bearer of Waterfield’s
bad tidings they either adopted his schemes as their own, or were exposed to
the staff side on their departmental councils as powerless. Atkinson of the
Commissioners of Charitable Donations found all his executive posts re-
graded as clerical and, correcting the belief that ‘a high degree of qualifications
in accountancy was necessary for the proper performance of his duties’,
Waterfield re-graded the accountant as a clerk and a clerk he remained, despite
the best efforts of Atkinson and the AEO.168 In the GVO Beckett, in an attempt
perhaps to save face, showed the staff side his correspondence with Waterfield,
drawing down the full wrath and majesty of Treasury (Ireland):
It is an essential part of the civil service constitution that where the head of a
department has done his best to get the Treasury to agree to a proposal, and has
failed, he must accept the Treasury decision loyally and do his best to carry it out.
Whitleyism does not in any way affect this fundamental principle; indeed it is
obvious that discipline would be reduced to a farce if it were to do so . . . I should
perhaps add that the Treasury do not anticipate or regard it as necessary that there
should be agreement between the official and staff sides in proposals of this kind.
They would of course prefer it, but they cannot undertake to make concessions,
of the necessity of which they are not convinced, merely in order to secure formal
agreement.169
Even Sir Henry Robinson of the LGB, possessed of a monumental sense of his
own importance, was brought to heel. Robinson presented the reorganisation
scheme to the departmental Whitley Council as being a ‘Treasury’ scheme,
which he himself had neither accepted nor rejected. Waterfield upbraided him
for revealing his disagreement with the Treasury which ‘it is of course desirable
to conceal as far as possible’ from the staff side. The issue on which they dis-
agreed was the fundamental one of whether the LGB department should be re-
graded as administrative or executive. This would determine whether it would
recruit at a clerical level or at the highest administrative level. Robinson, who
was notorious for nepotism, wanted to grade his department as administrative,
but Waterfield refused. In this case the staff side generally supported Waterfield
rather than Robinson because his scheme offered the best prospects for pro-
motion in the longer term. If Robinson had his way he would simply promote
his favourites to the plum posts. In fact he still managed to slip a couple past
Waterfield, promoting a Captain Harris to the post of secretary of the Irish
Public Health Council and a second division clerk to the post of deputy legal
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assistant on £500 per annum. Robinson eventually handed over the reorgani-
sation to Barlas who enjoyed a better relationship with Waterfield. In his letter
authorising Barlas’s scheme Waterfield revealed his own attitude to the staff
side and the Whitley Councils. Noting that the LGB process had been irregu-
lar and that the staff side would reject the proposed reorganisation, with which
they were already familiar, as inadequate, Waterfield suggested that Barlas ‘call
a special meeting, lay the scheme before them as an official scheme, give them
an hour or two to talk, then apply the closure and ask whether you are to record
the matter as formally agreed, or not, making it clear on the assumption that
nothing new emerges that the scheme will not be modified further whichever
line they take’.170
Sometimes, however, Waterfield got it wrong. In the land registry the cleri-
cal officers regarded the assistant inspectorate as highly desirable promotional
posts. Waterfield encouraged this expectation in his reorganisation of the
department. The head of the land registry preferred to follow a different
Treasury policy of reserving these posts for ex-service temporary officers. With
the only avenue of promotion choked off the clerical staff furiously accused the
departmental head of a breach of faith. He in turn accused Waterfield of
making him look ridiculous in front of his staff.171 Some departmental heads
simply threw in the towel and left it to the staff associations to fight it out them-
selves with Waterfield.172 The only departments where reorganisation was
uncontroversial were the Castle departments under Andy Cope and the land
courts under Wylie.173 In the reorganisation of the CSO Cope assimilated
almost the entire former clerical class into the new executive class.174
Waterfield also looked to London for guidance on dealing with the civil
service organisations. The most difficult year for the Irish civil service associa-
tions was 1920. The increasing violence of the IRA, a curfew, and the activities
of the ‘Black and Tans’ curtailed meetings. The debate on the Government of
Ireland Bill generated uncertainty as to their future.175 In the midst of these
difficulties the Irish Whitley Committee seemed to secure some measure of
control over their destiny. The civil service had already gathered that Warren
Fisher was not an enthusiast for the Whitley Councils and Waterfield, in first
meeting with the staff associations, was so frankly dismissive of Whitleyism
that the staff associations were taken aback.176 Determined that the reorgani-
sation would not become a competition between the executive and clerical
grades the Irish staff associations agreed that the departmental staff side com-
mittees would exchange information on the progress of each scheme. The COA
and the AEO, on a joint motion of Mortished and Smithwick, agreed to co-
operate on reorganisation.177 The CSA suggested to Waterfield that they might
be brought into negotiations in cases where the departmental Whitley Council
would not accept the Treasury reorganisation scheme. The CSA representa-
tives, Duff, Sloan and Mulvin, suggested that they might be able to induce the
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staff side to accept the Treasury decision. Waterfield was wary of a transparent
attempt by the CSA to get involved directly in departmental negotiations but
was prepared to be guided by Treasury opinion. He also revealed his impres-
sions of the Irish organisers; Sloan he did not like as too obstinate and a trou-
blemaker, but he thought Mulvin more diplomatic and tactful and willing
to see the point of view of the Treasury.178 The offer was of course refused.
Otherwise every department would want to appeal to the CSA.179 Interestingly,
one of those that he consulted in Whitehall was H.P. Boland who was within a
few years to become the establishment officer in the Department of Finance of
the Irish Free State.180
In dealing with the civil service associations Waterfield resorted to the threat
of imminent partition under the 1920 Act to force through agreement. Writing
to Mulvin (his more favoured association delegate) he noted that ‘the passing
of the Government of Ireland Act makes it urgent that schemes should be
settled as soon as possible. Staff will have sufficient time to consider the official
scheme but we cannot be held responsible for the consequences of delay.’181
The choice offered to the staff associations was to either accept Waterfield’s
proposals or be handed over to the ‘tender mercies of the new governments’
without reorganisation.182 With the ‘appointed day’ for the transfer to the new
governments postponed and with the signing of the Truce with the republican
forces in July 1921 this threat lost its potential to frighten. The staff associations
had no inducement to reach agreement. The associations argued that until the
very day of transfer they remained civil servants of the United Kingdom
and therefore entitled to all the benefits and advantages gained by the rest of
the service. They argued that there was every possibility that a new govern-
ment might take a less oppositional line to the Whitley Councils and the staff
generally than was being shown by Treasury (Ireland). Furthermore, they had
secured a commitment from Waterfield that reorganisation would be com-
pleted before partition and transfer of the departments. Therefore the staff side
had nothing to lose (as they would transfer with existing rights protected) and
the possibility of something to gain by refusing to accept the Treasury schemes,
or at least leaving agreement to the last minute. Waterfield could have allowed
it to drift but as he admitted ‘such a failure is a confession of weakness of
administration on our part which we ought to endeavour to overcome if we
can’.183
Generally it proved to be the case that it was to the advantage of the depart-
ments if they could secure an agreed reorganisation sooner rather than later.
The NHIC moved very quickly on reorganisation. The staff side, led by
Gallagher and Duff, watched the English claim closely and simply demanded
the same. They were not able to secure the number of higher posts that they
wanted but were relieved to agree to a complete re-grading of the 198 staff by
early 1921.184 This need for haste had little to do with Treasury (Ireland) but
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arose from the British newspaper campaign demanding economy in the civil
service that led to the ‘Geddes Axe’ and a series of wage cuts beginning in
August 1921. As the post-war improvement in the economy petered out, and
the scale of the inherited wartime debt became apparent, a relentless pressure
from the Treasury for savings soon over-rode all other considerations. The
 suspicion grew that Waterfield was using the departmental reorganisation
schemes submitted for approval as a device to secure reductions in staffing and
grades.185 In March 1921 Waterfield instructed that reorganisation schemes
should provide for ‘no addition to the established staff of Irish departments
except from the ranks of ex-servicemen’ and that new grades must be ‘on a scale
which is lower by not more than ten per cent than the London scale’.186 The
Irish associations complained of the manner in which the duties of the Irish
departments were being compressed to the clerical class and of the rapidly
growing number of the writing assistant class, which was being imposed in
every department.187 By August a new demand for economy flatly instructed
that no vacancies and no promotions were to be filled.188 It was now clear to
the staff associations that the primary purpose of re-grading was not to
promote efficiency but to make it easier to control, and therefore reduce, the
level of salaries. However, the post-Truce negotiations with the Dáil delegation
had begun, with no certainty as to what would emerge, except that it would be
more than Home Rule offered. It was now in the interests of the civil service to
secure the assurance of an agreement on salaries, even if the agreement was one
that would ordinarily be rejected.
By November Waterfield could report that almost all of the Irish depart-
ments were organised and either in operation or awaiting enforcement. To
complete reorganisation all that was required therefore was that the Irish
branches of the British departments should roll out their schemes. However,
the Treasury in Whitehall, under pressure to retrench, had abandoned reor-
ganisation though without saying as much.189 Waterfield therefore secured per-
mission to go ahead himself with the reorganisation of the Irish branches. He
was able then to report on the 2 December, four days before the Treaty was
signed, that all the Irish departments and the Irish branches of the British
departments were ready to go with reorganisation.190 Was this reorganisation
then the transformation of the universally condemned Castle into a modern
bureaucratic machine?
Waterfield was of the ‘candle-ends’ school of administration. His instincts
were to see the interests of the State as embodied in the interests of the taxpayer.
In his analysis no matter what settlement emerged in Anglo-Irish negotiations,
the interests of the Irish taxpayer and the British Treasury were at one.191 No
expenditure was too insignificant, or distasteful, for his attention. After the
hanging on 14 March 1921 in Dublin of six republican convicts Waterfield bar-
gained for a cut in the executioner’s fee. The executioner demanded the usual
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fee, multiplied by six, for himself and his assistant. Waterfield, noting that the
executions had been on the same day, imposed what was in effect a group dis-
count; sanctioning £15 for the first and £5 for each subsequent hanging for the
executioner, with £5 and then £2 10s 0d for his assistant.192
The Irish civil service saw Waterfield as a zealous and ruthless guardian of
the Treasury interest, fair in so far as his downgrading of departments was seen
to be utterly even-handed.193 So far as the associations were concerned, he was
certainly an improvement on Headlam.194 His instincts in dealing with the
Irish civil service were essentially decent. He pushed very hard to ensure that
the many temporary civil servants, who would no doubt in time become estab-
lished, received their certificates before the appointed day under the 1920 Act,
just in case the new government might take a different view.195 On the other
hand he was not going to allow the interests of any future Irish State to be com-
promised. He was committed to handing over the Irish departments in good
working order, by which he meant as close to the Treasury norm as possible. In
many of the departments, by coincidence, the heads were all due for retire-
ment. The demand to keep the departments in good working order would
ordinarily have meant making a new appointment. This would have led to
intense lobbying and political pressures from the eligible officials, with the
danger that the successful candidates would then promptly retire on a sub-
stantial pension having served perhaps only a few weeks. In order to avoid
having to make a new appointment Waterfield ‘in the public interest’, refused
to allow these departmental heads to retire leaving the incoming government
free to make whatever appointments it saw fit.196
Civil service associations were there to voice grievances and it would never
do to say there was no grievance. But the reorganisation did, with few excep-
tions, mean that the Irish civil servant received something like a promotion
when assimilated to the new grades and certainly an increase in salary. An assis-
tant clerk on a maximum of £200 became a clerical officer on a maximum of
£250; second division clerks on a maximum of £300 became lower executive
officers on a maximum of £400. With clear cross-service structures the possi-
bility of promotion to the heights of the administrative class, hitherto closed
to all without the right political connections, now opened up. With hindsight,
Michael Gallagher acknowledged that the reorganisation and assimilation of
the Irish civil service to the new classes was an enormous achievement in which
Waterfield succeeded in turning the labyrinthine multiple departmental grades
into a coherent service-wide structure. However, Waterfield was pedestrian in
his vision of the State and his work at Treasury (Ireland) was simply the
financial conclusion of a policy decided elsewhere, it was not a policy in itself.
He was often paralysed by the fear of creating a precedent and ultimately was
guided by fear of losing contact or influence in Whitehall, his natural home.
Reorganisation in administration has never produced economies, it can only
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produce better management. The Irish civil service in any case had not experi-
enced the phenomenal growth of the British service during the war years. In
July 1914 the Irish service was 25,192. In July 1921, at the Truce, it was still only
27,671.197 That the cost had risen was not due to any increase in numbers but
to the war-induced inflation. Nor by any stretch of the imagination could
Waterfield’s reorganisation of classes and grades be described as the transfor-
mation of a decrepit administration into the efficient apparatus of an inde-
pendent State. Waterfield did not even touch on what all commentators agreed
was the main weakness in Irish administration – the quasi-independence of
many of the boards and departments and the lack of any clear line of respon-
sibility binding politicians and civil servants. On the other hand the chorus of
derision that met the Castle from all sides lacked perspective. In any specific
policy that required complex administrative action, such as the transfer of the
land to the tenant class, the Irish civil service had demonstrated undoubted
ability. The problem in Castle government was its nepotism and the uncritical
identification of the State in Ireland with unionist opinion. The Irish civil
service also suffered from the assumption that the Whitehall system was
administrative perfection and the Irish system with its autonomous boards and
lack of clear political control was deficient. Ireland had efficient and able civil
servants; what it did not have was a civil service that could make the British
government popular or accepted in Ireland. This was equally true before and
after the efforts of Waterfield and Treasury (Ireland). The State in Ireland was
a political and not an administrative failure.
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3The revolutionary State, partition, and the
civil service, 1920–21
Introduction
B      1921 Truce between the republican and Crownforces there were three State authorities in Ireland: Northern Ireland, Dáil
Éireann and the Dublin Castle regime. The 1920 Government of Ireland Act
proposed to create two Home Rule parliaments in Ireland while retaining
Westminster sovereignty. Only one of these, Northern Ireland, actually assem-
bled in June 1921. Dáil Éireann continued to function despite being suppressed
by the British authorities and maintained its claim to be the only legitimate
State in Ireland. Dublin Castle continued to function but was paralysed both
by the military forces of the Crown who displaced civilian rule, and by the IRA
who assassinated its functionaries. Civil servants were recruited for the Dáil
departments of the counter-State, which functioned with different degrees of
effectiveness. It was clear that it would take more than the offer of Home Rule
to bring Dáil Éireann to negotiate with the British government. For Irish civil
servants in the Dublin Castle departments the priority was to secure the best
possible protection for their interests in an unstable world. The leadership of
the GCICS worked to ensure that the civil service clauses of the 1920 Act gave
them what was to prove a staggering degree of security for the future. The lead-
ership of the civil service trade unions meanwhile worked to prevent the
enforced partition of the civil service to serve the new Belfast regime while
secretly maintaining contact with the revolutionary forces in Dáil Éireann, just
in case.
The revolutionary State: Dáil Éireann, 1919–21
On 16 January 1922 a Dáil Éireann delegation led by Michael Collins swept into
the upper Castle yard and ‘accepted the surrender of Dublin Castle’ from Lord
Fitzalan.1 That moment brought to a victorious conclusion the revolution that
began on 21 January 1919, precisely three years earlier, when the Sinn Féin
members elected in the December 1918 general election assembled in Dublin
as Dáil Éireann (the assembly of Ireland) and declared it to be the lawful
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 government of the independent Irish State. In the December 1918 general elec-
tion Britain had voted ‘khaki’ and for Lloyd George, but Ireland voted Sinn
Féin and for secession from the United Kingdom. Historians have been reluc-
tant to describe events in Ireland between the assembly of the first Dáil Éireann
and the takeover of the Castle as ‘revolution’. Euphemisms such as ‘violence’,
‘struggle’, ‘troubles’, ‘takeover’, ‘rebellion’ and ‘war’ have been used in order, it
would seem, to avoid revolution.2 Among the recently written histories Kostick
and Fitzpatrick explicitly describe the period as revolutionary.3 The historian
of the Dáil administration also recognises the revolutionary nature of the
assembly.4 However, if we recognise that revolution in the twentieth century
was a State-centred event – the violent seizure of State power with the intent to
then use State power to transform society, putting the State rather than society
at the centre of revolutionary developments – then there is no doubt that the
takeover of Dublin Castle was as revolutionary an event as the storming of the
Winter Palace.
The surrender of the Castle administration to the revolutionaries was not
simply a consequence of the IRA military campaign. The IRA could survive but
it could not topple a State. Explaining the Irish revolution in terms of the
failure of the British State in Ireland rather than in terms of the actions and
intents of the revolutionaries, would suggest that the crisis of the Castle admin-
istration was deeply rooted in the long-term failure of the British State to
receive the complete consent of the Irish people (unionist as well as national-
ist) since the emergence of the Home Rule issue, or arguably since the Union
of 1801. This crisis of the State came to a final stage in the period 1919–22.
However, the failure of the British State was not simply the failure of legitimacy
brought about by the increasingly militarised response to Irish nationalist
opinion. It was also a failure in effectiveness as the State apparatus became so
saturated with politics it ceased to work and ground to a halt. The failure of the
State created a vacuum of both legitimacy and effectiveness in which the
 revolutionary challenge of Dáil Éireann, that might have been a comic farce,
succeeded in taking State power.
Sinn Féin was the first Irish party to explicitly give a State form to the his-
toric demands of Irish nationalism for separation. Sinn Féin’s strategy was not
aimed at simply destroying British State power but rather at its displacement
by a national State power. As a strategy it did not emerge from the traditional
engine of revolutionary nationalism, agrarian discontent. Previous Irish social
movements had sometimes developed beyond the agrarian issues that had
given rise to them and had taken on functions that could be described as State-
like. The Land League, which began as a tenant agitation, began to behave as
a proto-State and assume judicial, welfare and educational functions.5 But,
though the Land League and later the United Irish League both had the capac-
ity to create a proto-State, neither progressed beyond local agrarian issues.6 As
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movements they remained limited to expressing traditional tenant demands.
The ability of the British State to respond to those demands had led to the
assimilation and blunting of their revolutionary potential. The Ulster Unionist
Council had threatened to form a provisional government for Ulster in the
event of a Home Rule government being installed in 1914. The Unionist
Provisional Government had made elaborate plans to support the UVF in the
field and to maintain an Ulster government in defiance of a Home Rule exec-
utive in Dublin. The outbreak of world war meant that the Ulster Unionist
counter-State strategy was never activated.
As a revolutionary strategy, conceived by an intellectual elite within Irish
nationalism, essentially urban and middle class in its membership and ideol-
ogy, Sinn Féin succeeded in creating the broadest alliance against the British
State. Rather than aiming simply at the destruction of the State it aimed to con-
struct a more legitimate and effective form of the State. In the minds of the rev-
olutionaries taking over the Castle administration the transfer of State power
was simply the first stage of a State-led transference of society from a British to
a Gaelic way of life. Much has been written on the cultural aspects of Sinn Féin
strategy.7 Today there is a general tendency to treat this cultural aspect of the
movement in an ironic tone, noting the enormous degree of abstraction and
delusion it entailed about the Irish language, the working class, Irish women,
unionism and rural Ireland.8 While much of this criticism is accurate it misses
the fact that Sinn Féin, despite the rhetoric of cultural nativism, was thor-
oughly modern in situating nationalism within an Étatisme that gave priority
to the State, not the nation, in achieving progress and social justice. Sinn Féin
was effective because it succeeded in using the cultural rhetoric of tradition as
a form of broad mobilisation across Irish society and as a strategy to State
power. Of the two forces that were engaged in the revolutionary struggle, the
IRA and Dáil Éireann, it was the Dáil that came out on top. This is because it
used the revolution as a State-building opportunity. It undermined the claim
of the British State in Ireland to legitimacy by portraying the British State as
alien, oppressive and exploitative and by successfully countering its status as a
progressive and enlightened force in Irish society. By the time of the ‘surren-
der’ Dublin Castle was stained with ‘Black and Tanism’ and viewed with con-
tempt while Dáil Éireann basked in the glow of the Dáil courts and police, a
local government department that was pushing through reforms, and the
appearance of an energetic programme of industrial development; all pre-
sented to the world by a thoroughly modern and effective propaganda depart-
ment. The decision of the successful Sinn Féin candidates in the December
1918 general election to assemble in Dublin’s Mansion House and to declare
themselves, as Dáil Éireann, the legitimate government in Ireland was there-
fore in itself a revolutionary action. Resistance to the alien British State was to
be expressed through a rival popular State.9
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The civil service of Dáil Éireann
The emphasis on a State-centred revolutionary struggle necessarily focuses on
the role of the civil service both in the British State and in the revolutionary
counter-State. We now turn to the experience of those men and women who
made the Dáil function as a government from the assembly of the first Dáil
to the surrender of the Castle (see Appendix: Dáil Éireann civil service, Jan.
1919–Jan. 1922).
The constitution of Dáil Éireann, adopted provisionally at the opening
session of 21 January, was the organisational basis of the Dáil government.
Modified at the sessions of April 1919 it was composed of an inner circle of the
president of the Dáil (príomh aire) and four ministers of finance, home affairs,
foreign affairs and national defence with an outer circle of variously termed
ministers and directors. On de Valera’s departure Griffith, as acting prime min-
ister, set out the realisation of the domestic and constructive side of the Sinn
Féin programme as the work for the departments and directories of the Dáil.10
The Dáil was determined to give real effect to its claim to be the legitimate
 government of the Irish State.
A government to function required a civil service. The Dáil had in the writ-
ings of Griffith some guidance on how a revolutionary counter-State should
organise its civil service. Arthur Griffith, in his The Resurrection of Hungary: A
Parallel for Ireland, proposed that the four to six thousand officials of the local
government bodies would form the basis of a national civil service.11 This was
further developed in the pages of the Sinn Féin Weekly where he detailed how,
once stripped of nepotistic and corrupt recruitment practices, a national civil
service would have a profound impact on Irish education and would offer an
attractive alternative to the British and imperial services for young Irish men.12
Under this scheme of a single unified service comprising local and central
 government a clerk on Ballina Urban District Council could aspire to the
 secretaryship of a department of State.
In the session of 18 June 1919 the Dáil decreed ‘the establishment of a
National Civil Service embracing the employees of all public elective bodies,
and that a sum of £500 be appropriated for the purpose of the Scheme’. A short
debate, of which no record was kept, ensued. Griffith, in reply to the debate,
said that ‘the Ministry were not wedded to any particular scheme and that a
consultative committee would be selected to go into the whole matter’.13 In the
session of 19 August Griffith’s statement that the committee had not completed
its deliberations but ‘that it was for the Dáil or the Ministry to propose a
scheme, or for the committee to proceed with the completion of a scheme’ sug-
gested that the question of who exactly controlled the recruitment and role of
the civil service in the revolutionary State was not clarified. It might also
suggest that not a lot of thought was being put into the question. At the session
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of 27 October the final report of the committee implied that the national civil
service would in fact apply to local authorities only and not to the Dáil admin-
istration, though again the lack of a full debate report leaves the question
open.14
The question as to whether the civil service of the State would be controlled
by the Dáil or by the executive arose in June 1919 when the appointment of
Gavan Duffy as secretary to the ministry led to a debate on whether the gov-
ernment ought to be allowed to make appointments without the sanction of
the Dáil. Thomas Kelly pointed to the real question at issue, expressing a fear
of the government appointing members of the Dáil to paid positions, pre-
senting an opportunity for corruption and cronyism, the very vice of which
the Castle was so often guilty. It was agreed that in future all appointments
of members of the Dáil to paid positions would be sent to the Dáil for
ratification.15 However, the only civil service appointment that was in fact
brought to the Dáil for sanction was that of Accountant-General, a post that
went to George McGrath.16 For this post Collins sought permission for the
appointment of a professional auditor and accountant at £500 per annum to
co-ordinate the system of accounting in the various departments, except
defence, and to keep track of day-to-day spending.17 McGrath visited the
various departments and helped to set up proper accounting systems. He also
carried out occasional internal audits, very much like a one-man committee
of public accounts.18 Though some thought it desirable that the elected rep-
resentatives should have direct control of the developing civil service, the sup-
pression of the Dáil made it impracticable. In practice the various ministers
had the freedom to recruit their own staff as required. The only control was
that exercised by Collins in finance who had to be notified of appointments
and who provided the cash to pay their salaries, thus replicating the British
system of Treasury control of staff.19 Ministers notified Collins of the duties
and salaries of the new appointees; these were then registered in the depart-
mental schedules held by finance. Presumably Collins could also use his
central control to ensure that all those employed were trustworthy. Dáil
departments were instructed not to pay staff themselves. Staff was paid directly
by Seán McGrath, the Department of Finance’s ‘walking bank’, who some-
times carried thousands of pounds on his person as he walked with the weekly
wages around the streets of Dublin.20 It proved an efficient system of control-
ling payments and insuring a central control of numbers while also ensuring
that staff was paid regularly.21
The recruitment of a civil service for the counter-State raised questions
around issues of cost, control of recruitment and, linked to that question,
proficiency in the Irish language. Initially, as most of the departments remained
largely nominal, the civil service remained relatively small so the question of
where control of the civil service lay was of little practical importance. In June
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1919 £24 2s 4d was the total monthly bill for all seven staff of the Dáil;
O’Hegarty, clerk of the Dáil; Lynch, the official translator; O’Siochain, a private
secretary to Austin Stack; O’Donoghue, an accountant; Murphy, a clerical assis-
tant; Miss Mason a typist; and Conlon, a messenger.22 The Department of
Agriculture sought permission to empower the National Land Commission,
decreed by the Dáil, to appoint a registrar, secretary, assessors, valuers and ‘such
officers, clerks or employees as it deems necessary’. The Dáil agreed but, cau-
tious of the political capital that the ability to make grants of land commanded,
also decreed that no official of the proposed land commission could be elected
to, or be a member of, the Dáil.23
However, successful departments inevitably expanded and this was espe-
cially the case with local government.24 As the Dáil department sought to take
over the role of the LGB the ‘clean-break’ decree was promulgated in September
1920, ordering all local authorities to cease contact with the British LGB and to
accept the authority of the Dáil Éireann department. The minister, W. T.
Cosgrave, sought sanction from the Dáil for a dramatic expansion of staff: four
inspectors, ten clerks and nineteen auditors at an annual cost of £23,000.
Collins immediately refused, saying that the money was not available. Collins
was not going to diminish the priority of the IRA in the competition for
finances. Seán MacEntee suggested that the local authorities should be made to
finance the cost of the department by a levy but this was rejected by both
Cosgrave and Collins as undermining the dominance of the Dáil. No depart-
ment that supervised local authorities should depend on those authorities for
finance. Collins finally agreed to find £5,000 to cover the expenses of the
department to the end of 1920.25 By the time of the Treaty the Dáil Department
of Local Government had seventy-nine office staff, inspectors, auditors and
stocktakers. Interestingly, in view of the later Free State attitude to female civil
servants, the Dáil departments in general, and local government in particular,
were good employers of women. Women were rarely detained or searched and
so could be safely entrusted with the most sensitive documents.26 Of the thirty-
six office staff of the Department of Local Government, sixteen were women.
In the more demanding and dangerous work of the inspectors and auditors
there were seven women among the staff of forty-one.27
Cosgrave was a stickler for correct procedures and so far as possible he
wanted recruitment by examination only to apply. For the recruitment of audi-
tors this required an elaborate charade. Advertisements were placed in the
newspapers inviting applications for the posts, detailing the requirements but
without disclosing the name of the employer. Michael De Lacey, the officer in
charge of the outdoor staff, set and conducted an examination for the qualified
candidates in the offices of Dublin Corporation. The exact nature of the work
and the employer were revealed only to the successful candidates. Frank
Barnard, who was delighted to be told he had got first place, initially refused
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the post when its full nature was revealed to him.28 James Kavanagh, secretary
of the department, ran into trouble with Cosgrave on the issue of staff recruit-
ment. When Cosgrave was under arrest in early 1920 Kavanagh, in need of
extra staff, recruited Tom McArdle, a dismissed Castle civil servant. Cosgrave
on his release refused to sanction the appointment. It took a great deal of pres-
sure from Kavanagh to force Cosgrave’s reluctant agreement.29 McArdle went
on later to become the first secretary of the Department of Health.30 Cosgrave
could not maintain such Spartan recruitment procedures and personal rec-
ommendation by the trusted was resorted to. Michael De Lacey personally
recruited Nicholas O’Dwyer as an inspector. O’Dwyer in turn recruited James
McLysaght. O’Dwyer had no recollection of there ever being an interview; the
jobs were offered and accepted in personal conversations.31
However imperfectly it managed to recruit its own staff by open competi-
tion, one of the key functions of the Dáil Department of Local Government
was to enforce fair and open competition in local posts. Whatever compro-
mises were necessary to run the Dáil departments, appointments there were
not, in the longer term, as significant as local appointments because it was
intended that the post-revolutionary State would be staffed by a ‘National Civil
Service’ recruited and trained locally and advancing by ability alone. The
department closely watched the employment practices of the local authorities
and refused to sanction any appointment of elected persons to paid posts. In
Baltinglass in Co. Wicklow sanction was refused when the chairman of the
local Rural District Council successfully applied for the post of clerk to the
council. The appointment of an elected member of the Waterford Corporation
as town clerk was raised in the Dáil as an example of the bad practices that a
native government ought to eradicate.32 In August 1920 the Dáil Department
of Labour circularised local authorities with a proposed scheme of arbitration
for settling salaries of employees and officials, implying a centralising of
authority over local government by the Dáil.33 This was strongly welcomed by
the trade union of the local government officials the Irish Local Government
Officers’ Trade Union (ILGOU).
The ILGOU had its roots in the Dublin Municipal Officers’ Association
(DMOA). The DMOA was founded in 1901 to defend the Dublin municipal
officers against a wage-cutting corporation. The DMOA was from the begin-
ning sympathetic to the Sinn Féin ideal of a national civil service with open
competitive entry and promotion in the whole of the local and State civil
service. Henry Mangan, chairman of the DMOA in 1910, gave a critical but
positive response to Griffith’s original proposals for a single national civil
service.34 Mangan was later an advisor to Collins in the negotiations on the
financial provisions of the Treaty. Among those executed in 1916 Éamonn
Ceannt and John MacBride were both members of the DMOA. Ceannt served
on the executive between 1907 and 1913. The founding energy of the ILGOU
The revolutionary State and partition, 1920–21 99
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:09  Page 99
came from a group of DMOA members, many of them IRB, who had partici-
pated in the 1916 Rising or were strongly sympathetic.
Thomas Gay, a corporation librarian, who was close to Collins and allowed
him the use of the Capel Street library as a meeting place, was a prominent
figure in the ILGOU. The driving force was Harry Nicholls, an engineer in the
corporation, unusual in his militant republicanism in that he was a Protestant.
He was an officer in the fourth battalion Volunteers, the same battalion as
Patrick Pearse, Cosgrave and Ceannt. Arrested as a member of the St Stephen’s
Green garrison in the Easter Rising he was interned in Frongoch until his
release in December 1916. He immediately began organising the ILGOU as a
national union for all local government officers. There is every likelihood that
the ILGOU was conceived in Frongoch as an arm of the coming struggle.35 The
ILGOU announced itself as a militant white-collar organisation by staging in
Dublin in June 1920 the first ever strike by public servants in either Britain or
Ireland.36 At its first annual general meeting Nicholls committed the ILGOU to
supporting the Dáil department in its struggle against the LGB. The ILGOU
refused to represent officials, such as Henry Campbell and John Flood, dis-
missed for maintaining contact with the LGB despite the resolution of Dublin
Corporation. Instead the union gave full support to local authorities that threw
in their lot with the Dáil department. The reason that the local officers were
ready to support the revolutionary assembly was the promise of better pay and
conditions through the creation of a national standard salary scale, better pro-
motional opportunities and an end to corruption in local appointments.37
Another issue which intruded into recruitment of the Dáil civil service was
that of competence in the Irish language. The general feeling was that, all else
being equal, the candidate with Irish was to be given preference over the one
without Irish. Collins as Minister for Finance had to abandon his search for
Irish-proficient clerks and accept monolingual but efficient candidates.38 The
preference for Irish speakers was justified not on terms of efficiency – none of
Collins’s departmental business was conducted in Irish – but as a cultural
measure that would counteract the view of the language as a mark of ignorance
and poverty and enhance its status. This was seen as especially vital in the Irish-
speaking areas where English was the passport to employment. If Irish could
be seen as securing well-paid and high status employment it would be a
significant cultural shift. However, there was defensiveness in the debate and a
repeated insistence that Irish competence was to be the final criterion and not
the first.39
The reality for the departments of the Dáil government was that it was more
important that staff be discreet, loyal to the republic and willing to face the
danger that loyalty entailed. The departments could not be too fussy about
procedures of recruitment and officials were recruited by any and every means.
J.D. O’Connell, a solicitor in Tralee, came under considerable pressure to ‘lend’
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his typist Mary Hogan to the Dáil secretariat. His response lacked the zeal of
revolutionary commitment: ‘I trust she will be well looked after in Dublin. She
has not been out of home before and she is rather quiet in her disposition . . .
She is only lent to you temporarily, as soon as she can be spared I would like to
have her back again . . . Her people are quite elderly . . . if she does not like the
city she must be allowed back again’.40 Evidently the city suited Mary Hogan
very well as she settled into her job at £3 per week. Seán McCluskey, caretaker
of the Dáil offices at 76 Harcourt Street, and therefore privy to every secret of
the counter-State, was recruited by Kathleen Brennan, a member of Cumann
na mBan (the women’s arm of the republican army). After a hurried interview
by Michael Collins (one of the few instances of anything like an interview for
applicants) he was given the job and moved into the basement flat of the Dáil
premises.41 The couriers who carried the correspondence between the Dáil
departments and their covering addresses were all recruited from the Dublin
brigade IRA and from the IRB.42
The Sinn Féin party was an obvious source for staff but one with constitu-
tional difficulties. The 1917 party executive included several civil servants.43
Collins and de Valera, who were to come to such fundamental disagreement,
were at one on the necessity of separating the party from the State apparatus.
Not only was it undemocratic to merge party and State, it was also recognised
that the fundamental weakness of the Castle administration was its saturation
in party politics. Collins objected to two of the staff of the local government
department being elected to the second Dáil in May 1921. De Valera from the
earliest days of Dáil Éireann worked to exclude members of the party from
positions within the State apparatus.44
It was, however, impossible to ignore the potential offered by the party,
though it would be truer to say that the State exploited the party rather than
the party the State. In fact many of the Sinn Féin officials who migrated into
the Dáil civil service assumed that the work of the party and the State were
interchangeable. Seán Nunan, who was appointed the first clerk of the Dáil,
was recruited from the Sinn Féin party, though he was also known both as a
Volunteer and as an IRB man. He was then withdrawn from the Dáil to act as
de Valera’s secretary in the USA.45 Much of the maintenance of the ledger
records of the Dáil Éireann loan was done by Sinn Féin staff at the Sinn Féin
offices or at home.46 It was Sinn Féin members who did the hard graft of organ-
ising and running church-gate meetings to persuade the anti-conscription
fund subscribers to allow the money to be diverted forthe use of Dáil Éireann.47
When James Kavanagh, who was the accountant in Sinn Féin, was invited
by Kevin O’Higgins to take up the post of secretary to the Department of
Local Government, Pádraig O’Keeffe, secretary of Sinn Féin, strongly objected
to the Dáil departments raiding his staff resources. However, Kavanagh was in
no doubt that the work of the Dáil ‘was of greater importance than that of a
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political organisation’.48 Cathleen Napoli-McKenna thought that the Dáil
department of propaganda and the production of the Irish Bulletin had always
been run by Sinn Féin rather than the State.49 Vera McDonnell was employed
as a stenographer in Sinn Féin but also did the typing of ministerial memo-
randa for Michael Collins and Cosgrave, as well as encoding cablegrams on the
Dáil Éireann loans for transmission to the USA.50 She transferred to the repub-
lican side in the civil war and, at the request of de Valera, worked to keep the
Sinn Féin office functioning. For her the Sinn Féin party, the Dáil counter-
State, and the anti-Treaty republicans were a seamless organisation. After the
November 1919 arrests, the gaps in the administration of local government
were filled by transferring Frank Kelly (one of the London Irish who came over
for 1916) and Miss Enie O’Hegarty (sister of Diarmuid) from Sinn Féin to the
Dáil department.51
In choosing its civil service one further source available to the Dáil ministry
was the dismissed and former civil servants of the British government. Former
civil servants would be already well-versed in the intricacies of record-keeping
and bureaucratic procedures. A properly indexed and ordered record system
would be well able to bear the brunt of loss of officials through arrest and
imprisonment. Former civil servants of the British regime who worked in the
counter-State were F.X. Thunder, David O’Donoghue, Edward Cleary and
Hugh Hehir from the Land Commission; Diarmuid O’Hegarty and Michael
McDunphy from the DATI; Tom McArdle from the LGB; and Paddy Cremins
with Eamon Duggan from the Post Office. Most of these had been dismissed
for participating in the 1916 Rising or for refusing to take the oath of allegiance
in 1918.52
Procedures in the Dáil departments were, of necessity, informal and non-
hierarchical. The only employees with clearly defined positions were the typists,
couriers, George McGrath the Accountant-General and James Kavanagh who
described himself as secretary and accounting officer in the Dáil Department of
Local Government. There was no apparent division of work into administrative
and executive grade, nor was there clear grading of salaries or promotional
posts.53 Salaries were determined in an ad hoc manner by the cabinet and, if we
take salary as reflecting grade and status, were not any higher than those of the
clerical grades in the British civil service. The lowest paid were the couriers,
despite the danger of their work, next the typists, above them the equivalent of
the clerical assistants.54 Ministers themselves acted as an administrative or first
division rank. Just as in Dublin Castle, the Dáil civil service soon found that
inflation was rapidly eroding the value of their salaries and a co-ordinated
request for a general salary increase was met by the cabinet in June 1920.55 Co-
ordinating demands for salary increases has always proved a most potent source
of organisation; however, the civil service of the Dáil did not last long enough
to develop its own corp d’esprit. Any sense of comradeship was provided in the
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main by prior membership of Sinn Féin, the IRB, the Volunteers or Cumann
na mBan. If there was one single organisation binding the Dáil civil service
together it was the IRB. What bound the civil service to the Dáil was a shared
and intense commitment to achieving an independent Ireland. That shared
commitment blurred the distinction between politicians and civil servants.
Tom McArdle describes the Department of Local Government as working with
a ‘generous spirit’ with no distinctions of ranks and with ministers doing the
work of drafting and typing that ordinarily would be done by officials and
staff.56 Informality can, however, also be a sign of incoherence and lack of direc-
tion. Where there was no clear division of responsibility and no presiding min-
ister with energy and vision a department might never progress beyond a paper
existence.
The Truce brought an opportunity to evaluate the performance of the Dáil
departments and to address the question as to what extent the apparatus of the
counter-State was capable of undertaking the task of replacing the existing
Castle apparatus. The Truce gave equality to the counter-State and, in contrast
to the fear and confusion that permeated the Castle apparatus, the counter-
State was animated by a keen anticipation of power.57 The executive was reor-
ganised with six inner cabinet and seven minor non-cabinet ministries.
Liam de Roiste, TD (Teachta Dála, ‘delegate to the assembly’) for Cork
City, closely questioned Collins on the numbers and salaries of the officials
employed by the Dáil departments.58 In fact the cabinet had already recognised
that the informality in grading and recruitment of the underground adminis-
tration was not sustainable in the circumstances of the Truce. The proposal
to create a committee on the civil service that had first been mooted early in
1919 was resurrected, for a ‘salaries board’. This board, acting in either an
 advisory or a supervisory capacity to the cabinet, would grade and determine
salary levels across the administration, ensuring uniformity and equality of the
different departments. In some ways this would cut across the work of the
finance department’s Accountant-General appointed by Collins who had in
fact evolved into an ‘establishments officer’. The names suggested for the
salaries board were John Murphy of O’Loughlin, Boland and Murphy account-
ants; Richard Foley of the Underwood Typewriting Company, who had pro-
vided office space for Collins; Henry Dixon, the solicitor and Sinn Féin
founder-member; David O’Donoghue of the Dáil Department of Finance; and
Patrick O’Keeffe the Sinn Féin secretary.59 Such a board would have been dom-
inated by those with business and commercial traditions, rather than with the
traditions of the public service.
There is no evidence that the proposed board was ever formed and recruit-
ment continued on an ad hoc basis. The Dáil Department of Local Government
was, again, the most energetic. Of the seventy-nine staff in the department at
the time of the Treaty almost half, thirty-eight, were recruited in the months
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after the Truce.60 Cosgrave was still intent on enforcing local government com-
petitive recruitment and approached Professor Hayes of the National University
of Ireland about setting up an external examination board for local government
appointments.61 Austin Stack fretted about the lack of supervision over the Dáil
staff, suggesting that general regulations be enforced with office hours for all
government departments from 9.30 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. with an hour for lunch
and a half-day Saturday.62
During the Treaty debate much was made on the pro-Treaty side of the fact
that the IRA had reached the limits of its operational capacity. However, prior
to the Truce in early June, Collins was considering a shift in the fighting strat-
egy, which suggests that the revolutionary counter-State had not run out of
options. Collins proposal was to shift the target of the struggle from the police
and army towards the civil service of the Crown in Ireland. Citing as a prece-
dent Benjamin Franklin’s proclamation of October 1778 against loyalists in the
United States, Collins wanted the Dáil to pass an Act declaring as illegal and a
usurpation of lawful authority all practices that assisted the British government:
My chief desire is not to single out any particular institution but to get at them
all. No English connection should be tolerated, except a connection we could not
get rid of, or that we would be unwilling to get rid of, for instance the P.O. is not
doing us any particular harm and might be allowed to operate, or the Board of
Education, in certain ways at any rate, might be allowed to operate. This is a
matter that has been weighing heavily on me and I have been anxious to see you
about it. To my mind we must widen the attack at the present moment. We are
attacking with our weakest arm and are attacking their strongest arm.63
Collins was once again stressing the advantages that disorder and chaos in the
British administration would bring to the revolutionary forces. In response
Austin Stack drafted a memorandum for the cabinet detailing the new
offensive against the Castle administration. The memorandum listed nine cat-
egories of officials of the British State in Ireland:
1. Dublin Castle officials including the Chief Secretary, the Under Secretary, the
Attorney General and Solicitor General, Chief Crown Solicitor and their many
subordinates.
2. The members of the Privy Council.
3. The Lord Chancellor and other judges of the ‘Supreme Court of Judiciature in
Ireland’.
4. The officials of the ‘Four Courts’.
5. Recorders and County Court Judges.
6. Clerks of the Crown and Peace, Crown Prosecutors, Crown Solicitors.
7. Sheriffs and Under Sheriffs, Baliffs and Process Servers.
8. Civil servants engaged in the imposition and collection of taxes, custom duties
and the like.
9. Other civil servants.
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Categories one to three were clearly directing and assisting in the applica-
tion of martial law in Ireland and in the activities of the Auxiliaries and Black
and Tans and therefore ‘made themselves enemies of the Republic in time
of war and are . . . called upon the leave their present offices; otherwise
they themselves will be responsible for the consequences’. Civil servants in
the categories four to seven were essential to the administration of British
law. If they could be compelled to resign it would make it impossible for the
writ of British law to run in any practical sense. Categories eight and nine,
‘whilst not actually harmful in themselves’, did form part of the enemy
administration. If they also could be compelled to resign then British gov-
ernment in Ireland would be ‘seriously handicapped if not entirely impo-
tent’. Their fate, the memorandum concluded, could be left over for later
decision.64
This new aggressive strategy was overtaken by the Truce but was unveiled to
the post-Truce Dáil as a ‘decree as to purported exercise of public functions’.
The decree asked that the Minister for Home Affairs may ‘impose penalties by
fine, imprisonment, banishment from a particular area or otherwise’ (my
italics) on persons ‘purporting to exercise judicial, administrative and legisla-
tive functions without the authority of the Republic’.65 Launching an attack
on the civil service was now being offered as a strategy held in reserve in the
event of the Truce breaking down and war being resumed. Gavan Duffy
entered an objection to the ‘or otherwise’ which, as Austin Stack made clear,
meant execution. Gavan Duffy was not squeamish about the death penalty as
such. In fact he suggested that barristers ought to be included on the list. But
if the Dáil was to impose the death penalty then it should say so in plain and
simple language and it should be imposed by judges and not by politicians.
This view gained strong support from among the members of the Dáil, includ-
ing later die-hard anti-Treatyites such as MacEntee. With Stack in danger of
allowing the debate to be smothered in details on the right of appeal, Collins
intervened to bring the argument back to the central issue saying, ‘it was not
a question of preventing those officials from functioning, but a question of not
allowing the British government to carry on any functions at all in this State’.66
From his sources Collins was aware of the panic that swept through Dublin
Castle in the wake of the killing in March 1920 of Alan Bell, a civil servant who
had been investigating the hiding places of the Dáil finances. The killing of a
civil servant clearly had much greater impact on the administrative machine
than that of a policeman or a soldier. In Bengal the assassination of officials of
the Indian civil service had a devastating impact on recruitment and morale
and fatally undermined the ability of the British to suppress Indian national-
ist activists.67 Perhaps it was just as well that the Castle civil servants them-
selves had no inkling of their probable fate in the event of a resumption of
hostilities.
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Partitioning the civil service
Waterfield, in reorganising the Irish civil service, was simply applying with local
variations a policy that was also being applied in Great Britain. He could check
with Whitehall at every stage and ensure that his schemes were in line with
Treasury policy generally. Partition of the civil service was, however, uniquely
Irish in its application and was also an unprecedented administrative act. Earlier
Home Rule proposals provided that some of the Irish civil servants would be
transferred to an Irish parliament and that some would remain under the control
of the London government. The 1920 Government of Ireland Act divided the
Irish administration in ways never previously proposed.68 Originally the legisla-
tion proposed that the Irish departments would be divided north and south with
sections that could not be partitioned allocated to the Council of Ireland, thus
being shared between north and south. By the final stages of the bill, under pres-
sure from the Ulster Unionists, a ‘clean cut’ between north and south was envis-
aged with the Council of Ireland acting as a potential vehicle for future unity.69
Through the various drafts Westminster continued to retain most of the
financial, revenue and customs departments. Of all these State and quasi-State
administrations only two actually existed in reality, Dublin and London. Belfast
had only a paper and the Council of Ireland a purely conceptual existence.
Therefore the new civil service of north and south in Ireland would have to be
carved out of the existing Irish administration through partition.
On the ‘appointed day’ for the operation of the new governments, the func-
tions of existing departments would be transferred simultaneously to the
Southern and Northern Ireland governments and with them their civil servants
who were also transferred en bloc. For the purpose of partition the 1920 Act
created two categories of Irish civil servant. Those civil servants who ‘on the
appointed day were concerned solely with the administration of public serv-
ices’ in Southern or Northern Ireland automatically became officers of that
government. For all other civil servants the Civil Service Committee estab-
lished by the Act, and on which the civil servants themselves had two repre-
sentatives, would determine their allocation north or south. This was a further
development of the Civil Service Committee established by the 1914 Act. The
original committee had the power to determine the status and entitlements of
Irish civil servants who opted to retire. Under the 1920 Act this committee was
further empowered to determine the allocation of the civil service to north and
south and, in doing so, was instructed to defer to the wishes of the individual
officer so far as possible.70 The success of the GCICS in getting representation
on this committee was crucial to securing the confidence of the civil servants
themselves in the new governments. Sam Sloan of the AEO and Michael
Gallagher of the CSCA, the two most active representatives of the membership,
were elected to the committee.71
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Another class of civil servant whose welfare was being secured by Waterfield
was Englishmen who happened to be posted in Ireland and who faced being
allocated to either of the Irish governments on the appointed day. There was
also evidence that some Irish civil servants in Britain were looking for transfer
to Ireland in anticipation of native government. Waterfield established an
informal transfer between the British and the Irish departments for those
officers. His objective was to ensure so far as possible that the Irish govern-
ments would take over a civil service staffed by men who wished to serve in
Ireland.72 To his surprise the number of officials wishing to transfer out of
Britain to Ireland far outnumbered officials wishing to transfer the other way.
Generally civil servants of the higher executive grades wished to transfer out of
Ireland, those of the lower clerical grades into Ireland. This reflects the antici-
pation of where the better future opportunities lay for the respective classes.73
However, the main preoccupation of the civil service associations, as we have
seen, was reorganisation and re-grading. The threat, or promise, of Home Rule
had been part of Irish administration for the lifetime of many of the Irish civil
service and most had grown used to the waxing and waning of the issue and
even regarded it with some indifference.74 The GCICS was diligent in protect-
ing the interests of the service and used each revision of Home Rule to extend
previously won concessions. The mood within the Irish committee of the
cabinet was abjectly conciliatory to the Irish civil service, perhaps in an unstated
apologetic agreement with accusations of a breach of faith on the part of the
State. The amendments sub-committee on the Government of Ireland Bill rec-
ommended that the Treasury should go out of its way to meet the inevitable
‘hard cases’ that partition of the civil service would throw up, meaning most
probably those that neither north nor south wanted.75
As partition emerged as cabinet policy Anderson instructed the Irish depart-
ments to draw up a paper allocation of their work and a ‘provisional list of
officers available for transfer to the governments of Northern and Southern
Ireland, or the Council of Ireland’.76 However, the 1920 Act was so convoluted
that it was confidently felt that partition would never actually happen and the
whole work of preparing the Irish departments for the appointed day had an air
of unreality to it.77 For the civil service itself ‘the nightmare of transfer to Belfast’
as it was described in Red Tape, the civil service journal, seemed remote.78 Such
was the conviction within the civil service associations that partition would not
happen or, if it did, would not work, that they several times repeated their deter-
mination that they would remain as all-Ireland associations.79
A civil service for Northern Ireland
Of the political forces then shaping Ireland the only one that saw virtue in the
1920 Act was the Ulster Unionists. The key figures in turning the 1920 Act to
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successful regime-building were James Craig and Ernest Clark. However, it is
important to appreciate that Craig saw little virtue in the 1920 Act as such and
simply used it as the means to the end of Ulster Unionist autonomy in a six-
county Northern Ireland.80 Craig was among the more ‘State-minded’ Irish
politicians of his times. Close to Walter Long he deputised for him at times. He
transformed the paramilitary UVF into an armed force of the northern State,
the Special Constabulary, before the State itself came into existence. A skilled
administrator and negotiator rather than an original thinker, the record shows
that he had a keen appreciation of the importance of securing early control of
administration. Even though he had no actual position in the Irish government
it was assumed that Craig, as leader of the Ulster Unionist Council, was the
future prime minister of Northern Ireland and he was consulted as such.
Sir Ernest Clark, like Anderson a civil servant from the Treasury depart-
ments, was appointed in September 1920 as Assistant Under-Secretary in the
Irish Office with responsibility for the six counties that were to form Northern
Ireland. The appointment of Clark prompted Wylie to draw up a memo -
randum on the Irish situation in which he described the appointment as a
‘blunder leading to permanent partition’.81 A former evangelical preacher,
Clark retained throughout his life a sense of mission but was clearly over-
whelmed by James Craig’s towering presence and adroit flattery.82 Although he
was supposed to report to Anderson in Dublin Castle and remained a civil
servant of the Crown, Clark was soon acting at the behest of Craig. The civil
service staff representatives found him capable but ruthless in pursuing his
ends. On his trips to Dublin to meet with the civil service representatives he
mentioned more than once that he had ‘set up’ the South African government
equipped with no more than an Act of Parliament, a table and a chair and that
he would do the same in Northern Ireland.83
Months before the elections under the 1920 Act to establish the new Irish
governments, Craig and Clark worked together to create an administrative
apparatus for Belfast that would have written across it, as Craig urged Clark to
write across his own chest, ULSTER! In an echo of the strategy of Sinn Féin
they created an administration from the top down. First a framework for a
cabinet of ministries was elaborated, then the existing departments were allo-
cated to these ministries and finally a civil service to run these ministries was
assembled. The shape of the cabinet was developed in discussion between
Clark, Craig and Adam Duffin of the Belfast Chamber of Commerce between
February and April 1921. Clark’s suggestion for a cabinet of five ministries was
countered by Duffin’s suggestion of eight. Despite Clark’s warning that, for a
party that would have between thirty-two and forty seats in the northern par-
liament, to have one-quarter or one-fifth of them in cabinet would make a
nonsense of parliamentary government, Craig plumped for seven ministries;
six plus the prime minister.84 Craig seems to have already sounded out his
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Ulster Unionist colleagues as to prospective ministerial posts. The task then
was to start staffing the ministries with a civil service. It was here that the Ulster
Unionists ran into trouble with the Anderson team in Dublin Castle and with
the civil service staff associations.
Relations between Craig and Clark and the Anderson team were fraught as
Belfast became suspicious that Dublin was being obstructive and was prevent-
ing the smooth working of the Belfast administration. Most informed opinion
was well aware that the Anderson team were sceptical of the 1920 Act and were
working for a Dominion Home Rule settlement. Cope and Sturgis were hostile
and Anderson became even more stiffly formal.85 Anderson’s position on
Home Rule and partition has been described as ‘enigmatic’.86 The creation of
the office of a Belfast Under-Secretary seems to have been his idea, yet he was
less than enthusiastic about its operation. If we assume that Anderson’s main
objective was to ensure continuity and integrity in administration, then his
actions appear more consistent. By insisting that the Belfast administration
would not have a free hand in recruiting its civil servants he hoped to ensure
that the State apparatus would not be tainted by the sort of politicisation that
had brought the Castle regime into disrepute. Anderson reminded Clark that
the assignment of the civil service was entirely in the hands of the Civil Service
Committee, which could not come into existence until both the northern and
the southern governments had been elected. The sequence therefore should be
that the civil service heads of the Irish departments would make a putative divi-
sion of the work of the department between northern and southern business.
Staff would be discreetly sounded out as to their preference for future service,
north or south. The heads of the departments would then, so far as possible,
ensure that individual civil servants were assigned to the jurisdiction they pre-
ferred in advance of partition. In order to make partition of the staff as uncon-
tentious as possible Anderson suggested that departmental Whitley Councils
of staff and official sides could determine the preferences of each civil servant
and prepare provisional allocations. On partition the Civil Service Committee
would then find it simplest to assign the staff on the lines already worked
out provisionally by the departmental Whitley Councils. The governments of
north and south would then have to either accept or pension the staff assigned
to them.87 Anderson’s confidence lay in the civil service loyalty to the State and
to its esprit de corps, rather than in the putative governing parties, to ensure that
there would be an essential continuity. The determination of Craig and Clark
to push ahead with staffing the Belfast departments in advance of elections and
the creation of the Civil Service Committee fatally undermined Anderson’s
strategy. In this determination Craig and Clark had the support of the Lloyd
George cabinet.
In March Clark wrote to Sturgis asking for the list of the civil servants who
had opted to go north. Clark was suspicious that the departments in Dublin
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Castle were dividing up the staff in such a way as to transfer the ‘duds’ of the
service to the north. Cope in his reply, denying that there was any such intent,
told Clark that there was an equally strong suspicion on the staff side in Dublin
Castle that the few plum jobs in the new administration were being earmarked
for English civil servants.88 Clark, who anticipated that the southern govern-
ment would retain most of the experienced men, began looking to recruit pen-
sioned civil servants as temporaries to set up the departments.89 Anderson
offered Clark further assurance that nothing was being withheld from him and
the problem was that the men were unwilling to commit themselves either way
in advance of the actual date of transfer. In fact, as we have seen, the civil service
associations were fully occupied with reorganisation and re-grading. Also, with
the future so uncertain, a sensible civil servant might reasonably fear that too
enthusiastic a display of support for either government might jeopardise future
prospects if he had the misfortune to end up under the other. Anderson sug-
gested that the best course of action for Clark would be to pick men for the
principal posts in the departments and let them work out schemes of organi-
sation and staffing for their departments.90 Anderson assumed that Clark
would recruit the heads of the departments from the Irish service, as these were
the men who best knew the requirements of the work and the calibre of the
officers available. He also assumed that this would be a purely paper exercise
until the Civil Service Committee could function and make allocations. In fact
Craig and Clark were already filling the key posts with Ulstermen such as Sam
Watt with his well-known anti-Catholic views, Gordon from the DATI, Dale
and Litchfield from the British service, Magill and Duggan from Dublin and
W.D. Scott from the Treasury.91 In order to make Belfast an attractive posting
Clark recommended that the staff scheme should have a ‘liberal number of
higher posts’.92 He also offered considerably higher salaries to English officers
as an inducement to transfer. Waterfield, conscious of the resentment this
injustice would cause among the officers transferred from Dublin, later insisted
on Treasury salary scales being applied evenly.93 There was also an attempt to
prevent the reorganisation grades being applied so far as the northern juris-
diction was concerned, leaving the Northern Ireland government free to offer
better terms if necessary to attract the right men.94 Clark staffed his own office
first, recruiting officers from London such as Scott from the Treasury, but also
choosing men of Ulster Protestant background like Captain Petherick, a
war veteran who had served in the Iniskilling Fusiliers.95 In this initial recruit-
ment to the senior ranks of the nascent northern civil service preference was
given to firstly, men of Ulster Protestant background, secondly Englishmen
who were presumed to be sympathetic to an Ulster Protestant state and lastly,
other Protestant Irishmen. The northern State-builders saw Northern Ireland
primarily in sectarian rather than territorial terms; ‘Ulster’ meant ‘Protestant’.
This was now to apply to the lower ranks of the new civil service being
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 assembled in Belfast. Protestant loyalism would bind the civil service to the new
Northern Ireland State.
Relations with the Irish civil service, where there were growing suspicions
about the recruitment of staff to the northern government, were also poor.
Mortished, in his Irish Civil Servant journal, noted as early as April 1921 that
allegations of patronage appointments in ‘Carsonia’ were circulating within
the Irish service.96 In May 1921, before the elections to establish the Belfast gov-
ernment, the AEO published its correspondence with Craig as the ‘prospective
head of government of Northern Ireland’. The AEO had written to Craig in
April 1921 asking him to express support for recruitment by open competitive
examination and for the principle of promotion by merit alone. Specifically the
AEO asked him for assurances that appointments to the Northern Ireland civil
service would be made through the Civil Service Committee established by the
1920 Act. On neither count would Craig offer any substantial assurance.97 The
creation of two governments and the partition of departments necessarily
reduced the work and opportunities that each government offered as com-
pared to an all-Ireland service. In much reduced administrations, which coin-
cided with a large number of retirements, the competition for the few top posts
would be even keener.98
The May elections and the establishment of the Northern Ireland govern-
ment in June added another force to the partition of the civil service, the Belfast
cabinet. The 1920 Act stated quite unambiguously that the allocation of staff
north and south was exclusively a function of the Civil Service Committee.
That could not happen until both governments were established and both
could nominate their representatives to the committee. However, as Craig indi-
cated to his cabinet, the northern government did not want to recruit the whole
of its civil service from Dublin. He regarded the Dublin civil servants as unde-
sirable and, in particular, was unhappy that the allocation of staff was under
the control of the Whitley Councils of each department. This, the northern
cabinet agreed, was in itself prejudicial to Northern Irish interests. Greenwood
suggested to Craig that the problem could be addressed by the loan of tempo-
rary staff from Dublin. This, he assured the cabinet, would not lead to the
northern administration acquiring too many civil servants, and therefore a
demand for extensive pensioning of redundant staff, as Greenwood had also
offered assurances that any surplus would be re-absorbed. Anderson does not
seem to have been informed of these assurances.99 Fortified by these assurances
the northern government began recruiting a civil service by personal contact
with individuals in the Dublin administration and by public advertisement
inviting applications to a selection board. The mysterious migration north-
wards of certain officials was noted and condemned as ‘wire-pulling’ by
the civil service associations. The Irish CSA sent a delegation on the issue to
the new Minister for Finance Pollock, the first Irish minister they had met.
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Refusing to accede to the delegation’s demand that the hand-picking of men
stop and that transfers only take place as the Civil Service Committee directed,
Pollock lamely referred to the problem of finding housing or lodging for trans-
ferred officers from Dublin. It was clear to the civil service associations that
with the northern government now a reality, and the Truce adding to uncer-
tainty as to the future of Dublin government, a scramble for posts was going
on behind the scenes and fatally undermining the safeguards that had been
won. Those without influence in Belfast would end up with little choice.100
In fact the possible employment of Catholics was already exciting debate
within the Northern Ireland cabinet. Complaints about the employment of
Catholics in the civil service were being forwarded by the Orange Order and by
the Ulster Ex-Service Association and were being treated with utmost serious-
ness by the cabinet. Clark might have dismissed as ‘pure imagination’ allega-
tions of anti-Catholic bias but the Freeman’s Journal was completely accurate
in its reporting of a furore in cabinet around the employment of Coyle in the
Ministry of Agriculture. Coyle was a Catholic transferred from the DATI
who was an early target of Orange Order complaint.101 The cabinet members
regarded the selection board as the vehicle for their personal patronage and
there was stout resistance to Clark’s suggestion that recruitment would be
entirely in the hands of the Ministry of Finance. Cabinet ministers arranged it
so that the crucial selection board would in fact be simply a ‘rubber stamp’ on
the employment of the individuals they recommended.102 The pattern of Ulster
Unionist Party and civil service relations was established in the short period of
1920–21 as intensely parochial, nepotistic and anti-Catholic.103
Mention of a selection board alarmed Dublin. Fairgrieves wrote to Clark
reminding him that the only body competent to assign staff to the northern
government was the Civil Service Committee mentioned in the 1920 Act and
that a selection board was ‘not on’. Clark assured him that the board was for
purely temporary posts to ensure the operation of the administration and that
as soon as the new officers were assigned to the northern government they
could be dispensed with. A public notice was drafted and then redrafted to
exclude references to an interview panel and preference being given to men of
an ‘Ulster’ background.104 By now allegations were flying around Dublin Castle
of the northern government refusing to entertain any applications for transfer
from Dublin by Catholics.105
Resisting partition of the civil service
The Truce of 11 July and the search for a basis for negotiation that took up the
months that followed gave the priority to conciliation with Sinn Féin rather
than to establishing the northern administration. The transfer of authority that
was meant to follow the elections under the 1920 Act was delayed. The threat
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to impose Crown Colony government in the area of Southern Ireland was not
followed through. In the aftermath of the Truce the establishment of the Civil
Service Committee and the partition of the civil service became in effect a ‘slow
bicycle’ race with all the contestants determined to go as slow as possible. The
winner, it was felt, would be whoever was last in. For Sinn Féin it was vital in
the period between the Truce and whatever agreement would emerge that the
government of Southern Ireland should not be established.
While Craig was desperately anxious for the transfer of functions he was not
at all anxious for the transfer of staff. He was confident that between local
recruits and selected transfers from Dublin he had in fact a functioning civil
service and did not particularly want or need an allocation of the existing civil
service.106 Yet he could not say this. The non-functioning of the administration
disguised the degree of ‘Stateness’ it had already acquired through its security
apparatus, the Special Constabulary. Therefore Pollock and Clark, who was
now head of the Northern Ireland civil service, began to delay the question of
transfers. Pollock asked for an inquiry by the Civil Service Committee, prior to
allocation, into the staffing of the existing Irish departments, alleging that there
was evidence that the staff levels were excessive. He argued that it was the
responsibility of the British government to either absorb or pension excess
staff and not place this burden on the Irish governments. Waterfield quickly
quashed that line, insisting that his own reorganisation had dealt with the issue
(which it had not) and there was no excess in the Irish service.107 The long delay
between the Truce and the actual start of negotiations on 11 October allowed
the Belfast government further time to consolidate its security and adminis-
trative apparatus.
On 9 November, soon after the Treaty negotiations had started, the British
government announced suddenly the transfer of services to Northern
Ireland.108 Over the next few days, in a rush of orders-in-council, the Dublin
Castle departments were commanded to assign officers for temporary transfer
to the north, even though the Civil Service Committee, which had the statu-
tory function of distributing staff, had not yet formally met. Lord Chancellor
Birkenhead and Lloyd George had been considering how it would be possible
to transfer power to Northern Ireland without setting up crown colony gov-
ernment in Southern Ireland. The difficulty was that the 1920 Act could not be
put into operation without the Joint Exchequer Board and the Civil Service
Committee, on which there would be a representative of the government of
Southern Ireland. Birkenhead suggested that the 1920 Act could be stretched
to authorise the Lord Lieutenant to appoint the southern representative
without having to dissolve the Southern Ireland parliament that had never met
and declare Crown Colony government.109 The place of the government of
Southern Ireland on the Civil Service Committee, which remained unfilled,
was allocated to MacMahon by order of the Lord Lieutenant.110 At the same
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time the ‘appointed days’ for transfer of the departments of government were
set out as 22 November, 1 December, 1 January and 1 February.111
While Craig sat on his rock of ‘Ulster’ the civil service sat on the rock of the
Civil Service Committee. The associations were confident in their understand-
ing that partition of the civil service could only be done by that committee and
therefore, in the absence of a representative of the southern government, it
could not be established. The civil service associations were confident that
whatever would emerge from the London negotiations would be at least as
good as existing terms and might be even better. The civil service had always
done well in setting the terms in the discussions on Home Rule. In those cir-
cumstances it was better to wait. As the Treaty negotiations made progress
Conn Murphy and Mortished of the CSA maintained contact with Sinn Féin
and the Dáil and received assurances that the protection granted in the 1920
Act to civil servants would be continued into any new agreement.112
Every Home Rule proposal, from 1886 to 1920, had been based on some
form of division between Ireland and Britain of the departments of State and
therefore of the civil service. For instance customs and trade had been excluded
in each and every Home Rule proposal thus implying that the civil service of
the revenue and custom and excise departments would remain as they were.
The Post Office, by far the largest of all government departments, was also
excluded, as was the Ordnance Survey, which had its own service traditions
that owed much to its military origins. This would in part explain the detached
complacency with which many Irish civil servants regarded the Anglo-Irish
negotiations, confident as they were that they at least would not be affected.
The Treaty, to the amazement of the Irish civil servants, transferred all twenty
thousand of them without exception to the new Irish Free State (Saorstát
Éireann). Even the postal service which had been reserved to the imperial par-
liament in all the Home Rule bills, and which represented the vast majority of
the Irish civil service, was to be transferred in its entirety to the Irish govern-
ment. It was even possible that the Treaty could be interpreted as transferring
authority over the Northern Ireland government to Dublin.
There was considerable disagreement within the civil service associations as
to the correct response in the aftermath of the Treaty.113 Despite his later avowal
of anti-Treaty republicanism, which cost him his civil service job, Conn
Murphy was initially an ardent supporter. On its announcement he addressed
an impromptu audience from the steps of his departmental offices on Merrion
Square on the momentous achievement.114 Murphy as chairman of the CSA
took the view that the 1920 Act, and all associated with it, had been swept away
by the Treaty and that the civil service should throw in its lot with the elected
government of the Irish people, Dáil Éireann. They should do nothing that
would validate partition and in particular should not participate in the Civil
Service Committee now summoned to meet. Gallagher and Sloan were loath
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to simply refuse to attend, not least because the committee could function
without them. It was eventually decided that the CSA would enter a legal chal-
lenge to the validity of MacMahon’s appointment in an effort to stop the com-
mittee in its tracks. Legal advice was sought from Hugh Kennedy, later legal
advisor to the Irish government.
The Civil Service Committee first met on 8 December, two days after the
Treaty had been signed and after the first two of the appointed days for trans-
fer of services had actually passed.115 The committee consisted of Sir Courtauld
Thomson, chairman; A.P. Waterfield, Treasury (Ireland); R.A. Johnson,
Treasury London; James MacMahon, the southern government; R.D. Megan
(later replaced by Ernest Clark), the northern government; and Sam Sloan with
Michael Gallagher representing the existing Irish officers. Sloan and Gallagher
immediately challenged the appointment of MacMahon as not in accordance
with the 1920 Act, and protested against the ‘Civil Service Committee under-
taking any functions or carrying out any duties until it has been duly consti-
tuted in accordance with provisions of the Act’. Having entered their protest
Sloan and Gallagher then agreed that the committee could continue so long as
the proceedings remained provisional and transfers were confined to volun-
teers. A paper allocation would be made and civil servants were to be asked (a)
did they wish to be allocated to the northern government (b) were they willing
to be allocated and (c) did they object to being allocated? All transfers were to
be at existing ranks but promotions were the sole concern of the government
employing the officers.116
At the second meeting Sloan and Gallagher returned to question once again the
appointment of MacMahon. A letter from Anderson was read stating that the
order-in-council was valid but, if it proved necessary, steps would be taken to put
it beyond doubt by effective legislation. Sloan and Gallagher then withdrew from
the meeting to consult with the CSA. The rest of the committee may not have
accepted the position of Sloan and Gallagher but they were certainly willing to
play for time and delay matters. When Ernest Clark, who had replaced Megan as
the northern representative, began to name individual officers as having indicated
a willingness to transfer north the committee determined that it would be neces-
sary to have the personal signature of each officer consenting to transfer. Clark
interpreted this as pure obstruction, but in fact the rest of the committee was
more likely to have been afraid of the growing reaction within the civil service to
the work of the committee.117 At a mass meeting of the Dublin civil service on the
12 December it was resolved that no civil servant, whatever his personal opinion
may be, should answer the questionnaire or any other document issued by the
Civil Service Committee as at present constituted, but that in each Department
the representative of each Association or the Chairman of the Staff Side of the
Whitley Council or Committee should collect the blank forms issued and return
them to the head of the department accompanied by copies of this resolution in
explanation of the refusal of each officer to reply to the questions.118
The revolutionary State and partition, 1920–21 115
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:09  Page 115
As the 17 December meeting of the Civil Service Committee was drawing to
a close a messenger arrived with a notice of proceedings by Conn Murphy acting
on behalf of existing Irish officers seeking an injunction against those ‘purport-
ing to act as the Civil Service Committee’ thus effectively ending the work of
the committee.119 The proceedings were heard by the Master of Rolls on 21
December, as the Treaty debate continued in the Dáil. Not surprisingly the courts
rejected the case put by the CSA; however, it had served its main function of
further delaying the process of partition until the provisional government took
power.120 The committee was finally halted by the decree of the Provisional
Government of 16 January forbidding all movements of civil servants without
the permission of that government. On the following day when Clark asked that
the committee immediately allocate those civil servants who had declared a will-
ingness to move north but had not yet done so, he found no support. Instead the
committee, whether from fear of the Provisional Government or exasperation at
Clark, adjourned indefinitely.121
The committee meetings worked by allocating staff for the departments and
then trying to find sufficient volunteers to fill them. This involved a notional
allocation of proportions of the work of the department as to north and south.
When it came to actually filling the positions it was clear that though there were
volunteers to go north, there were not enough of them. Service in Northern
Ireland was not attractive to the majority of the civil service, especially as the
prospects now looked more promising in the Free State. In Waterfield’s own
Treasury (Ireland) not one man volunteered to go north to the new Belfast
Ministry of Finance. Besides, allocation north or south was a function of the
Civil Service Committee, not the Treasury, so there could be no question of
compulsion.122 The Civil Service Committee, for its part, insisted that each civil
servant allocated north indicate in writing that he was indeed a volunteer. In
order to make up the numbers the committee decided to move outside the
strict letter of the 1920 Act and invite applications from any civil servant
serving in Ireland, whether in an Irish or an imperial department.
The number of staff actually allocated by the short-lived committee was
235.123 It was calculated that the new northern administration required
between six and seven hundred staff but by May 1922 only 280 were actually
transferred officers from Dublin and London.124 The only comprehensive list
of transferred civil servants is that compiled from memory in 1978 by Frederick
Falkiner of the Board of Works. He lists 185 transfers from Dublin.125 Had the
Civil Service Committee actually operated then about six out of ten civil ser-
vants in Northern Ireland would have been allocated by compulsion. Though
Clark recorded a great deal of indignation at the obstruction he encountered
from the committee, he was in fact probably happy enough with the result.
Along with the London transfers, officers who supported the Unionist regime
formed a core staff of the civil service of Northern Ireland. The vacancies could
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be used to sate the feeding frenzy of applications that formed around every
northern minister. The selection board filled 245 posts in the first five months
of 1922. As early as March 1922 concerns were being expressed by senior
Whitehall civil servants as to the narrow sectarian bias of the emerging north-
ern government.126 On the other hand the Free State acquired an un-
 partitioned and functioning civil service. As for the civil servants themselves
they had prevented compulsory allocation to the north while preserving all the
safeguards that had been won in the 1920 Act. All in all everybody could feel
satisfied.
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4The Provisional Government and the civil
service, 1922
Introduction
T -  of December 1921 provided for the formationof an Irish Provisional Government to take control of the Dublin Castle
administration and write a constitution for the Irish Free State (Saorstát
Éireann). The government of the Irish Free State with executive and adminis-
trative responsibilities would come into being within one year of the Treaty.
The stability of Irish democracy in the aftermath of revolution and civil war is
sometimes explained by the new government retaining the State structures and
especially the civil service inherited from the former regime. It is argued that
because of its innate conservatism and its distance from the revolutionary
State-building process the former civil service ensured stability and continu-
ity.1 This argument, that what happened to the Irish State could be charac-
terised as evolutionary rather than revolutionary, was articulated as early as
1936 by the Brennan Commission. Brennan’s report on the civil service con-
cluded that
The passing of the State services into the control of a native Government, however
revolutionary it may have been as a step in the political development of the
nation, entailed, broadly speaking, no immediate disturbance of any fundamen-
tal kind in the daily work of the average Civil Servant. Under changed masters the
main tasks of administration continued to be performed by the same staffs on the
same general lines of organisation and procedure.2
The question arises as to whether the Provisional Government did simply
continue with the same civil service, given that every other institution of the
British State in Ireland was changed – parliament, executive, judiciary, police
and the military – to be replaced by native institutions. In the midst of so much
change why retain the same civil service, especially as the revolutionary regime
had built up a civil service of its own? If continuity was the case, why did
the Provisional Government accept what was described as an anti-Irish, extrav-
agant, corrupt and run-down apparatus? The accepted view is that the Irish
civil service, notoriously inefficient, had been thoroughly overhauled and
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 successfully rebuilt into a modern and efficient machine by Waterfield in the
previous year and a half.3 That transformation, were it true, would in itself be
remarkable, though as we have seen, it had not in fact occurred. Waterfield had
reassigned the civil servants to the new grading structures but had not even
begun to address the dispersal of authority that many considered the funda-
mental problem in Castle government. He had succeeded in dressing mutton
as lamb, but it remained mutton. The emphasis on continuity also begs the
question as to the fate of the civil service of Dáil Éireann. Did the men and
women who had loyally served the revolution allow themselves to be meekly
absorbed into the inherited apparatus of the State they had fought to destroy?
The process by which the Provisional Government constructed the civil
service of the Irish Free State was in fact one of immense complexity to which
the anodyne assurance of continuity does not apply. We now turn to examine
in turn the constitutional path that was laid down for that process and the devi-
ations from that path which the emergence of anti-Treaty sentiment necessi-
tated; the reactions of the civil service itself in the Castle administration as well
as in the administration of Dáil Éireann to the formation of the new Irish Free
State civil service and their attempts to shape it as it emerged; the emergence
of the marginal pressure groups such as those civil servants who for whatever
reason felt left out by the transformations in the State; and finally the practical
problems of unifying the civil service of the Castle administration and that of
the revolutionary Dáil.
Debating the Treaty in Dublin and London
The situation in which the Castle civil service found itself in January 1922 was
one that was inconceivable in 1912. The Treaty proposed a constitutional rela-
tionship between Britain and Ireland far in advance of all previous Home Rule
proposals, including the 1920 Act, a tribute to the negotiating skills of Griffith
and Collins. Unlike all previous Home Rule bills, which limited the range of
executive responsibilities of an Irish government, Article 1 of the Treaty stated
that the Irish executive would be responsible only to the Irish parliament with
no reference to any authority being retained in Westminster. The civil service
was not to be divided between an imperial and an Irish service; the authority
of the Irish parliament over the entire State apparatus was absolute. Also,
looking no further than the title, Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between
Great Britain and Ireland – December 6, 1921, it brought into question the very
existence of Northern Ireland. It could be interpreted as implying that the
Treaty had superseded the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and that parti-
tion would be a purely temporary arrangement. Even if the Northern Ireland
parliament were to continue it might well be as a subordinate authority to the
Irish Free State.4 Article 10 of the Treaty provided that civil servants dismissed
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or who wished to retire under the new government would receive compensa-
tion terms ‘no less favourable’ than those offered in the 1920 Act.
Article 17 of the Treaty provided a mechanism for transferring the adminis-
tration of Ireland from British to Irish control via the interim Provisional
Government. Precisely how this would work was, however, still unclear and the
Treaty was marked by not only political but also institutional confusion.5 For
instance it was not at all clear at what point the Treaty could be said to have
taken effect; was it when it was agreed by the Dáil cabinet or by the British
cabinet, or by Dáil Éireann or by Westminster?6 The only certainty was that the
ratification of the Treaty by the Dáil would be immediately followed by the
withdrawal of the ‘military and auxiliary Forces of the Crown in Southern
Ireland’.7
The Treaty required that the MPs elected for the constituencies of ‘Southern
Ireland’ under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act should meet as such, ratify
the Treaty and approve the formation of the Provisional Government.8 The
British government could therefore claim that the Provisional Government
was a continuity of British authority in Dublin Castle. However, while the
British government were determined to ‘preserve unbroken the line of British
statutory authority’ and had allotted no role to the Dáil in establishing the
Provisional Government, Collins and Griffith were equally determined to pre-
serve the authority of the Dáil.9 On both sides therefore, as the Treaty was being
considered by parliament and Dáil, there was considerable thought being given
to the practicalities of transferring authority over the State and the civil
service.10 Throughout the Treaty debate Collins and Griffith suggested propos-
als that were constitutionally ambiguous but were designed to prevent a resur-
gence of the British State in Ireland and to bring partition of the civil service
to a halt. In a memorandum drafted on Christmas Day 1921 Griffith outlined
a strategy whereby the Dáil Éireann administration would continue to func-
tion during the interregnum and then, after the passing of the new constitu-
tion, merge with the Free State; ‘the Provisional Government would do nothing
to consolidate the Castle system of administration by filling vacancies etc., but
would on the contrary let that system wither and die and allow the Dáil system
to grow and strengthen . . . [B]y the time the new constitution was in opera-
tion the Irish system of administration would have superseded the Castle
system’.11 The Provisional Government, which would take control of the exist-
ing civil service, would take over and isolate the inherited administrative
machine in Dublin Castle. All business would be directed to the civil service
under the control of the Dáil Éireann ministries. Tightening the grip of the Dáil
on the departments would also make further partition difficult. The Dáil
departments would continue to meet as a government under President de
Valera while only the members of the Provisional Government would be
required to declare allegiance to the Treaty. Collins and Griffith envisioned the
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Provisional Government acting as a ‘committee of public safety’ under a united
Dáil. The Dáil would continue in being ready to reassume full authority on
completion of British withdrawal.12 With both the Provisional Government
and the Dáil functioning there would be in effect a dual government. It would
be possible, whatever the British might legislate, to maintain that the
Provisional Government was a creation of the Dáil as much as it was a creation
of the British government.
However, this was too subtle for those opposed to the Treaty, and even for
some of those who supported it. As Collins said ‘hardly anyone, even those who
support it, really understand it’.13 The debate failed to get to grips with the
mechanics of taking over the State and never got beyond an argument between
those who saw the Dáil government in symbolic terms and those who saw it
in functional terms. Indeed, those opposed to the Treaty insisted that the
Provisional Government was as much a usurpation of the Dáil as of the Castle
government that it replaced. Seán T. O’Kelly described it as the ‘partitionist,
provincial, provisional’ government.14 Piaras Béaslaí countered by insisting
that the Treaty was popularly accepted and that ‘the State is the people organ-
ised in a coherent from, and no matter whatever you call it a Republic or a Free
State, my allegiance is to the people of Ireland and to the State which represents
the national will. If we do not represent the national will, we [the Dáil] are a
usurpation.’15
De Valera’s counter-proposal to the Treaty, known as Document Number
Two, made unnecessarily explicit what was implicit in the Treaty on the trans-
fer of State power, but missed the key element of preserving the Dáil as a
 continuing and separate authority. In de Valera’s proposal the Provisional
Government of the Treaty became the ‘transitional government to which the
British Government and Dáil Éireann shall transfer the authority, powers and
machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties’. The clear difference from
the Treaty was that de Valera’s transitional government derived its authority
from the members of Dáil Éireann, not the members of the Southern Ireland
constituencies and replaced the Dáil instead of acting as a sub-committee to
it.16 Document Number Two also reproduced precisely Article 10 of the Treaty
on compensation for dismissed or retired civil servants.
De Valera’s tactics during the Treaty debate suggest that initially he antici-
pated the Dáil would reject it, but that Collins, through his IRB centres, would
ensure the IRA accepted it. His emotional outburst at the vote in favour of the
Treaty also suggests this remained his hope up to the last moment and that he
had no second line to retreat to. His resignation and offer of re-election were a
desperate attempt to retrieve his position by continuing the Dáil as suggested
by Collins, but now as an opposition to the Provisional Government. Even at
this stage Collins was prepared to postpone the vote on the Treaty and offer
once again the idea of a ‘committee of public safety’ to take over the Castle, to
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‘do all the dirty work’ as Collins termed it, while preserving the Dáil as a united
and separate authority.17
But the rancorous tone of de Valera’s opposition and the transparency of his
intent to use Collins’s constitutionally ambiguous dual authority to undermine
the Provisional Government at every turn meant that the offer was no longer
on the table.18 Liam de Roiste, in rejecting de Valera’s offer, put it plainly when
he said that the Provisional Government was simply the mechanism whereby
the British could hand control of the ‘abomination’ of Dublin Castle adminis-
tration over to the Irish. In the absence of the Provisional Government that
abomination was retained.19 Ernest Blythe also recognised that what de Valera
was proposing differed significantly from the offer originally made by Collins.
Under the original idea the Provisional Government, either informally or for-
mally, would derive its authority from the Dáil. What de Valera proposed was
two distinct and rival governments.20 The reality was that de Valera had little
experience of statecraft. Except for a brief period he had not participated in the
Dáil between his arrest in March 1918 and his return from America in
December 1920. Choosing to exercise his authority at the heady level of inter-
national diplomacy he had no experience of cabinet decision-making or the
reality of running departments of State.
The strategy of constitutional ambiguity began to unravel with the resigna-
tion of de Valera and the election of Griffith as president of the Dáil. A new Dáil
executive was elected with Collins as Minister for Finance, Gavan Duffy in
Foreign Affairs, Eamonn Duggan in Home Affairs, William Cosgrave in Local
Government, Kevin O’Higgins in Economic Affairs and Richard Mulcahy in
Defence. Collins, Duggan, Cosgrave and O’Higgins were also members of
the Provisional Government, along with Patrick Hogan, Fionan Lynch, Joe
McGrath and Eoin MacNeill. The shared membership of the Provisional and
Dáil governments was an attempt to reconstruct a creative ambiguity around
the authority of the State. Collins acted as chairman of the Provisional
Government while retaining his post as Minister for Finance in the Dáil
Éireann executive. Arthur Griffith’s absence from the Provisional Government
provided constitutional cover for the same persons in the same posts acting as
distinctly different executives – that of the Provisional Government and that of
the Dáil. When Collins was chairman it was the Provisional Government, when
it was Griffith it was the Dáil ministry. In the end the steady undermining of
the authority of the Dáil executive by the anti-Treaty deputies and its outright
rejection by the anti-Treaty IRA undermined the constitutional ambiguity
and exposed it to ridicule. The Dáil ministry was silently merged into the
Provisional Government and by the end of April has ceased to exist as a sepa-
rate body.21 Whether dual government could be effective government was
never actually tested, but the strategy of constitutional ambiguity did mean
that during the crucial months of State-building the anti-Treaty forces were
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confined to an armed strategy and no attempt was made to establish a rival
republican Dáil until October, by which time it was too late.22
The weakness of the strategy of constitutional ambiguity lay in the hesitancy
of the Provisional Government in asserting its ‘Stateness’ by confronting the
anti-Treaty forces and in the equally slow response of the British government
that allowed the northern government time to consolidate its control. The
British government interpreted the December vote in Westminster as merely
approving and not ratifying the Treaty. Ratification could only occur later with
the simultaneous ratification of the constitution of the Irish Free State, which
would take some months. It was not until 13 March that the British parliament
passed its own measure to enact the Treaty.23 This delay created a three-month
‘moment of ambiguity’ in which the British source for the authority of the
Provisional Government was missing.24 Had the Dáil remained united this
period of ambiguity would have been to its advantage and could have rein-
forced the Irish source for the authority of the Provisional Government.
Taking over Dublin Castle
On the British side it was generally expected that the takeover of the Castle
departments would be a gradual process, with the inexperienced new govern-
ment proceeding one department at a time. But the Provisional Government in
fact moved with great speed and decisiveness to assume full control of the State.
The takeover of Dublin Castle was a revolutionary event, but it was not a spec-
tacle. At that time there was no precedent for British withdrawal from her
colonies so there was none of the elaborate ceremonial to which a later genera-
tion became accustomed, with flags coming down and flags running up, accom-
panied by gun salutes. Instead, in the Privy Council chamber Collins handed
Lord FitzAlan, the first Catholic viceroy since the seventeenth century and the
last viceroy of all, a copy of the Treaty signed by the members of the Provisional
Government. FitzAlan then congratulated the Provisional Government and,
wishing them the best of luck, left.25 The Provisional Government was then
introduced to the few senior civil servants rounded up for the occasion, at least
some of whom enjoyed the irony that men who just a few months before had a
price on their heads or languished in Mountjoy Prison were now being intro-
duced as the new government. For others there was a deep sense of betrayal
and disgust at being invited to ‘grasp hands red with the blood of government
servants’.26
The Provisional Government then returned to the Mansion House and issued
a press statement announcing that ‘the members of Rialtas Sealadach Na
hÉireann [Provisional Government of Ireland] received the surrender of
Dublin Castle at 1:45 p.m. today. It is now in the hands of the Irish nation. . .’
The reference to ‘surrender’ angered Sturgis, who hoped that Lloyd George
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would use the Honours List to signal some recognition of the achievement of the
Anderson team.27 Honours were indeed distributed but, apart from Anderson
himself, their work in extricating Britain from Ireland was not the launch of a
brilliant career for these civil servants and the members of Anderson’s ‘Junta’
faded into obscurity. A new cohort of civil servants was assembled in Dublin
to assist in the construction of the civil service of the Irish Free State, most
notably William O’Brien from Inland Revenue, Joseph Brennan and Walter
Doolin from the CSO, along with T.K. Bewley and C.J. Gregg on loan from
Whitehall.28
The revolution that opened with the rhetoric of the Declaration of
Independence, the Appeal to the Free Nations of the World and the Democratic
Programme, announced its victory with its first directive:
WE do hereby direct that all Law Courts, Corporations, Councils, Departments of
State, Boards, Judges, Civil Servants, Officers of the Peace, and all Public Servants
and functionaries hitherto under the authority of the British Government shall
continue to carry out their functions unless and until otherwise ordered by us,
pending the constitution of the Parliament and Government of Saorstát na
hÉireann, and without prejudice to the full and free exercise by that Parliament
and Government, when constituted, of all and every its powers and authorities in
regard to them or any of them . . . Published at Dublin this 16th day of January,
1922.29
The Provisional Government also prohibited any action ‘altering the status,
rights, perquisites or stipends or the transfer, or dismissal of any officer,
servant, employee or functionary of the State’, or the removal of any records,
documents or correspondence.30 While these directives lack the rhetorical
flourish that began the revolution they display a sober understanding of what
revolution entails, the seizing of State power, and they are directed precisely at
the apparatus of the State, the civil service. Though the country had been par-
titioned, due to the action of the civil servants themselves the entire State appa-
ratus remained united, available and now firmly under the control of the
Provisional Government.
Although the power of the Provisional Government was purely administra-
tive and not legislative, and in that respect seemed limited, to the civil service
that was the power that mattered.31 The Provisional Government, by Seizing
control of the civil service, seized control of the entire existing machinery of
the State. Thus, a revolutionary act was cloaked in a constitutional and parlia-
mentary form. The new government shunned the Castle, establishing itself in
the City Hall. As the British soldiers, Auxiliaries, Black and Tans, and RIC
all departed the Castle fell silent. It was even suggested that the entire Castle
complex should be demolished in a series of spectacular detonations to
demonstrate the reality of the ending of British rule.32
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The Provisional Government and the civil service
Collins, Duggan and O’Higgins travelled to London on Tuesday 17 January, the
day after the takeover of Dublin Castle. Patrick McGilligan travelled as secre-
tary, Kevin O’Sheil acted as liaison with the Dublin Castle departments.33 As
the Provisional Government began to implement the Treaty it was pressed by
the British government to use the mechanisms created by the 1920 Act to facil-
itate the partition of the civil service. In particular the British government
wanted to see the Joint Exchequer Board and the Civil Service Committee
established by the 1920 Act constituted as part of the transfer of authority.34
Waterfield administered a mild fright to the Provisional Government by
reminding O’Brien that the Irish government would have to either employ
or pension all the civil servants it would acquire on the setting up of the
Free State and that it might be in its own interest to agree to some sort of civil
service committee to facilitate transfers north immediately.35 Waterfield reck-
oned that he could immediately identify about thirty officers still in Dublin,
willing to transfer north, costing about £10,000 in salaries. He suggested that
the Provisional Government could agree to allow, while refusing to compel,
transfers north.36
Instead of facilitating partition, however, the Provisional Government
ordered the Civil Service Committee, which had begun to allocate officers to
Belfast, to cease.37 Collins intended to use the control exercised by the
Provisional Government over the civil service to prevent the northern govern-
ment establishing itself. In a characteristically succinct note to Kennedy he
asked for instructions as to ‘what we are entitled to do and what we entitled to
prevent the north-east government from doing’.38 In February the Provisional
Government instructed departments to accord no facilities for allocating staff
to Northern Ireland.39 At a London conference in late March Collins refused to
hand over State documents until the boundary was settled.40 This refusal to
send staff north suited the heads and staff of the departments in Dublin
because it is part of the culture of bureaucracy that size is equivalent to status
and no head of a department will reduce staff unless compelled to do so.
However, perhaps as part of the rapprochement leading to the second Craig-
Collins pact, the Provisional Government did eventually allow the voluntary
transfer north of thirty officers.41
In early February Anderson in a memorandum on the power of the
Provisional Government attempted to create an administrative cordon sani-
taire around the six counties, saying that the terms of the Treaty established
that the British government could not transfer, and the Provisional
Government could not exercise, ‘any powers within or in respect of that area’.
The administration of Northern Ireland would continue as if the Provisional
Government had never been established. Following this, Treasury (Ireland)
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instructed that all payments of salaries to civil servants serving in the territory
of Northern Ireland would cease as from 1 April and would become the respon-
sibility of the Belfast government.42 Kevin O’Sheil dismissed this as a far-
fetched interpretation. In his view, which we may assume was also that of
Collins, the only limitations on the Provisional Government’s power were
twofold: that all the members of it should have signed the Treaty and that it
should cease to exist after twelve months. O’Sheil summarised his interpreta-
tion as ‘briefly we are not obliged by the Treaty to assist the Belfast Parliament
in any way’.43
Though the threat of immediate and compulsory transfer to the north had
receded, the civil service would have been apprehensive had they known that
even as the Provisional Government was taking over the Castle it was already
discussing its replacement. At the meetings with the British government for
establishing the Provisional Government and transferring responsibility for
the administration, the Irish delegation had originally wanted the entire Irish
civil service transferred on loan rather than permanently. This would have
allowed the Free State to pick and choose, leaving the British government
to deal with the rest. Not surprisingly the British rejected this suggestion.44
Nevertheless there was an intense debate going on within the Provisional
Government as to the future of the civil service. This debate was characterised
by outright hostility to the Castle apparatus and a determination to replace it,
reflecting the strategy outlined in Griffith’s Christmas memorandum. Collins
indicated that he looked forward to replacing the ‘alien and cumbersome
administration’, scrapping the inherited civil servants and replacing them with
fresh ‘Gaelic’ ones.45 The leading Sinn Féin ideologue Aodh De Blacam called
for the imposition of an ‘iron Bismarckian phase’ as a step on the road to
the creation of a model corporate Catholic State and society.46 J.J. (Ginger)
O’Connell, Assistant Chief of Staff in the IRA at the time of the Treaty and a
supporter of Collins, proposing a virtually militarised civil service, urged a
purge of those civil servants ‘with the wrong outlook’, an immediate imposi-
tion of salary ceilings, big cuts in staffs and a government directive to ‘bring all
public servants under thorough discipline and prohibit and make criminal
strikes by government employees’.47 Meanwhile the IRB was being courted to
support the Treaty with promises of civil service jobs.48
The most detailed, and realistic, analysis of the relationship between the
Provisional Government and the Castle civil service is contained in a ten-page
memorandum on Provisional Government policy toward the civil service pre-
pared by Eoin MacNeill, the founder of the Gaelic League and Irish Volunteers
and a member of the Provisional Government.49 MacNeill sent the memoran-
dum to Collins outlining a proposal to ‘make the fact of the change of govern-
ment penetrate every cell and fibre of the old governmental system’. At the
heart of his scheme was a supervisory commission of a small number of the
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best men in the civil service, qualified by their ‘sound national outlook’, to act
as a kind of watchdog over the senior civil servants.50 The memorandum out-
lined a vital role for the civil service in consolidating Provisional Government
control of the State. Listing the Dublin Castle offices it suggested that the
Provisional Government select ‘three or four existing Irish civil servants from
each of these offices of sound national outlook’ to act as the eyes and ears of
the Minister for Finance, Collins, and the Minister for Home Affairs, Duggan.
Those civil servants, with their understanding of the State apparatus, would
have a vital role in preventing the northern government consolidating itself.
They were to be joined by the best of the Dáil Éireann staff from the local gov-
ernment and secretariat departments. The next suggested step in taking control
of the State was the appointment of an officer equivalent to Anderson in the
Treasury and Clark in Belfast, a civil servant expert in Treasury matters to take
control of staff and financial matters.
From the point of view of the civil service the most interesting proposal was
one to establish an advisory committee of civil servants ‘to take an immediate
survey of the machinery required for finance and civil administration and to
report to a small cabinet committee’. The memorandum stressed that ‘it is of
the highest importance for the Provisional Government to get in touch with
and take the fullest advantage of the experience of the Irish civil service gener-
ally’. This advisory committee would assist in preparing a budget, keeping an
eye on transfers of revenue from Whitehall, and in reshaping the departments
of government and staffing in preparation of the assumption of power by a
native government. It would also be vital in directing departments ‘away from
British and toward Irish considerations’ and would have blanket powers of
access to all departments and records.
The MacNeill memorandum also suggested that a cabinet secretariat could
be drawn from the loyal elements of the existing civil service to ‘give effect to
cabinet decisions’. It also suggested a civil service commission to replace the
Civil Service Committee established by the 1920 Act. This would consist of
two members elected by the staff and two appointed by the Provisional
Government, with a Dáil Éireann judge acting as chairman. It would therefore
have no representative from either the British Treasury or the Belfast govern-
ment. This commission would deal with all questions of ‘retirement and dis-
charge of civil servants owing to the recent change of government’, and
transfers of civil servants between Britain and Ireland, and would consider all
applications for new appointments and make recommendations on ‘Principles
of Promotion’. The memorandum also strongly recommended that the
Provisional Government should publicly adopt a ‘self-denying ordinance’ to
give no undertakings and make no promises as to jobs or promotions. Finally,
a full list of forty-six ‘reliable and efficient’ civil servants, who the Provisional
Government could consult with confidence on the work of the departments,
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was attached. The ‘reliable civil servants’ included seven civil service trade
union activists: E. Fahy, Conn Murphy, P.J. Troddyn, H. Bell, E.P. O’Toole,
Thomas A. Murphy and Michael Smithwick.
The Conference of All Associations of Irish Civil Servants
In some of its suggestions the MacNeill memorandum reflected the position of
the civil servants themselves, as is shown by an equally detailed memorandum
presented by them to the Provisional Government. In fact it is possible that the
MacNeill memorandum may have been partly written by Conn Murphy, who
had several unofficial meetings with Collins, Griffith, and MacNeill.51 As soon
as the Treaty was approved Conn Murphy and Michael Gallagher wrote to the
secretary of Dáil Éireann, Diarmuid O’Hegarty, introducing themselves as the
staff side of the ‘Irish Civil Service Joint Whitley Committee’ but now repre-
senting the new ‘Executive Committee of the Conference of All Associations of
Irish Civil Servants’, with whom ‘any future Irish government may conduct
such negotiations as may be deemed necessary’. They also forwarded a detailed
fifteen-page memorandum on the current situation of the Irish civil service
and its relationship with the Castle government, the Belfast regime and the
Provisional Government.52 Murphy knew O’Hegarty personally from the 1918
campaign against the oath of allegiance and addressed him on first name
terms. The civil servants’ memorandum was entirely positive and optimistic
about the situation of the civil service. The memorandum initially explained
that the staff side of the Whitley Committee represented the entire fifty-six
organisations of the civil service. With the formation of the Provisional
Government the official side of the council, appointed by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, had lapsed. The staff side now looked to the Provisional
Government to form ‘consultation and conciliation machinery of a kind more
suitable to Irish conditions’, which implied that they were not entirely happy
with the Whitley scheme and were anxious for an opportunity to put their
views on an alternative.
Although the civil servants’ memorandum did not detail what they thought
was ‘more suitable’ the expectation was that the machinery would be more than
a mechanism for conveying Treasury decisions and would offer the civil service
more real control over their conditions. It had been the experience of the civil
service organisations that substantial gains had always been negotiated with
politicians. For instance, all the safeguards and guarantees in the Home Rule
proposals had been secured through dealing with the government. In contrast
the experience of dealing with the Treasury in the Whitley Committees or in
the person of Waterfield had produced mere consultation and not negotiation.
However, the memorandum did recognise that the Treaty imposed no obliga-
tion on the new government beyond that of compensation to discharged or
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dismissed civil servants and that the Provisional Government was free to deal
with the existing civil service as it thought fit.
The memorandum shows that the civil service was dominated by fear of the
imposition of partition and responded to the Provisional Government’s resist-
ance to partition with encouragement and support. It also shows that the civil
service hoped to use the transition to the Provisional Government to end the
dominance of the Treasury in civil service negotiation. On partition the mem-
orandum not only underlined the resistance of the civil service but also
directed attention to the danger posed to the authority of the new government
if the changes in train were allowed to continue unchecked.
On the handover of services such as education the memorandum warned
that though this was not to be completed until the Council of Ireland had been
set up, a number of services had already been transferred with consequent divi-
sion of staffs, with more transfers due in February and March. The northern
government was pushing for these transfers to be dated from 16 January, the
day the Provisional Government took power. This was clearly a challenge to
the authority of the Provisional Government. The memorandum urged that
the government consider the validity of the transfers already made and whether
it was prepared to agree to further transfers.
On the reserved services, such as the Post Office and police, the civil service
view was that the Treaty clearly handed these over to the Provisional
Government for the area of ‘Southern Ireland’ but equally clearly did not give
the northern government any additional power over them. The question for
the civil service, and for the Provisional Government, was whether these serv-
ices and their staffs in the northern area would pass to the control of the
Provisional Government or remain under the control of the British govern-
ment. This was also the case with the excluded services, such as customs and
excise and revenue, where the legislation was quite clear that the northern gov-
ernment had no authority whatsoever. Yet the actions of the northern author-
ity indicated that it wanted to partition all the government departments in
advance of the establishment of the Free State.
The memorandum also emphasised the hostility of the civil service to the
Civil Service Committee created by the 1920 Act and the ‘repugnance with
which they, as a whole, viewed the liability of transfer to Belfast’. They asked
that the Provisional Government support their resistance to compulsory trans-
fer, even if it led to surplus staff in Dublin, and suggested that the government
form a new Civil Service Committee composed of three staff side representa-
tives, three Irish government representatives and a Dáil Éireann judge to act as
chairman, almost replicating MacNeill’s scheme. The staff side would sit oppo-
site a politician, not a higher-ranking fellow civil servant. The committee
would deal with all questions arising from retirements and discharges; make
recommendations on inter-departmental transfers and new appointments; set
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up an open competitive recruitment scheme; act as a conciliation and arbitra-
tion board on salaries, hours, terms of service and conditions of employment;
and, finally, prepare a superannuation scheme.53
The civil service memorandum also warned that there were strong grounds
for objecting to a continuing role for Waterfield and warned that, if he was
retained, ‘means should be devised to ensure that the policy of the Provisional
Government shall be observed . . . and that his work . . . should properly be
directed from Dublin and not from London’.54 The memorandum reinforced
the distaste that the civil service felt for higher officials in its recommendation
that the Provisional Government immediately appoint a minister correspon-
ding to a secretary to the Treasury with whom the civil service could make rep-
resentations. Although the memorandum complained of the distaste the civil
service felt at making representations to the British Treasury now that there was
a native government, the real difficulty lay with the higher officials.
The memorandum also conveyed the view of the civil service that it had ample
talent to staff the new departments which the Provisional Government would
have to create and asked that ‘in no circumstances should English civil servants
or outsiders be imported for these purposes’. Other issues of lesser, but still of
some, importance, were the reorganisation of the existing departments, the
imminent cut in the cost-of-living bonus, transfers of civil servants between
Great Britain and Ireland, the liability for pensions and the principle of open
competition. In order to address these issues Murphy pressed O’Hegarty for an
immediate meeting.55 Murphy and Gallagher were essentially offering to throw
the full weight of civil service organisations behind the Provisional Government
and any changes they might wish to make, so long as they could be assured
that there would be no worsening of conditions and changes would be negotiated
through the staff side, now known as the Executive Committee of the Conference
of All Associations of Irish Civil Servants.56 The draft rules of the new association
included as its objects that of encouraging ‘educational and social development
among the members along Irish lines and in harmony with Irish interests’.57 The
relationship binding the civil service to the Provisional Government would, they
expected, be based on a shared suspicion of Whitehall, joint resistance to parti-
tion and a united determination to create anew a native administration.
A delegation of the Irish branch of the Customs and Excise Federation (CEF),
which had always expected to be retained as an imperial service, also met with
the government to seek reassurances, while also indicating a general enthusiasm
for serving the new government. Even the professional civil servants, who were
now in a grading limbo, could summon up some degree of enthusiasm. The
initial response of the IPCS to the establishing of the Provisional Government
was a guarded optimism. At the annual general meeting in March 1922 the IPCS
president spoke warmly about the ‘new vista of usefulness that was gradually
opening before the Institution’.58
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There was, however, no reason to suppose that the Castle civil servants were
irreplaceable. Almost all of them were lower-level clerical grades with few in
the higher policy-developing levels. The signing of the Treaty unleashed a flood
of job applications to the Dáil, most of them accompanied by a recommenda-
tion from a parish priest, a TD and the local IRA commander, with some of the
applications in fact coming from the local IRA men themselves.59 It ought to
be noted that the Provisional Government decided that there would no toler-
ation for canvassing by politicians or by ministers on behalf of any applicant
for employment or promotion, a decision that was, with a few exceptions,
rigidly obeyed.60 There were also, to the surprise of Waterfield, a considerable
number of applications by civil servants in Britain to transfer to the Provisional
Government.61
A ‘thoroughly Irish’ civil service
The Provisional Government did not in fact simply take over the existing
Castle administration. It drew its staff variously from the Sinn Féin party,
Dublin Castle departments and the Dáil departments, while maintaining strict
 separation between the Dáil Éireann accounts and those of the Provisional
Government.62 Between January and April, that is between setting up the
Provisional Government and the formal transfer of authority, the departments
had a free hand in recruiting staff on a quasi-permanent, temporary or even
casual basis.63 Staff was recruited from the existing civil service in the Castle
departments, from the civil service of the Dáil departments and from civil ser-
vants who had been dismissed since 1916 for disloyalty. The intent here was
clearly to draw from all the potential officials to forge a completely new civil
service. The Provisional Government took immediate steps to disperse the
Castle civil service by reassigning men. The CSO staff was dispersed to the
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Home Affairs with other individual
civil servants sent to various separate departments.64 The core Provisional
Government Ministry of Finance was made up of civil servants recruited from
the Treasury in London, the CSO, the NHIC, customs and excise, the LGB and
the Dáil local government department,along with Collins’s personal secretariat
almost entirely consisting of the staff of the Dáil Department of Finance; Joe
O’Reilly of the ‘Squad’ acted as Collins’s personal bodyguard.65 The CDB,
which had played such a key role in making the State a positive force in trans-
forming western Ireland, found itself dispersed among the departments of
agriculture, fisheries and the Irish Land Commission.66
However, pouring the new wine of native government into the old skin of
the Castle departments proved more difficult that had been anticipated. The
clash of authority between Dáil and Castle civil servants was causing problems
in the Department of Local Government. The Dáil Department of Local
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Government was one of the successes of the revolutionary administration and
by the time of the Treaty had already effected radical changes in the local
administration of the country. Between the Truce and the Treaty the depart-
ment had continued recruitment and maintained its authority as the de facto
local government department. With the passing of the Treaty the old Custom
House officials, transferred to Jury’s Hotel after the burning of their depart-
mental headquarters by the Dublin IRA, immediately began to undo the work
of the Dáil department. Lorcan Robbins of the Dáil local government depart-
ment demanded that the Provisional Government put the LGB under the
control of sympathetic men or, if that was not possible, close it down.67
As the IRA split and opposition to the Treaty became militarised the pre-
tence of a dual power was dropped and the Dáil ceased to meet from mid-April.
In May Collins circulated a request to the members of the Provisional
Government to provide a summary of the work of their departments with an
outline of reforms, economies and improvements. Collins indicated that ‘it was
essential that each department should become thoroughly Irish, and that forms
and circulars associated with the old administration should be altered to suit
the new condition’.68 This suggests that the Provisional Government was
still planning major changes in the inherited civil service. However, that a shift
in thinking was underway is indicated by the decision of the Provisional
Government to invite civil servants from both Castle and Dáil to offer their
names for inclusion in a pool of candidates for a selection board to the new
higher clerical and junior executive grades that would be created in the new
departments.69 The outbreak of civil war in June prevented the sweeping
changes that clearly were being planned for the Irish administration. From that
point on the Provisional Government had to assert control over not only the
Castle administration but also the remnants of the Dáil departments.
The split in the republican movement profoundly affected the Dáil Éireann
civil service. The Dáil Éireann district court clerks had been replacing the dis-
missed petty session clerks, but as some took an anti-Treaty position and loy-
alties became uncertain the Dáil clerks found themselves put on probation, a
status they still held ten years later.70 The Dáil ministry was initially minded to
facilitate the retirement of any of its civil servants who had a genuine objection
to the Treaty and there was some discussion of compensation on resignation.
Attitudes hardened as the rhetoric of the anti-Treaty forces became more
extreme and militaristic. The Belfast Boycott staff, which initially had been
offered compensation for loss of office, was threatened with summary dis-
missal. Thirteen of the staff forwarded a memorandum to the Dáil cabinet
comparing their treatment as civil servants of the Dáil with that accorded by
the Treaty to the ‘British officials who worked against the Republic’.71 The more
political Cosgrave convinced his cabinet colleagues to offer three months’
wages to buy off the boycott staff.72
136 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:09  Page 136
Insubordination was noted in which some messengers refused to carry out
orders, alleging that the authority of the Provisional Government officials was
not valid.73 Absences in either the Dáil or Provisional Government depart-
ments were noted and, in an echo of the response of the British government to
suspected involvement in the Easter 1916 Rising, civil servants were compelled
to give an account of their movements on the days after 27 June and the out-
break of the civil war.74 It was instructed that women staff suspected of irregu-
lar sympathies were to be imprisoned if caught in the act of spying.75 If a
minister was not satisfied with the attitude of any member of staff toward the
Provisional Government then the officer was to be suspended and prevented
from entering government buildings.76 Bolstered by the results of the June
general election the Provisional Government now treated both the Dáil and the
Castle civil service as equally under the control of the Provisional Government,
not Dáil Éireann.77
An oath of fidelity to the Provisional Government was imposed on both the
civil service of Dáil Éireann and the Castle departments.78 Each civil servant
was required to sign an undertaking stating that, ‘I have not taken part with, or
aided or abetted in any way whatsoever the forces in revolt against the Irish
Provisional Government and I promise to be faithful to that government and
to give no aid or support of any kind to those who are engaged in conflict
against the authority of that government.’79 A note from Collins accompanied
each copy of the declaration emphasising that the irregulars were in opposition
to the elected government of the people and denying that the declaration
sought to prescribe the political opinions of civil servants. Rather than being
directed against opinions it was directed against activities incompatible with
public service, an echo of Nathan’s attitude to civil service engagement with the
Irish Volunteers.80
The judge of the Dáil land courts, Conor Maguire, it soon emerged, was
actively working to draw the staff of the Land Resettlement Commission away
from the Provisional Government. He was immediately suspended.81 Conn
Murphy was another victim. Despite his earlier enthusiasm for the Treaty, by
the outbreak of the civil war he had changed sides. In September 1922, after
writing to the newspapers complaining of the heavy-handed raids by the mil-
itary on his home, he was immediately dismissed though he had not actually
taken any active part in hostilities, but had merely signalled his opposition by
his letter to the newspaper. His son Fearghus, who was an active anti-Treatyite,
was interned in the Curragh. Perhaps because of the high profile enjoyed by
Murphy as an organiser within the civil service trade union movement and his
status on the National Whitley Committee and despite the key role he had
played in preventing the partition of the civil service, the Provisional and Free
State governments took a particularly hard line with him. He did not help his
own case by writing a personal letter to Blythe reporting how his family had
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been terrorised by ‘an organised murder gang, the members of which are at
present employed and paid by the Provisional Government’.82 He was refused
permission to retire under the Treaty provisions as he had been dismissed
already and was also denied his accumulated pension as a signal of government
disapproval, despite the pleas of Áine Ceannt, widow of the 1916 leader, on his
behalf.83 Dismissed in October 1922 he was briefly reinstated in December
1927 by the government in order that he be formally discharged as redundant
and awarded an inadequate pension.84
Assimilating the Dáil Éireann civil service
Plans to construct a completely new apparatus were abandoned and the civil
service of the Dáil was assimilated into the old Castle administration rather
than the other way round. The terms of the Treaty and the need for a speedy
transfer of authority did not encourage any radical restructuring of the civil
service. In the absence of such radical restructuring, for each department the
process of assimilating the staff of the Dáil ministries to the Castle administra-
tion was simply a matter of assigning each member of the staff to a grade, based
on an inspection of the work done. Curiously enough this was exactly the
process that Waterfield had been laboriously doing in each department of the
Castle administration. However, although the Castle civil service were reas-
signed and dispersed across the new departments, the Dáil civil service tended
to move en bloc into the parallel department of the Provisional Government.
It was decided that as a fundamental principle of assimilation the Truce would
be the deciding line for allocating the staff of the Dáil ministry to permanent
or temporary positions. This was in recognition of the special claim to perma-
nent pensionable posts of the staff that had borne the risks of the pre-Truce
service while, at the same time, being fair to the existing staff with years of
efficient service. In effect this isolated the civil service of the pre-Truce Dáil as
a special case. The staff of the Dáil civil service recruited after the Truce became
temporary civil servants and would have to compete along with the rest of the
civil service for any permanent posts that might become available. They were,
however, assimilated at the same salary they had enjoyed under the Dáil
departments, even though it was generally higher than a temporary civil
servant usually enjoyed, subject to that salary being liable to any subsequent
reductions due to the fall in the cost-of-living bonus.
Both the LGB and the Dáil Department of Local Government were now in
disarray. Though it would have been preferable to decide on the future shape
of the department and fit the two organisations into that model, it had proved
impractical as a way of progressing.85 The LGB was still in disarray due to the
stand-off between Robinson and Waterfield on reorganisation. A further
difficulty was that the Provisional Government had brought into its Ministry
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of Local Government departments other than the LGB. It was anticipated that
these would become sections in a rationalised ministry run by a single minis-
ter rather than a collective board, with a consequent reallocation of staff, but
that was yet to be arranged.86 On the Dáil department side there was the
difficulty that the Treaty split was undermining control over republican local
authorities and testing departmental staff loyalties. The appointment of
McCarron, a former auditor in the LGB, as acting departmental secretary
tested the loyalty of the Dáil staff, with rumours that some were threatening
mass resignations. The assimilation and grading of the Dáil staff was done by
McCarron of the LGB and De Lacey of the Dáil department and sanctioned by
Gregg in finance. Loyalties were further tested when the staff that had been
given permanent status discovered that in many cases the scale of pay in the
Provisional Government was lower than that of the Dáil ministry. There is,
however, no evidence in the records for Blythe’s claim that he had averted the
threatened mutiny by random increases and decreases of salaries, thus foster-
ing distrust in the ranks of the mutineers. The salary levels on assimilation were
in every case those appropriate to the LGB staff on the same grade and were set
by Gregg in finance. Gregg in fact resisted Blythe’s suggestion that some staff
should enter their scales at a higher level. The Provisional Government seems
to have determined that service in Dáil Éireann would neither help nor hinder
any member of staff. All staff were assimilated at the bottom of the scale, with,
in the cases of some younger officers, the direction that they should ‘mark time’
until they had attained the age usually appropriate for their point on the scale.87
In agriculture assimilation of the Castle and Dáil departments was compli-
cated by the ILC status as a reserved service. The staff of the ILC, like other
reserved services, remained the employees of the British government, which
acted as agent for the Provisional Government. The Dáil Department of
Agriculture staff were the members of the Dáil Éireann Land Resettlement
Commission, established to quell the rising unrest over land, and so therefore
engaged in much the same sort of work of inspection and adjudication as the
ILC.88 From the point of view of assimilation, however, this made the task a
straightforward one. Following a practice that was being elevated to a princi-
ple it was decided that the staff of the Dáil land commission would be assimi-
lated to similar grades and scales as the ILC staff.
Civil servants who had served the Dáil felt badly treated by the favour, as they
saw it, with which the old regime’s civil service were treated. Years later, in evi-
dence to the Brennan Commission, the Association of Dáil Civil Servants and
Dismissed British Civil Servants claimed to represent 120 members. Most were
clerical officers, with some from higher posts. Their main complaint was that
on assimilation ‘due regard was not paid to the nature of the duties on which
they had been engaged previously’. It was their contention that the duties on
which a Dáil Éireann officer had been engaged ought to have determined their
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grade and not the duties to which they were assigned in the Provisional and
Free State governments. The informal and unstructured Dáil departments had,
rightly or wrongly, given them a greater sense of status than that attached to
their new Provisional Government grades. The implication clearly was that
they felt that‘people who had suffered in support of the national cause’ had
undergone loss of status. It was also their view that the civil servants who had
been dismissed under the British regime had suffered loss of promotion and
that ‘it is a distinct loss to have been patriotic in the civil service’.89
That was not true for at least some of the Dáil civil servants. One group of
Dáil civil servants that did do well in the change of government was drawn
from those dismissed by the British for disloyalty. Alexander J. Connolly,
interned in Frongoch after 1916, was reinstated in the Department of Industry
and Commerce and ended his civil service career as private secretary to Lemass.
Michael Cremen, another 1916 veteran, became private secretary to Patrick
Little in Posts and Telegraphs, then to Gerald Boland in Justice, as well as being
appointed secretary to the Military Pensions Board. Patrick J. Daly emerged
from the Dáil Éireann local government department to finish as assistant sec-
retary to the Department of Local Government. Michael De Lacey was another
civil servant interned after 1916 who entered the Dáil Éireann local govern-
ment department. He ended his career as assistant secretary in the department.
Michael Heavey transferred from the Land Resettlement Commission to the
Irish Land Commission as senior commissioner. Thomas McArdle, who had
served in the Dáil Éireann local government department, went on to become
the first secretary of the Department of Health. James J. McElligott, interned
after 1916, returned to become the dominant figure in the Department of
Finance. His case underlines the fact that participation in revolution does not
preclude an intense conservatism. George McGrath transferred to the Free
State as Auditor-General from the equivalent post of Accountant-General in
Dáil Éireann. Michael McDunphy, dismissed by the British government for
refusing to take an oath, ended his career as secretary to the president of
Ireland. Maurice O’Connor, dismissed during the War of Independence, was
reinstated and retired as assistant principal in the Department of Education.
Henry O’Friel, another civil servant dismissed for refusing to take the oath in
1918, ended his career as secretary of the Department of Justice. P.S. O’Hegarty,
dismissed for refusing the oath in 1918, was a long serving secretary to the
Department of Posts and Telegraphs. Diarmuid O’Hegarty, dismissed in 1918,
served the Dáil cabinet and the Provisional Government as secretary, ending
his career as chairman of the Office of Public Works (OPW).90
However, these cases perhaps served to underline the poor treatment meted
out to others who felt themselves as well qualified on grounds of commitment
to the national cause and ability. Diarmuid Fawcett had served Sinn Féin
and the Dáil as a member of Cork Industrial Development Association, as
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Consul-General in the USA and as technical advisor to both the Dáil and the
Provisional Government on economic affairs. Then in September he was told
that he was to act as assistant to the secretary of the Department of Industry and
Commerce, Gordon Campbell, former Castle civil servant and son of the chair-
man of Seanad Éireann, Lord Glenavy, but without a right of access to the min-
ister. In a bitter letter of complaint at this demotion he detailed the service he
had freely given ‘when to serve Dáil Éireann was not the secure and pleasant
office that comparatively speaking it is today. Moreover I rendered this service
at a time when those many others who professed to be possessed of technical
and administrative knowledge elected to serve under an entrenched despotic
alien government than under a popularly-elected national administration in
the adolescent stage’.91 Joe O’Reilly, who as a member of ‘The Squad’ had killed
several British intelligence agents, found the transition from gunman to civil
servant particularly difficult. When he remarked that it was his opinion that
there would be ‘more than a few irregulars [anti-Treaty republicans] to be
cleared out’ in the government departments, he was sharply reminded by
O’Brien that ‘whatever his qualities as a soldier he had better understand his
position as a clerk’.92
T.H. Nally and Leon Ó’Broin, who had resisted Conor Maguire’s attempts to
alienate their loyalty to the Provisional Government, were shocked to discover
that they would have to suffer a reduction of salary on assimilation. Nally took
the high view that his salary had been negotiated with the minister personally
and was therefore not subject to finance controls. Neither got very far in their
challenge to the emerging power of the Department of Finance.93
In the Ministry of Home Affairs P.J. Crump got a particularly raw deal. As the
Treaty split began to undermine the Dáil departments Crump was appointed to
the legal staff in February 1922 to replace an official who was taking an increas-
ingly anti-Treaty line. Crump abandoned a good post in a solicitor’s practice on
the assurance that he would get a permanent post and also because he was
pressed by Eamonn Duggan to do his duty by the country. However, because he
was recruited after the Truce the Department of Finance refused to make his post
permanent, despite the pleas of Duggan and the protests of Crump that he had
been duped. Regardless of the difficulties that it might cause for ministers,
finance was demonstrating its unwavering determination to achieve sole control
of establishments. Although this can be seen as an early expression of the dom-
inance of the finance mandarins, it was in fact as much a reflection of the mind
of Collins as the official mind of finance. Of all the ministers of the Provisional
Government it was Collins who best understood that though control of the IRA
was vital, no less vital to the success of the Provisional Government was control
of the civil service of both the Dáil and the Castle.94
Whether because of the speed of their assimilation, or the short period in
which they had functioned as a corps, the civil service of the former Dáil did
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not manage to form any organisation to fight their interests.95 Where the Dáil
staff did manage to combine to make a protest about reduced salaries, as hap-
pened in the Department of Local Government in November 1922, they suc-
ceeded in winning some concessions but Gregg in finance refused to allow
Blythe to make any offer that would be ‘embarrassing for us vis-à-vis the
civil service generally’. The Provisional Government was learning to think of
itself as a cohesive if isolated collective that had to stand united against all
claims, even those of loyal supporters.96 The only organised pressure group
to emerge was the ‘Irish Republican Soldiers 1916–1921 and Prisoners of
War Association’ that acted as a not very effective conduit for pleas for employ-
ment for the ex-IRA men and the relatives of the fallen.97 The final ‘clean break’
with the Dáil came on 14 December 1922 when a directive ordered McGrath
to cease making payment from the Dáil funds and to transfer all the staff and
payments to the Provisional Government.98 All those employed by the Dáil and
transferring to the Provisional Government were required to sign the declara-
tion of fidelity to the government.99 Finally, Article 10 of the Treaty (and Article
77 of the constitution of the Free State) gave a constitutional standing to the
vested interests of the former Castle civil service, guaranteeing their status,
tenure, salaries and conditions. On the other hand the staff of the Dáil Éireann
departments were not offered any constitutional or indeed any legal status
at all.
Ending the Whitley Councils
In the cabinet the correspondence from the civil service associations in Dublin
Castle welcoming the Provisional Government and asking for a meeting was
noted but ignored. Conn Murphy had some unofficial meetings with Collins,
Griffith, and MacNeill, but nothing concrete emerged from these meetings.100
Although the official break with Whitleyism was not announced until
December 1924, and although departmental councils continued to meet, the
decision to do away with it was in fact made early in the term of the Provisional
Government.101 Discussing a memorandum on the Whitley Councils prepared
by James MacMahon, which included Conn Murphy’s observations, the
Provisional Government decided that they posed an unacceptable limitation to
the power of the executive, were un-Irish, and ordered that they should imme-
diately cease working.102 As the Treaty split began to edge toward crisis Collins
agreed to meet a deputation from the civil service associations. The CEF sub-
mitted a memorandum detailing the points that the deputation wanted to
discuss: the status and continuity of service and salaries, the establishment of
a new Civil Service Committee, the setting up of a new Irish Civil Service
National Council in which government and civil servants would negotiate a
future relationship, and retirements and pensions.103
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On the first point the deputation was assured that the government, while not
being in a position to give a guarantee (as they could not bind their successors),
had no desire to interfere with the existing rights and privileges of civil ser-
vants. The specific assurance offered was that the government ‘would try to
ensure that future conditions will be no worse than hitherto and had no inten-
tion to deprive civil servants of any rights held under the former government’.
The question of a Civil Service Committee was being addressed by what
emerged as the Wylie committee. On the question of retirements and pensions
Collins directed the deputation to Article 10 of the Treaty. On the request for
an Irish Civil Service National Council Collins was wary and it was clear to the
deputation that the Provisional Government was opposed to the idea. Instead
it offered a special commission to find out ‘whether the object of an Irish
National Council could not be effected in a different manner’. Until the ques-
tion was decided a temporary consultative committee was offered.104
Waterfield and the Provisional Government
As the Dáil debated the Treaty, Waterfield’s main concern was those depart-
ments that he had never re-graded, such as the Post Office, on the assumption
that they would remain part of the reserved civil service. The Treaty, to his sur-
prise, proposed to transfer the entire civil service to the new Free State.
Waterfield spent Christmas and New Year hurrying through a series of notional
reorganisations with immediate effect while moving a few key men from
Dublin Castle to Whitehall.105 The proclamation of 16 January put an imme-
diate stop to all changes. To those civil servants who disagreed with their new
grading Waterfield could only offer the view that they were lucky to have been
re-graded at all. To the civil servants still waiting a new grading he could only
offer the advice to wait until the new Provisional Government had found its
feet before opening the question.106
It was made clear to Waterfield that the Treasury in Whitehall would be co-
operating with the Provisional Government in giving effect to the proclama-
tion. Cope’s assurance that the proclamation was for appearance only and that
the prohibitions might not be applied as rigidly as might appear at first sight
did not reassure Waterfield. He feared that a close scrutiny of the re-gradings
he had already completed might lead in some cases to their rejection by the
Provisional Government.107 There is no doubt that Waterfield was pessimistic
as to the future prospects of the civil service in the Irish Free State and was bur-
dened by a deep sense of obligation to those civil servants left out of his re-
grading who, he feared, would be ejected on to the street on inadequate
pensions. On 23 January he sent a detailed memorandum to the Provisional
Government on the outstanding problems in reorganisation that had been
brought to a halt by the proclamation. These included cases where the Treasury
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had sanctioned appointments but the formalities had not been completed
before the proclamation, cases where individuals had passed the civil service
examinations but had not been actually appointed and cases where persons
had not qualified for permanent appointment but were eligible to compete
in the civil service examinations for pending permanent appointments.
Waterfield pressed all of these as requiring decisions one way or the other. A
month later he was still waiting a reply.108 All through January and February he
attempted to secure a personal interview with the Provisional Government
while assuring the civil service associations that outstanding re-gradings
might yet go through.109 Waterfield’s own feeling was that the Provisional
Government was convinced that the Castle was over-staffed and in need of
severe cutbacks. Besides, they would want to keep any vacancies to satisfy the
demands of their own supporters.110 What finally enabled Waterfield to get his
foot in the door was the question of salary cuts for the civil service.
In order to compensate for wartime inflation the government had introduced
the ‘bonus’ as a multiplier on basic salary. This multiplier was based on a cost-
of-living index figure calculated every six months. It was expressly declared that
the bonus would be temporary. With post-war deflation this figure began to fall.
Civil servants, having got used to thinking of their combined basic and ‘bonus’
as their real salaries, now faced what was in effect a cut in pay. As the Provisional
Government came into office the British government had already made a deci-
sion that the civil service would face a significant reduction in pay. The post-
war euphoria had evaporated in Britain. The conservative newspapers, the
Morning Post and the Daily Mail, ran a populist campaign against the expanded
civil service. The root of the emerging economic problems they confidently
asserted lay in ‘squandermania’ and those mythical civil servants ‘Dilly and
Dally’.
In reaction to this campaign the British government instituted the Geddes
investigation into the cost of the civil service. Geddes, one of the allegedly
efficient businessmen brought into the war cabinet by Lloyd George, had been
personally responsible for the creation of the enormous Department of
Transport. In February 1922, following the recommendations of his investiga-
tion, the British government imposed the ‘Geddes Supercut’ of between 10 and
50 per cent on civil service salaries along with an overall maximum total remu-
neration of £2,000.111 Waterfield wrote to O’Hegarty to ask whether the
Provisional Government ‘concurred’ in the cut.112 At this stage the authority of
the Provisional Government was being eroded by anti-Treatyite propaganda
and it seemed that actual State authority lay in Portobello barracks, headquar-
ters of the Irish army, rather than in the Merrion Street offices of the govern-
ment. In Cork the civil servants in the Ministry of Labour went on a three-day
strike when the reduction was first announced. It seemed probable that strikes
would spread when the cut was actually imposed. Waterfield would actually
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have been happier of the government had ignored his letter as they had ignored
earlier ones. Once the transfer date of 1 April was reached responsibility would
pass from his hands and it would be up to the Provisional Government and not
Treasury (Ireland) to impose economies. However, his acute sense of profes-
sional propriety and responsibility to both staff and Provisional Government
would not allow him to delay the question.113
Waterfield was called immediately to a meeting where he could elaborate his
concerns on reorganisation, as well as on the cuts. Within a few weeks he felt
sufficiently confident of his position to offer a mild reprimand for excessive
government expenditure, asking whether the Provisional Government could
not have secured less expensive accommodation for the constitution commit-
tee than the Shelbourne hotel and refusing to sanction the purchase of  cal -
culating machines for the Department of Finance.114 Waterfield established
a good working relationship with Cosgrave, similar to that of any Treasury
official and a politician, and together they ironed out some of the difficulties
that were pressing. It ought to be noted that compared to the problems facing
the Provisional Government, Waterfield’s anxieties about the accounting
officers of the LGB or temporary ex-servicemen would have seemed absurdly
trivial.115 In fact while Waterfield’s concerns for the rank and file of the Irish
service shows a commendable decency, it was Cope who managed the delicate
task of discreetly moving staff out from the Castle into the departments of the
Provisional Government and ensuring that those formerly engaged in security
work found safe niches.116
The postal workers strike, 1922
In contrast to the British Post Office, which was profitable, the Irish Post Office
ran at a massive loss due to the density of its service in a thinly populated
country. When the Provisional Government decided to impose the ‘Geddes’
cut, only the postal workers signalled resistance. The postal workers had not
won any revision of their grades or scales since 1870. Great hopes had been
placed in the Whitley reorganisation but in Ireland Waterfield had ignored the
postal grades, expecting they would be included in the general British reor-
ganisation. When the Treaty clarified that the entire postal staff would in fact
be transferred Waterfield worked up a hasty reorganisation in some of the
managerial sections that was only completed the day before the transfer of the
administration. It was in any case rejected by them as an ‘utterly worthless pro-
posal’.117 The Provisional Government decided that the best policy was to
follow the line it took over the departments as they found them and that the
reductions would be allowed take effect.118 The postal workers, organised in
three unions – the Irish Postal Union (IPU), the Irish Postal Workers’ Union
(IPWU) and the Irish Post Office Engineers’ Union (IPOEU) – threatened to
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go on a co-ordinated strike if the cuts were imposed. A request by J.J. Walsh to
the British Postmaster General to provide strike-breakers got a positive
response. The British government was anxious about the impact on their own
civil service of any successful agitation in Ireland against cuts at a time when
the two civil services were still closely linked.119 The British civil service unions
were in fact following the course of this first confrontation between the new
government and its civil service with great interest.120 But the Dáil and Collins
repudiated this ‘scab’ tactic.121
Collins was in fact very worried by the complications that labour troubles
would add to the developing Treaty split and wanted a settlement. He asked
James Douglas to chair a commission to consider wages, salaries, organisation
of work and conditions generally in the Post Office. Apart from Douglas as
chairman the commission consisted of Grattan Esmonde TD and Henry Friel
of the Department of Finance as the Provisional Government nominees with
T.J. O’Connell of the Teachers’ Union and L.J. Duffy of the Distributive
Workers’ Union as Labour Party nominees.122 The Department of Finance was
hesitant about this, the first commission of inquiry within the early weeks of
native government in Ireland, which in their view set an unhealthy precedent.
Gregg wanted to establish as a governing principle of civil service pay that no
higher basic wage would be paid in the Free State than was paid by the British
government to similar grades. Walsh argued that such a principle was wrong
in itself as, firstly, wages should be determined solely by local conditions, and,
secondly, it implied that not paying more also meant not paying less.123
Douglas settled the threatened strike by securing a temporary rise in the
basic salary, rather than a reduction in bonus, and promising to effect a reor-
ganisation of the Post Office. It was also agreed that the government would cal-
culate an Irish cost of living figure rather than rely on the British figure.124 Part
of the opposition to the cut had been that the cost of living in Ireland was
higher than in Britain and that in justice the British figure could not be used to
cut wages. The Ministry of Economic Affairs of Dáil Éireann was given the task
of calculating an Irish figure based on the cost of rent and basic foodstuffs. The
secretary to the committee was Michael Gallagher.125 Five thousand forms were
sent to national schoolteachers in every school in the country asking for details
of local rents and prices. Three hundred and eight were returned, from 112
towns.126 The dramatic gains that had been won by the threat of strike did not
go unnoticed by other civil service associations. When Walsh refused to meet
the AEO branch in the PO accountant-general’s office, they pointed out that
staff had always been consulted on reorganisation and expressed the hope that
his decision to meet the humble postmen, which contrasted with his refusal to
meet the accountancy staff, was not because of their threat to strike.127
In September the next cost-of-living calculation, based on the new Irish
figure, was due. In Britain the figure was calculated at eighty-five, that is the cost
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of living was 85 per cent above that of August 1914. In Ireland, based on the local
cost-of-living figure, it was ninety. This meant that the civil service still faced a
cut in salaries, though not as severe as in Great Britain. The reduction amounted
to 3/26ths, or between 11 and 12 per cent, on the bonus element of salary.
Departments were instructed to apply the reduction from 1 September.128
O’Hegarty was sanguine, predicting that the postal workers would contest the
cuts but would use the Labour party in the Dáil to make complaints rather than
take direct action. The government offered to phase in the reductions, so long as
the principle of reductions was accepted. The postal unions shifted position by
arguing that basic wages were too low to bear any cuts in the bonus and asked
that the cuts be withdrawn and their claim for an increase in basic pay be sub-
mitted to arbitration. Negotiations broke down and a strike was declared.129
By now the civil war was entering its darkest phase in the weeks after the
killing of Michael Collins. Faced with a strike by the Post Office workers the
government responded as if the strike was inspired by ‘Irregulars’ rather than
by discontent on pay. The Provisional Government recruited pensioners and
the unemployed to act as strike-breakers and issued a statement that ‘the gov-
ernment does not recognise the right of Civil Servants to strike. In the event of
a cessation of work by any section of the Postal Service picketing such as is per-
mitted in connection with industrial disputes will not be allowed.’130 Few civil
servants would have conceived of ever going on strike, but to be told that the
right to strike was expressly denied them by their employer was a shock, espe-
cially since that same government had left the Whitley Councils in suspension,
the only institutional forum for addressing grievances in the civil service. Nor
had it been forgotten that the same politicians had applauded strikes by civil
servants in support of Irish political prisoners in April 1920.
In the Dáil it was implied that the strikers were motivated by hostility to the
government and sympathy for the irregulars and that they were out to subvert
the government. It was also alleged that a clique of Dublin postmen, who used
intimidation to enforce their will, drove the strike.131 The army broke up the
attempted pickets of the Dublin telephone exchange by firing volleys over their
heads. Pickets in Dundalk were arrested by military patrols. Eventually the
defeated postal workers returned to work, their return negotiated by Thomas
Johnson of the ILPTUC. They accepted the government’s offer to impose the
cuts in phased reductions over three months, an offer that had been made
before the strike but rejected.132 As the strike leaders told the IPU conference,
‘the power of the government was derived from the circumstances of the time,
and because of civil war. The government did not care at any time if the whole
place fell down about them.’133 The other civil service organisations, which had
accepted the cuts, remained aloof from the strike but the assertion that they
had no right to strike made a deep impression and was often referred to as an
example of the autocratic attitude of the government.
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The near hysterical atmosphere in the Provisional Government, which
treated any opposition as treason, can be sensed in the memoirs of the then sec-
retary to the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, P.S. O’Hegarty.134 O’Hegarty
was in fact urging the government to break the unions completely by adopting
an aggressively intransigent attitude. O’Hegarty, it ought to be noted, was just
as aggressive as any trade unionist in preventing a reduction in his own salary
as secretary to the Post Office.135 It was only fear of a general strike, as the
railway men began to threaten sympathetic action, that persuaded the govern-
ment to resubmit the original offer.136 The only member of the government
who objected to Walsh’s handling of the strike was Joe McGrath, an IRB man
and director of Intelligence in the army, but even he toed the line.
The Irish Free State constitution and the civil service
The postal workers’ September strike coincided with the first meeting of the
Third Dáil, elected in June 1922 to debate and pass the constitution and so allow
the Irish Free State come into official existence on 6 December, the anniversary
of the Treaty.137 The debate on the status of the transferred civil servants was
brief and uncontroversial.138 All of the 21,035 officials transferred had, under
the Treaty, a right to compensation if they resigned as a consequence of the
transfer of government or were dismissed. In fact, however, the majority of this
apparently vast bureaucracy was the now thoroughly humiliated postal staff.
The civil service proper, of administrative, executive, clerical and professional
grades, were 6,403.139 Article 77 of the constitution provided that ‘every such
existing officer who was transferred from the British Government by virtue of
any transfer of services to the Provisional Government shall be entitled to the
benefit of Article 10 of the Scheduled Treaty’. Article 10 of the Treaty stated that
‘the government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair compensation on terms
not less favourable than those accorded by the Act of 1920 to judges, officials,
members of police forces and other public servants who are discharged by it or
who retire in consequence of the change of government’. The inclusion of this
assurance in the Treaty, in effect a constitutional guarantee of their status,
seemed to assure a fair deal in future negotiations and was initially of great relief
to the civil service.140 The 1920 Act set out in considerable detail the compen-
sation and pension entitlements of civil servants dismissed, permitted to retire,
or who chose to retire. However, the Treaty Article 10 differed in significant
ways to the guarantees contained in the 1920 Act. The IPCS immediately noted
that though Article 10 offered guarantees to those civil servants who were dis-
missed or chose to retire, it offered no guarantees in terms of status or condi-
tions to those who chose to remain in the service of the Irish Free State. The
relationship between the State and the civil service in the new Irish Free State
remained to be negotiated.141
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It was also noted that under the 1920 Act the British government had the
security of the Irish share of reserved taxes to ensure compensation was paid
to any discharged or retired civil servant. If necessary the British government
could make the payment and recover it by deduction from the reserved funds.
Under the Treaty all payment would be made by the Irish Free State and if that
government decided that, for whatever reason, the compensation was unrea-
sonable or excessive and would not be paid, then there was nothing the British
government could do about it. The retired civil servant would go penniless.142
Also, under the 1920 Act transferred ‘Irish officers’ were only those civil ser-
vants working in the transferred government departments. A great number of
civil servants would have remained servants of the Crown and part of the
British service though serving in Ireland. Under the Treaty all civil servants
serving in Ireland were transferred, even those in the War Office who were busy
evacuating the British military from Ireland!143 From the point of view of the
staff of those departments reserved under the 1920 Act such as the Land
Commission, Registry of Deeds or the Post Office, the Treaty offered them pos-
itive guarantees as to status and pension that they would forgo if they opted to
serve in the north, where these departments remained reserved.144
The last days of Treasury (Ireland)
In contrast to Cope, who continued to enjoy a close relationship with Collins,
and Anderson, who was a member of the British cabinet committee on Ireland,
Waterfield found himself increasingly marginalised during the administration
of the Provisional Government. It was only after Waterfield repeatedly pressed
O’Brien for a decision that the Provisional Government decided to retain
Treasury (Ireland) staff on loan for a further six months after the 1 April han-
dover of responsibility. Waterfield was under some pressure from Whitehall to
return, or at least to allow some of his principal officers to return. For his part
he was anxious that the Provisional Government and the civil service should
both feel that he had not allowed either to be badly treated. His main anxiety
was the dual role he had to play as a representative of the imperial government
running the few remaining all-Ireland departments and defending the interests
of the Whitehall Treasury, while also advising the Provisional Government on
Treasury matters. In fact, however, the Provisional Government never sought
his advice and he was allowed a free hand to run down the British administra-
tion. Acting as O’Brien’s subordinate Waterfield was primarily engaged in a
‘sunset’ department, tidying up the withdrawal of British government from
Dublin Castle.145
The LGB was the department that continued to cause Waterfield most
difficulty. Despite Waterfield pointing out that his department had done well
on reorganisation, Robinson continued to demand more higher-grade posts
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for his department right up to 1 April. Waterfield was aware of the difficulty
that though the Provisional Government had ambitious plans for local gov-
ernment, it had a department of its own. The combined staff, in his view, was
too big and therefore the LGB, the only department for which he was respon-
sible, had to be reduced.146 Waterfield was acutely embarrassed to discover after
1 April, when the departmental records were handed over, that Robinson had
been using the soldiers and sailors housing scheme in Killester in north Dublin
as a sort of works scheme under his personal patronage with over-employment,
high specification and slow completion. The financial allocation was almost all
spent but the scheme remained unfinished. He had also run up enormous legal
bills of over thirteen thousand pounds in two years with a single senior counsel,
presumably a friend of his, in pursuit of mandamus claims by staff against local
authorities.147
Waterfield was also deeply involved in arranging for the transfer of staff
between Ireland and Britain.148 The scheme that was agreed provided for a head
for head transfer between the British and the Irish administrations of officers
at the same class and grade, with the agreement of the heads of the departments
concerned.149 Each government agreed to accept full liability for the pensions
of the officers that they received. What this meant was that transfers could in
reality occur only where there were officers closely matched in terms of years
of service, class and grade, and were thus actually very few.150 Some heads of
departments were not satisfied that the officer being transferred to Dublin was
of the same calibre as the officer transferred to London and as a result refused
permission. A further inhibition on transfers was the requirement that the
officer transferring into Ireland sign an undertaking that he was not covered by
Article 10 of the Treaty. When the scheme was finally wound up in July 1931,
271 civil servants had transferred into the Free State and 88 had transferred out.
Of those transferred only 139 were on a head for head basis.151 One task that
Waterfield was happy to hand over to the Provisional Government was that of
meeting delegations of the staff associations anxious as to their position.
Waterfield refused to meet Michael Smithwick of the AEO, redirecting him to
O’Brien.152
The main task that occupied Waterfield in the last days of Castle rule was the
establishment of a committee to deal with those civil servants who would be
discharged, or who would resign, as a consequence of the change of govern-
ment.153 The Civil Service Committee set up by the 1920 Act, which was
seen by the Provisional Government and the civil service alike as a partition
committee, had of course stopped functioning by order of the Provisional
Government. But, under the 1920 Act, this same committee also had the task
of determining the status and the compensation of discharged and retiring civil
servants. The Provisional Government was not going to operate any commit-
tee established by the 1920 Act, which it regarded as superseded by the Treaty.
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In the absence of the committee established by the legislation it was clear that
some equally acceptable forum had to be established to deal with the task of
retirements and compensation.
Section 7 of the order-in-council of 1 April dealt with the transfer of the civil
service from British to Irish authority. It provided that ‘Where an officer is
transferred to the Provisional Government under this order, he shall hold office
by a tenure corresponding to his previous tenure and if he is discharged by the
Provisional Government, or if he retires in consequence of the change of gov-
ernment, he shall be entitled to receive compensation from the Provisional
Government on terms no less favourable than provided by the 1920 Act.’154 The
order-in-council deliberately omitted any reference to a civil service committee,
thus putting the onus on the Provisional Government to either use the 1920
committee or set up by its own authority a committee to fulfil the same func-
tions.155 The original committee had the widest discretion to determine the
question of status and the terms of compensation free of either Treasury or
political influence. Now, with that committee defunct, if any officer protested
that the terms of compensation offered by the Provisional Government were
less favourable than those offered in the 1920 Act it would be impossible to
determine what the committee might have decided. As was to become appar-
ent, Waterfield was far-sighted in his prediction that this question had endless
possibilities for disputation between the awarding body and the staff. Waterfield
had also been anxious since the publication of the terms of the Treaty about the
phrase ‘in consequence of the change of government’. This phrase was not in
the 1920 Act and again was one that invited litigation.156
Waterfield decided to press ahead with the original committee accepting that
the Provisional Government would not attend. It was therefore concerned only
with the Northern Ireland civil service. The last meeting of the committee was
held in London on 16 May 1922. MacMahon refused to attend and sent a note
questioning the legality of the meeting.157 Sam Sloan, who had transferred to
Belfast, was regarded as the staff representative of the committee. The Irish civil
service associations immediately revoked his appointment but Sloan had
already decided to be unavoidably detained and arrived late to the meetings.
With a quorum sufficient to do its business the committee was able to wrap up
the allocation of the staff to Northern Ireland and tidy up that part of its
remit.158
The only departments that continued to present difficulty were the reserved
departments of the ILC and the Registry of Deeds where the staff, many of
them highly skilled, refused to be transferred north, even those that had been
working in the transferred Ulster counties. Though this may have been distaste
at working under the Unionist government it was also prompted by the fact
that in the Free State they had rights under Article 10, rights which disappeared
if they transferred north where the ILC remained a reserved service. As none
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were ‘rabid Ulstermen’ Waterfield could only suggest that the Belfast govern-
ment bribe them with promises of promotion.159
Once the question of the allocation of staff to the north had been dealt with,
the Provisional Government committee working on the financial aspects of the
Treaty put in a claim for compensation for the amount of pension liability in
excess of that which would have fallen on the Free State if there had been ‘a
complete and equitable allocation of all-Ireland staff based on the separation
of work as contemplated by the Government of Ireland Act’.160 Though
Waterfield took the view that that was entirely the fault of the Provisional
Government, which had torpedoed the transfers north, it was recognised that
the Dublin government had incurred a much heavier liability for pensions than
had Belfast, where most staff were newly recruited.161 The Irish and British
sides were agreed that though the civil servants ‘should not be left in the lurch’
the Provisional Government should not be trapped by Article 10 for more than
a just portion of the civil service.162
By November Waterfield was winding up eight centuries of Dublin Castle
rule. A departmental circular and newspaper advertisement advised that ‘the
office of Treasury Remembrancer and Treasury Assistant Secretary in Ireland
will be closed and the post abolished in consequence of the change of govern-
ment, as from 1st November next’. The notices in the newspapers, at advertise-
ment rates, were to prevent anybody ‘making malicious political capital’ from
the notice.163 Waterfield’s last official act was to agree compensation for the
destruction of O’Neill’s Irish House in Tipperary by Crown forces.164 The last
word may be left to an anonymous colleague of Waterfield who contributed a
piece to Red Tape on his experiences as a ‘Temporary Irishman’. Despite the
lurid accounts of irregular activity in the English newspapers the last months
in Dublin were, he wrote, characterised by a ‘delightful lack of formality and
stiffness’ along with ‘a staggering degree of responsibility’ though unfortu-
nately without any extra pay for assuming it. The months spent working for the
Provisional Government were ones he would ‘always remember with fond nos-
talgia’.165 One group that could not conceal their delight at the winding up
of Treasury (Ireland) was the Public Accounts Committee of the House of
Commons. Again and again they asked Sturgis and Waterfield to confirm that
department after department of Dublin Castle had been transferred to the Free
State and that the demands of the Irish government on the exchequer were
indeed at an end.166
The Wylie committee
The Dáil civil service was purged by demands of loyalty to the Provisional
Government. But the old Castle administration was also purged, not by the usual
firing squads of revolutionary regimes, but through the operation of the Wylie
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committee on Article 10 of the Treaty. In order to deal with its obligations under
Article 10 of the Treaty the Provisional Government established its own advisory
committee on compensation for discharged and retired civil servants. Collins
asked Justice Wylie to act as chairman of the committee, emphasising that it
would be advisory only and also that its work would not include the allocation
of staff north and south.167 Chaired by Wylie, the committee had an official side
of two senior officers nominated by the Department of Finance and a staff side of
two representatives drawn from the CSF. Gregg and Hugh Kennedy proposed
alternative terms of reference for the advisory committee, with Gregg laying
down a more restricted brief. Despite the reputed dominance of the finance
department it was Kennedy’s terms that were adopted: ‘to enquire into and
advise as to the compensation and all matters consequent thereon which should
be paid under Article 10 of the Treaty to any civil servant or other public servant
or officer of the Irish government who may be discharged or may retire in con-
sequence of the change of government’. Wylie was told that, though his com-
mittee was purely advisory, the government could offer a commitment that his
advice would be accepted and followed in every case, so long as the compensa-
tion was not more generous than it would have been under the 1920 Act.168
Gregg and Gordon Campbell were both so worried at the government’s
failure to restrict the Wylie committee’s latitude in rewarding compensation
that they asked for specific instruction a week before the public announcement
of the committee’s establishment. The case of those civil servants that the gov-
ernment wished to dismiss was straightforward. They would be got rid of and
Wylie would award them the pension they were due. It was the civil servants
who chose to retire that worried them. Under the 1920 Act civil servants could
opt to retire and be granted seven extra years on their pensionable service. The
only restriction on such civil servants was that they could not exercise their
right to retire for a period of six months. The heads of departments at their
meeting on the committee had expressed the view that the government should
not allow civil servants to retire on enhanced pensions if it could be avoided as
the future liability was unknowable and the departments were in danger of
losing a cohort of experienced officers. They argued that the words in Article
10 ‘in consequence of the change of government’ imposed a new condition that
was not in the 1920 Act and that an applicant for retirement should be made
to explain what exactly there was in the change of government that justified
him asking to go out on pension. The memorandum concluded that it ought
to be made mandatory for the Wylie committee to actually establish, rather
than simply accept, that the retirement ‘is in consequence of the change of gov-
ernment’. If the applicant could not establish such, then they went out on ordi-
nary terms and not the terms of the 1920 Act. But as this raised the question of
an interpretation of an article of the Treaty the senior civil servants wanted a
direction from the politicians.169
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The Provisional Government was unwilling to grasp this particular nettle.
Cosgrave circulated the memorandum among his colleagues, but only Walsh
actually penned a response. It may have been that the ministers felt that Gregg
and Campbell were exaggerating the danger, or that it was inspired by pique
after rejection of Gregg’s advice. It was also the case that the Provisional
Government was fighting for its survival in the depths of civil war and after the
death of Collins and Griffith. Walsh, predictably, supported the memorandum
and urged that the Wylie committee should be instructed to make it as difficult
as possible for civil servants to resign.170 When Gregg brought this issue to the
initial meeting of the Wylie committee the staff side strongly maintained that
the Treaty carried forward unaltered the rights they had won in the 1920 Act
and they would not allow any questioning of motives nor the implication that
an applicant entertained ‘traditional prejudice against a native government’
which had to be then proved.171 Wylie used his casting vote to engineer a com-
promise; he agreed that the phrase ‘in consequence of the change of govern-
ment’ implied a new condition. He therefore proposed that the form of
application for retirement would require that the applicant be asked ‘On what
basis is compensation claimed?’ and ‘If retirement, state is retirement in con-
sequence of the change of Government?’ What Wylie would not do was grill
each individual applicant as if he were the defendant in a court of law. Gregg
and Campbell asked that Cosgrave himself should meet with the heads of
department and impress upon them the government’s view as to the impor-
tance of the key phrase, instructing them to brief, in utter confidence, the
official side to the Wylie committee on ‘the merits of the individual applicants
by reference to the new condition’. 172
What exactly Gregg meant by individual merits is not clarified in the written
memorandum. Based on Walsh’s response and the original memorandum
what seems to have been envisaged was that if the applicant was someone the
department was happy to be rid of, then the application would not be con-
tested. If it was an experienced officer that the department wanted to retain
then, unless he was a rabid unionist, Protestant, and had always expressed
extreme loyalist views, it would be contested. It was therefore up to the heads
of the departments to supply the material for the official side on the commit-
tee to make a case that the application was not ‘in consequence of the change
of government’ but due to some other cause, such as a desire to retire on
pension with seven years of unearned increments and bonus added. Gregg,
Campbell and the departmental heads were aware that the treatment of the
postal workers and the hostility toward the civil service that the dispute had
revealed had created a great deal of resentment within the service. There were
already signs that civil servants were intent on a mass exodus on the generous
terms available under Article 10, rather than suffer what was clearly going to be
a hardening of conditions under the new government. The operation of the
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Civil Service Committee (Compensation) was announced to the service by a
Department of Finance circular and began operation on 12 October.173 Smyth,
Fitzgibbon and Smithwick of the CSF represented the staff side.174 The civil
service associations had their own concerns about the Wylie committee. Firstly,
it would only deal with those civil servants who were leaving the service and
thus would have nothing to say on those who remained and, secondly, it would
be advising the Minister of Finance on compensation rather than making a
firm determination. A minister is always free to reject advice.
Under the terms of the 1920 Act there were three categories of applicant to
the Wylie committee: those discharged by the Irish government, those seeking
permission to retire and those opting to retire under the statutory conditions
provided by Act. The precise details of qualification and compensation were
laid out in the eighth schedule to the Act. The initial intent of the Provisional
Government was to use the Wylie committee to purge the administration of
the more obnoxious of the Castle civil servants. There were some departments
that the government simply cleared out. The Marlborough Street Teacher
Training College was closed down and the entire staff of fifty-three discharged,
from professors to charwomen.175 The Catholic and Church of Ireland author-
ities had rejected Marlborough Street, as a non-denominational training
college, and most of its graduates were from, and were employed in, the area
of Northern Ireland.176 The departments where the number of discharges was
highest were the legal and judicial departments and the LGB. All thirty-six res-
ident magistrates were also discharged, as were the petty session clerks and staff
of the Supreme Court. In the LGB thirty of the senior staff were discharged,
including Barlas who had led the negotiations that had won the eighth sched-
ule. In other departments the government’s intent was simply to get rid of the
more awkward senior staff: two in the CDB, three in the DATI, and none at all
in many other departments.177 MacMahon, who had smoothed the waters for
the transfer of authority, was given two weeks to clear out of the Under-
Secretary’s lodge in the Phoenix Park.178
But the government did intend that the Wylie committee would be simply a
prelude to a thorough reorganisation of the civil service of the Irish Free State.
This bloodless purge of the civil service was preparation for the installation of
the new administration. Professor Henry Kennedy was asked to study recruit-
ment in the civil service generally and to suggest a system of recruitment for
the Irish public services. He studied the British, American and Commonwealth
systems. He suggested a simplified organisation for a single local and central
civil service and that recruitment and control of the civil service should lie with
a single Public Service Commission. This was very much in the Sinn Féin tra-
dition. This reasonable suggestion was rubbished by the Department of
Finance civil servants who dismissed the report as uninformed, mistaken and
even unconstitutional in its suggestions. The best system in the world, as they
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suggested and as Walsh agreed, was the British system where the Treasury
reigned supreme on establishment matters. That this was a recent doctrine in
Whitehall and one that was still contested was not admitted. Kennedy’s report,
holed below the waterline, sank without trace.179
As a purge of the senior ranks the Wylie committee was clean and effective
and the civil service of the new State was comparatively free of the ‘silverbacks’
of the old administration, especially in the legal and local government depart-
ments. The Free State began with new men in new positions in most depart-
ments. But the quiet revolution in administration that was effected by the
Wylie committee was not as contained and clean as the government had
intended. What the government was not prepared for, though Gregg and
Gordon Campbell had warned them, was the flood of applications for volun-
tary retirements from all ranks which soon overwhelmed the comparatively
few cases of discharged officials. In the DATI there were 23 retirements, as com-
pared with only 3 discharges. In the National Education Office, where there
were no discharges, there were 13 retirements. In the OPW, where again there
were no discharges, there were 15 retirements. In the vital revenue department
there was only 1 discharge, but 21 retirements. The DMP had only 2 dismissals
but had 578 resignations and the policing of Dublin seemed close to collapse.
For many of the DMP it was not only the attraction of a pension but also a real
distaste at serving under men responsible for the death of comrades. The postal
services suffered 644 retirements but only 2 dismissals. It was the revenge of the
postal workers on the government that smashed the strike.180 Blythe was later
to express regret that the government had not dismissed the postal workers, or
allowed them to stay out on strike and so dismiss themselves.181
In every department the number of voluntarily retired civil servants far
exceeded the number of discharged, running at the ratio of five to one.182 What
had been intended as a relatively swift and surgical purge of the senior figures
was in danger of turning into an administrative rout. Wylie refused to summon
applicants for cross-examination, as Gregg wanted; instead the committee
simply agreed the correct calculation of benefits and recorded a decision with
the applicant never actually having to attend, leaving it to the associations on
the staff side to guard their interests. The civil service soon came to regard the
eighth schedule of the 1920 Act, along with Article 10 of the Treaty, as their
Magna Carta and even to sing the praises of their predecessors, men such as
Barlas, who had won it for them.183 If the government of the Irish Free State
was not going to negotiate a new relationship binding the civil service and the
State then the civil servants would rely on the contractual relationship and
associated rights already won in the Treaty.
The loss of civil servants due to Article 10 retirements and discharges, espe-
cially from the upper ranks, opened up the civil service to vistas of oppor tu-
nity and promotion that it had never seen before. There had been no
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examination for the executive and administrative classes since before the First
World War so there was no cohort of candidates ready to fill the gaps. In April
1922 the Provisional Government invited heads of departments to make rec-
ommendations, and higher clerical and executive officers to offer themselves,
for consideration by a promotional pool to fill the rapidly widening gaps in the
departments. The board, made up of senior civil servants (rather than politi-
cians as was happening in Northern Ireland at the same time), P.S. O’Hegarty,
Pierce Kent and H.J. Smith, chose to interview all applicants rather than
just those recommended by the departmental heads. Fifty-nine higher-grade
officers were interviewed. Seven were identified as exceptional including
Arthur Codling and E.P. McCarron. Fifteen were classed as very good and to
be promoted; this group included some of those who rose to senior rank in the
Department of Finance, which seemed to have first pick, such as J.T. Lennon,
J.L. Lynd and T.S.C. Dagg. A further thirteen were classed as good and to be
promoted as soon as the class above was exhausted. In the meantime they could
be redeployed in more useful posts. Twenty-two were classed as adequately
placed in the grade and department in which they were employed.
The board also interviewed 150 clerical officers and classified thirty-one as
‘fit for promotion’; thirty-two as ‘very promising’; thirteen as ‘promising’;
twenty-four as ‘good’ and fifty as ‘to remain at present grade’. Included in those
recommended for promotion were many of the leaders in the civil service asso-
ciations such as Gallagher, Mortished (though in fact he took an Article 10
retirement), Smithwick and Mulvin. The interviews, necessarily short, valued
evidence of initiative and energy. Knowledge of Irish was noted, but does not
seem to have been as important as knowledge of book-keeping and account-
ancy.184 A brief survey of the key staff in the Department of Finance in 1925,
just three years after its establishment, illustrates the point: G.P. Fagan, thirty-
one years of age, with eleven years of service, and J.L. Lynd, forty-one years of
age, with sixteen years of service, had both progressed in three years from clerk
class 1 to assistant principal; J.E. Hanna, thirty-six years of age, with seventeen
years of service, progressed in three years from junior executive to assistant
principal; T.S.C. Dagg, forty-nine years of age, with twenty-eight years of
service, had progressed in three years from staff clerk to assistant principal; M.J.
Beary, thirty-three years of age, after fourteen years of service, progressed in
three years from higher executive to assistant principal. E. O’Neill, forty-eight
years of age, with twenty-eight years of service, progressed from first class clerk
to junior administrative officer. John Leydon, thirty years of age, after ten years
of service, transferred from London and progressed from higher executive to
assistant principal and then later went on to become departmental secretary.185
The civil service associations, doubtful of the idea of a board that decided
promotions, were hesitant in their reactions. The CSF, recognising that a pool
board was an improvement on former nepotistic practices, was prepared to
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allow it time and await judgement.186 Of the associations the AEO was the one
most uneasy at the pool board and also the one most open to a completely new
civil service organisation based on the old Sinn Féin ideal of a single national
service with a single grade and a simplified class structure to reflect ability and
responsibility. The ‘one-grade’ service remained an ideal but as promotions
were used to fill the gaps in the existing structure it was an ideal that looked less
and less realisable.187
‘Eight young men in the City Hall’
In most countries that have emerged into independence through a revolution-
ary struggle, the army of liberation has served as the main stabilising force. But
in Ireland as the IRA split on the issue of the Treaty, the liberation army became
in fact the main source of instability. As the Dáil, Sinn Féin and the IRA all split,
some of the staff of the old Dáil departments, many of them also members of
Sinn Féin and of the IRA, were seen as no longer reliable. The legitimacy of the
Provisional Government was challenged and there were instances of insubor-
dination and refusals to obey instructions. In contrast, whatever the private
sentiments of individual civil servants, the entire Castle apparatus without
exception accepted the legitimacy of the Provisional Government as the State
authority. The Provisional Government became isolated from its roots in the
Sinn Féin party and in the Dáil, and soon lost contact with any popular base.
The Castle bureaucracy on the other hand had long learned to remain aloof
from the political struggles in civil society and demonstrate its readiness to
work with whatever authority it found. A besieged Provisional Government
soon shared the barely concealed contempt with which many in the Irish civil
service had long regarded the political classes.188 It was these circumstances of
civil war that enabled the Castle civil service to get a foot in the door of the
independent State and establish itself as a stabilising force. However, the view
that some senior civil servants later encouraged, that in the absence of politi-
cal interference they quickly dominated their departments and were able to
construct the State administrative machine without the politicians, is to be
taken with a grain of salt.189 To return to O’Higgins’s cry about the eight young
men in City Hall, not only were there the foundations of the old administra-
tion in ruins, the foundations of the new were still to be laid. The Castle civil
service was viewed with suspicion. It was dispersed across the new departments
and a close watch was maintained. The Treaty split then led to the Dáil civil
service also coming under suspicion. The relationship between the new State
and the civil service was therefore characterised by suspicion and fear.
The immediate task facing the fledgling State was waging war, the most State-
defining activity of all. As the Provisional Government concentrated on the
growing military threat of the anti-Treaty IRA its control of civil government
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weakened. Thoughts of building a completely new and national civil service
were set aside. Collins, McGrath, O’Higgins, O’Hegarty and Lynch were trans-
ferred from civil government to the army and the Provisional Government
seemed to exist only as a facade for the military. The survival of the new State
depended on the army, not civil government. Gavan Duffy emphasised to
Mulcahy the danger that lay in creating the impression that the ‘men who
matter have gone to Portobello leaving only a feeble residue in Merrion
Street’.190 In an echo of the fears expressed by Wylie, Cope and Anderson in
1920, there was a real danger that the military alone would become the expres-
sion of State authority in the Free State.191 The Dáil civil service was further
weakened by the formation of a Volunteer Reserve of the National Army from
the civil service. A great many of the former Dáil civil servants enlisted, whether
in the hope of bettering their status or simply to escape the tedium of adminis-
tration.192 With the death of Griffith and of Collins the Provisional Government
lost its visionaries.
In October 1922 the anti-Treaty IRA, belatedly recognising the need to cloak
their anti-Treaty war with a State form, nominated a government of the repub-
lic. De Valera issued a circular directed to all State employees asking that they
sever their connection with the Provisional Government and recognise the
government of the republicans.193 The logical decision, which flowed from the
formation of a republican government, was to target members of the ‘illegal’
Provisional Government that sanctioned the execution of republican ‘irregu-
lars’. The IRA murder of the TD Sean Hales on 7 December 1922 led in turn to
the wholly unlawful executions of McKelvey, Barrett, Mellows and O’Connor
at dawn on the following day. No challenge to the authority of the State was tol-
erated. Even the September postal strike against wage cuts was treated as sub-
version and ruthlessly crushed. This strike led the government to outline a view
of an almost authoritarian relationship binding the State and the civil service
that was far removed from the informality and casualness of the old regime.
The establishment of the new State was not an uninterrupted continuity with
the old, as suggested by Joseph Brennan and accepted by later historians. Rather
than being a smooth transfer of a functioning apparatus the Provisional
Government operated in a country where the existence of any central govern-
ment as a functioning reality could be questioned.194 Kevin O’Higgins’s picture
of anarchy and smoking ruins got it right. The civil service that the Provisional
Government took over remained in a state of organisational confusion. It is as
well to remind ourselves that Waterfield’s ‘reorganisation’ was in fact a re-
grading and entailed no more than assigning so many administrative, executive
or clerical posts to each department and slotting the existing civil servants into
these new grades. Although it was treated by Brennan, and by later historians,
as having been delivered from a burning bush Waterfield’s reorganisation was
in fact purely imaginary in some departments and never existed in most.195
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Waterfield had taken the model as agreed in Britain as a norm and attempted to
apply it to the Irish departments, disregarding the very different function, struc-
ture and relative autonomy of the State in Ireland. Reorganisation did not begin
with an analysis of the objective of each department followed by an assessment
of its success or failure to achieve that objective. Assuming that Whitehall was
best he stubbornly forced the Irish bureaucratic horse between the shafts of a
London cart. In departments where there was an allocation of significant
numbers of higher posts, individual clerical and executive officers could antic-
ipate promotion, but the Irish administration as a whole retained what was
regarded as its notorious low status, fragmentation and incoherence. This frag-
mentation was in fact simply the structures that had evolved through British
government intervention in Irish society.196
The Provisional Government missed an opportunity to create completely
new structures for the civil service of an independent Irish State. While many
of the senior civil servants were fearful of the pace and revolutionary nature of
the changes, the rank and file of the service enthusiastically anticipated the pos-
sibilities opening up before them. None of the civil service associations were
enamoured of the Waterfield reorganisation, which was largely a paper reor-
ganisation in any case, and all were prepared to negotiate something new. The
only conditions they expressed were that change should be negotiated and that
the civil service should be assured that they would suffer no worsening of con-
ditions. Apart from that, anything was possible. The clerical and executive
grades would have agreed to a much more streamlined and flattened civil
service, the so-called ‘one-grade’ service. The professional civil servants were
hopeful that the more senior administrative posts would be opened to their
grade. Because of its quasi-colonial status Ireland had no administrative class
to speak of. The leadership of the associations were nationalist to some degree,
and some to a greater degree than others. They would have made great efforts
to carry the membership with them in changes, even revolutionary changes.
But the government, challenged by the republicans as to its legitimacy,
responded with an aggressive display of effectiveness. The postal workers and
the civil service generally were unfortunate in that they provided the opportu-
nity for the government to show that it was in charge. The government delib-
erately used the postal strike in September to rally public opinion behind a
government that was showing a determination to prevail over all opposition.197
Under the Provisional Government the failure to remember that it was a rev-
olution that created the State meant also a failure to recognise the potential of
the State to redirect Irish society. The Treaty that was meant to be a beginning,
a stepping stone, became an end. This failure was not without resistance within
the Cumann na nGaedheal party, where it was identified with the remnants of
the old regime in the Department of Finance.198 However, the positive aspect
of this failure was that the State escaped the fate of many decolonised regimes
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where the bureaucracy becomes an instrument of the ruling party.199 Hardly
any of the revolutionaries inserted themselves into the civil service. It is very
striking that the revolutionaries who remained in politics almost all chose the
path of engagement in the uncertain world of electoral politics. Only two, P.S.
O’Hegarty and Diarmuid O’Hegarty, chose what must have been the tempting
option of a permanent career in the emerging bureaucracy.200 The creation of
a relatively incorruptible and professional civil service must rank as a major
achievement of the Provisional Government and not the former British regime
under whom Dublin Castle was a byword for nepotism. Despite the lingering
doubts of the civil service associations about other matters, the independent
State was well on the way to finally achieving what had been the rhetoric of civil
service reform for over sixty years: meritocratic entry, promotion by ability and
an apolitical culture of service to the State.201
However, the expectation of the Provisional Government that the civil
service could be kept at a distance from the changes in the State were not only
unrealistic but also counter-productive. The civil service was ready to embrace
revolutionary changes with only the barest safeguards. Nationalists uncritically
accepted the denigration of the pre-independence civil service, not reflecting
that, among many achievements, it had successfully transferred the land to the
tenants, democratised local government, set up a local health service through
the dispensary system, transformed the western areas of greatest poverty and
overseen the construction of one of the densest railway networks of Europe.
The success of the local, centrally financed, autonomous boards, despite the
problems of nepotism and cronyism in recruitment and promotion, was for-
gotten. The Irish administration had a great number of able and energetic civil
servants who saw themselves as agents of State-driven social transformation.
The opportunity passed and instead of building up a civil service suited to the
needs of an independent Irish State – less hierarchical, decentralised, an agent
of economic change, focused on development rather than administration – the
government allowed a Whitehall to emerge with all the faults of the metropol-
itan original but of provincial dimensions.
The year 1922 was a deeply hazardous rite of passage for Irish democracy.202
Much of the anarchy of the year of Provisional Government could be put down
to the weakness of the State itself, a legacy of inherited neglect, failed reform
and the Anglo-Irish war. For two years, at least, civil government had been
overshadowed by military rule, either by republicans or by Crown forces. The
ruthless and often illegal suppression of the anti-Treaty forces did ensure that
the elected representatives and civil service of the new State could do their work
and build the civil administration of the State in safety. Winning the civil war
was the result not of a more coherent ideology but rather of a greater determi-
nation to use the conflict to consolidate control of the State. However, filled
perhaps with an awful consciousness of the consequences of failure, the
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Provisional Government in its determination to win became filled with a high-
handed arrogance. The civil service was, initially, fired with a sense of mission
and a determination to serve the new State fully and faithfully. Though there
were instances of sympathy to the anti-Treaty irregulars the mood was one of
enthusiasm, in which change would have been possible and perhaps even wel-
comed. The first issue of Iris, the journal of the Civil Service Federation, noted
that at the time of the Treaty the civil service had been enthusiastic at the
opening up of brighter prospects of an efficient service and had hoped that the
camaraderie which had pervaded the Gaelic League in the old days would
infuse the nation and its civil service once again. Most civil servants anticipated
that national independence would mean a civil service in which patronage and
nepotism would be a thing of the past, entrance would be by a ‘ruthlessly just’
competitive system and industry, integrity and intelligence in the service of the
State would prove the only passports to promotion. However, one year later the
mood was one of foreboding. National freedom meant an attack on workers,
on trade unions and on the civil service.203 The opportunity had passed. The
Provisional Government squandered the goodwill of its civil service and as
1923 dawned and the Irish Free State came into office the attitude of the civil
service was one of suspicion and defensiveness. For many civil servants the
State was failing to embody the bright ideals and generous ambitions of the
national struggle.
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5Cumann na nGaedheal and the civil service,
1923–32
Introduction
L  1922  Provisional Government and pro-Treaty members of SinnFéin regrouped in a new political party, Cumann na nGaedheal [Society of
the Gael].1 On 6 December 1922, one year after the Treaty was signed, the
Provisional Government came to an end and the first Executive Council of the
Irish Free State was approved by Dáil Éireann. In August 1923 the ‘Constituent’
third Dáil dissolved and the general election returned the Cumann na
nGaedheal party to government, led by W.T. Cosgrave. Although the immedi-
ate threat from the anti-Treaty forces was defeated the Cumann na nGaedheal
governments remained deeply influenced by the crisis of legitimation that con-
tinued to surround the State in Ireland. They were in fact all minority admin-
istrations empowered by the abstention of republican TDs.2 The opposition
was composed of small groups made up of the Labour Party, Farmers’ Party,
Businessmen’s Party (mainly ex-Unionists) and other individuals. Most of the
opposition, apart from the Labour Party, were to the right of Cumann na
nGaedheal. These were also governments that were too fond of Public Safety
Acts which curtailed civil liberties, an unwelcome continuance of the British
tradition of ruling Ireland by coercion. Republicanism, crushed as an armed
force, survived in the remnants of the anti-Treaty Sinn Féin and IRA. When it
later reorganised as the political party Fianna Fáil [Soldiers of Destiny] under
the leadership of Éamon de Valera republicanism proved both popular and
resilient, despite denying the legitimacy of the Irish Free State.
Reinstating dismissed civil servants
The fourth Dáil, which continued until June 1927, laid down the foundations
for the relationship between the Irish Free State and the civil service free of any
constraints. The government could, if they wished, give whatever shape it liked
to the civil service. Also, for the first time, the Department of Finance was no
longer shared with any other office and the minister Ernest Blythe was free to
concentrate on finance affairs exclusively. The government was more concerned
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initially with regularising the few civil servants that had been carried over from
the Dáil administration than with the civil service inherited from the Castle
administration. In July 1923, in the last days of the third Dáil, a superannuation
and pensions bill to grant them civil service pensions was enacted.3 The gov-
ernment also responded to pressure to reinstate those civil servants that had
been dismissed by the British government because of nationalist sympathies or
activities in the period from the 1916 Rising to the Truce. These civil servants
were well organised in the Association of Victimised Civil Servants in Ireland
and vocal in their demand for reinstatement and compensation for lost
income.4 Following a cabinet decision that these men and women were entitled
to re-employment, if the dismissal was indeed for nationalist activities, a com-
mittee of senior civil servants chaired by P.S. O’Hegarty reinstated about 200 of
the 400 original claimants. Pension entitlements were restored as if there had
been no break in service but without compensation for loss of earnings.5 The
actual number of reinstated civil servants is an elusive figure due to the rapid
political changes. For instance, Seán O’Ceallacháin was dismissed after partici-
pating in the 1916 Rising. He was reinstated in 1922, but was then dismissed
again in 1923 for anti-Treaty activity. He was then once again reinstated in 1928,
but on a lower clerical officer scale as a form of discipline. With the return of
the Fianna Fáil government in 1932 he was promoted to the grade that he would
ordinarily have reached after his years of service.6 The Cumann na nGaedheal
government reinstated in total 129 civil servants who had lost their post due to
disloyalty to the British regime.7 A further issue relating to the civil service,
which came up at most, if not all, cabinet meetings, was that of identifying sym-
pathisers of the republican irregulars and dismissing them if already appointed
or excluding them from civil service examinations.
Legislating for the civil service of the Irish Free State
The Civil Service (Regulation) Act, 1924 and the Ministers and Secretaries Act,
1924 offer an insight into how the Cumann na nGaedheal government
intended to build new State organisations and how the new State would relate
to its civil service. Under the British regime the various boards and commis-
sions in Dublin Castle enjoyed considerable autonomy, worked to a budget
and recruited and paid their own staff. The Irish government’s Civil Service
(Regulation) Act of 1924 swept aside all of these boards and brought their
staffs into a single civil service under the control of the Minister of Finance.
Yet, surprisingly, the bill was also described as continuing ‘the system with
which we are familiar’.8 Rupture was denied and continuity of the State was
now portrayed as a virtue by the former revolutionaries. The Provisional
Government and the first Executive Council of the Free State had recruited
many temporary civil servants to handle the volume of work associated with
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the changeover from the British administration and to process the many
claims for compensation for war damage and Land Act transfers, but no
 permanent civil servants had been recruited. The Civil Service (Regulation)
Act of 1924 established the Civil Service Commission to recruit future civil
servants by open competitive examinations. The Act also empowered the
Minister of Finance to make, change or revoke regulations for establishing the
classification, remuneration, conditions and terms of service of the civil ser-
vants. Thus while the Civil Service Commission controlled recruitment the
minister would remain solely responsible for management of the civil service.
In line with the general expectation for a minimal State apparatus Blythe
expected that the commission would have very little work to do and the com-
missioners would be very much part-time positions.9 The first commission-
ers were the Ceann Comhairle [chairman] of the Dáil and the secretaries of
finance and of education, the two departments most directly involved. Civil
servants were aghast at the appointment of the Ceann Comhairle to chair the
commission as his was a political position.10
The opposition, while approving of the commission, proposed that it ought
to report to the Dáil rather than to the Minister for Finance and that control of
the civil service ought to lie ultimately with the Dáil as the legislative assembly
rather than with the executive. The intent was to make the management of the
civil service of the new State subject to a detailed code enshrined in legislation
rather than to ministerial prerogative. Although this was rejected as unpracti-
cal it does underline the extent to which the question of recruitment and
control of the civil service was still under debate.11 During the debate Blythe
expressed an ‘ultra-montane’ view of the relationship between the State and the
civil service, essentially denying any contract. It was his view that the executive
could brook no interference in dealing with civil service organisations. The
debate was actually threatening to become an interesting and sophisticated
analysis of executive and democratic control of the State apparatus in which
the hopeless position of the civil service under minister Blythe began to win
sympathetic consideration. Blythe relented in so far as he agreed to lay any reg-
ulations on the table of the House for scrutiny by TDs.12 Johnson, the Labour
leader, unfortunately rather late in the day, hit the nail on the head when he
pointed out that Blythe wanted to import into his ministry the customary
authority of the Crown over the civil service in Great Britain. However, unlike
in Britain, where civil servants were entirely ‘at the pleasure of the Crown’, the
Irish civil servants had secured certain statutory rights and not merely personal
rights. Their conditions were not variable at the whim of the minister.13 The
Executive Council strongly supported Blythe’s resistance to attempts by the
Dáil or Senate to interfere in his control of the civil service.14
In 1925 the Senate rejected an amendment to the regulations that pro-
posed to allow the Civil Service Commission to restrict admission to certain
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examinations to men only. This was one of the few legislative acts subject to the
suspensory power of the Senate, preventing its enactment for 270 days.15 This
had arisen out of attempts by Blythe to restrict candidates for the first recruit-
ment of the administrative class, out of which future departmental heads
would arise, to men only.16 Blythe made it obvious that he disliked having
women in the civil service and used his power to direct that female civil ser-
vants were to retire on marriage. The first examinations for the clerical class
were confined to men with army service. The standard was deliberately kept
low to accommodate men who had been a great many years out of school.
Nevertheless the failure rate was high: 571 from a field of 1,244.17 Thus, at a
time when the demobilisation of the army was causing great difficulties leading
to the so-called ‘army mutiny’, the civil service was to provide a useful avenue
to siphon off discontent, while retaining competitive entry.18 In the pursuit of
economy Blythe also used his powers to cut the salary scales for new entrants
to the service.
The Ministers and Secretaries Act centralised the departments of govern-
ment in an executive of twelve ministers. The ministries were conceived as
essentially administrative or executive. The governing Executive Council was
made up of the executive ministers only.19 Cosgrave described the bill as second
only to the constitution in importance in laying down the foundations of the
State.20 He also saw the bill as rationalising the inheritance of two former gov-
ernments – one that was young and inexperienced but enjoyed popular
support and the other unpopular and disorganised but handed over with
certain Treaty rights.21 The broad principle of the bill was to take the multi-
plicity of boards and commissions of the inherited administration, and reor-
ganise them into a few ministries under ministers described as ‘corporation
sole’; in other words the minister was the department and all acts of the civil
servants of that department were done as if directly ordered by the minister.
For many civil servants this represented a loss of the personal autonomy that
marked the more casual and decentralised Castle administration.22 The key
department was that of finance, which took charge of the administration and
business of public finances and to which was assigned the Civil Service
Commission. Although each department continued to appoint its own civil
servants each appointment required the express permission of the Minister of
Finance. The former departmental autonomy of the old British regime had
truly passed beyond recall.23
The Dáil debate on the key section of the bill referring to the role of parlia-
mentary secretaries reveals the lingering suspicion within the Executive
Council about the reliability of the inherited civil service and doubts about its
willingness to embrace the revolution that had swept over it.24 Taunted by the
contradictions between his calls for national economy and his plans for an
extra layer of paid ‘assistant ministers’, Blythe was quite frank in expressing his
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doubts about the willingness of the civil service, ‘which was not created as a
Civil Service for an Irish State’, to accept ministerial control.25 Within the
Cumann na nGaedheal party Milroy voiced a general suspicion about the
‘rump of officialdom of the old regime’ which was still in power in the civil
service.26 In what was becoming a predictable contribution to any debate on
the civil service the Farmers’ Party used the bill to demand cuts in civil service
pay.27 It is also clear that it was generally accepted that the State would seek to
reduce its presence in Irish society and that, after the initial pressure of recon-
structing the State was complete, the Oireachtas [Irish Parliament] would have
little to do and might meet at most for three or four weeks in two or three ses-
sions a year.28 The only relief offered to the civil servants was by the eccentric
Darrell Figgis who suggested that the State required fewer politicians and more
civil servants.29
One further piece of legislation of 1925 illustrates the developing attitude of
the Cumann na nGaedheal government to the civil service. The Treasonable
and Seditious Offences Bill included a paragraph decreeing that ‘every person
who incites any person in the civil service (other than a police force) of the
Government of Saorstát Éireann to refuse, neglect, or omit to perform his duty
or to commit any other act in dereliction of his duty, shall be guilty of felony.’30
The constitution guaranteed the right to join unions and organise. The postal
workers’ and clerical officers’ trade unions were both affiliated to the ITUC and
to the Labour Party. But the 1925 Treasonable Offences Act, the 1927 Trade
Union Act and the Department of Finance circular 14/1927 ‘Civil service
(approved associations) regulations’ were designed to suppress any public
display of civil service discontent, including withholding labour, which would
almost certainly lead to dismissal.31 Denying the right to organise a strike was
simply the logical extension of the denial of the right to strike. It was only by
overcoming its deference and inherent conservatism that the civil service could
make full use of its labour affiliation.32
H.P. Boland, head of the establishment division in the Department of
Finance, transferred from Whitehall in September 1924. Boland came from
the same mould as Waterfield. Within the Whitehall tradition senior civil ser-
vants’ status was measured by their closeness to the minister. In his meetings
with the civil service representatives, and in his advice to his minister, Boland
treated the idea of personal meetings between them as a personal affront.
Neither did he bother to conceal his contempt for the lower grades of the civil
service.33 Hostile to the ‘one-grade’ idealism of the lower grades, Boland was
devoted to hierarchy. Some years later, during the currency commission hear-
ings, Boland in one of his many personal letters to Brennan wrote of another
reason why finance control of the civil service was so important. Boland
warned Brennan that this reason was one that could not be quoted as it might
‘do us more harm than good’. He wrote, ‘the position that our department
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occupies in the mind of the service generally and the respect they show for
our minister’s authority must obviously be very largely affected by the feeling
that ours is the minister and the department who in so large a sense can
control and determine the fortunes of individual civil servants. I need not
enlarge on this point.’34 For Boland, and for Brennan, finance dominance was
more a matter of power and prestige than one of efficiency. That is why
Boland insisted that civil service organisations could not have non-service
general secretaries to represent them on the representative council; ‘such out-
siders would be at liberty to express opinions and adopt an attitude not open
to a civil servant’.35 Boland, along with McElligott, had a very high estimate
of Whitehall procedures in dealing with the civil service. They both assidu-
ously sought and retained copies of British Treasury organisational forms and
booklets. Years later, their successors in finance Twamley and Feeney, when
they stumbled on this horde of documentation, were mystified as to where
they had come from and, sceptical as to their usefulness, ordered they be
dumped.36
Dáil debates reveal a depth of unthinking hostility to the civil service which
never abated and which all parties indulged in to a greater or lesser degree.37
Even the Labour Party joined in on occasion. William Davin TD and Richard
Corish TD, in the July 1924 debate on the estimates, attacked the civil service
as an unreformed and domineering ‘Castle’ apparatus that needed to be
‘cleared out bag and baggage’. In the same debate the government TD Grattan
Esmonde suggested replacing ‘the old regime’ of inherited civil servants in
finance with a panel of experts. 38 Even from within the Executive Council
support for the civil service was conditional and qualified.39 Assailing civil ser-
vants fast became a regular ritual of the Dáil debates and the failings of the civil
service a cliché of political discourse in independent Ireland.
The underlying assumption of these pronouncements was that the civil
service of the Irish Free State ought to be a minimalist one and certainly would
be smaller than that handed over by the Treaty. However, the tradition of a large
section of the civil service in Ireland was ‘maximalist’. Under the British
regime, outside the confines of the Castle departments, there had developed a
large and decentralised corps of non-political experts whose objective was the
transformation of Irish society and economy through government action. In
the last decades of the British regime many civil servants were recruited to run
the autonomous institutions being developed as a solution to the problems of
Irish society, especially its chronic poverty and under-development. Inheriting
pre-independence nationalist suspicion of the Castle apparatus as an alien
intrusion, government policy was to reshape the civil service into a smaller,
centralised administrative rather than executive bureaucracy. The civil service
of the newly independent State was viewed as an essentially administrative
machine that dealt with simple repetitive tasks rather than as a source of
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expertise and advice. The resentment of the political classes toward the civil
service was a revival of the pre-independence attitude of nationalist opinion to
the Castle regime. In that, the Cumann na nGaedheal party was the inheritor
of Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party rather than Griffith and Sinn
Féin.
Civil service trade union reorganisation
In response to the establishment of the Irish Free State the civil service was
experiencing a drive to organise in every grade and section, ready to meet the
new State in negotiation. In February 1923 a conference of Irish civil service
organisations formally recognised the Irish Civil Service Federation (CSF),
which had been formed early in 1922, to act as a single voice in negotiation with
the government. The Federation was an alliance of various staff federations
that grew out of the ad hoc ‘Executive Committee of the Conference of All
Associations of Irish Civil Servants’ that had met with Collins. Thus the
Federation in its structures sought to act as an umbrella organisation for the
many autonomous and diverse civil service organisations.40 The IPCS and
the Post Office Workers’ Union (POWU) remained outside the Federation.41
The CSF was therefore dominated by the ordinary rank-and-file civil servants
of the clerical grades, most of them nationalist and many of them Gaelic
League members. It was expected that the Federation would be successful in
establishing a new basis for civil service and State relations based on a shared
commitment to making an ‘Irish-Ireland’ of the newly independent nation. At
its height the Federation organised sixteen associations representing just over
1,500 civil servants.42 This poor level of saturation in a potential membership
of approximately 6,000 requires explanation. The low level of support reflects
the loss of leadership due to retirements and promotions, the reorganisation of
the government departments which were the organisational base, the concen-
tration on the rights of retiring officials, but especially the failure to achieve a
replacement for the powerful Whitley Councils.
The pre-war leadership of the Irish civil service associations continued into
the time of the Provisional Government but was then reduced by retirements
and by promotions.43 Despite their trade unionism the calibre of these civil
servants was recognised and awarded. Michael Smithwick, secretary to the
executive grade association, was promoted and transferred to act as secretary
to the Dáil Éireann Courts (Winding Up) Commission, from which he was
transferred to the Revenue Commissioners. Thomas A. Murphy was pro-
moted first as secretary to the Douglas Commission on the postal service, then
to the secretaryship of the Civil Service Commission (despite the protests of
Gregg at favour being shown to a ‘prominent trade unionist’44). W.F. Nally
became a principal officer in the Department of Finance. Mortished served on
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the constitution committee and then took Article 10 retirement and began a
successful career in labour organisation outside of the civil service.45 Sam
Sloan went to Belfast and Michael Gallagher was promoted to the executive
grade.46 The only pre-independence leader of the associations not to enjoy
success was Conn Murphy. However, the associations had sufficiently deep
roots to generate a new cadre of leadership with relatively little difficulty. The
experiences of the First World War and independence struggle also encour-
aged a more aggressive and less deferential style of leadership. This was in fact
a general European phenomenon as white-collar trade unions and profes-
sional associations of the middle classes gave the lead in post-war industrial
unrest.
In the absence of formal negotiation machinery the civil service associa-
tions began to develop contacts in the Oireachtas and to revive the practice of
political lobbying. For lobbying purposes the IPCS generally favoured former
Unionists. However, although the IPCS may have been instinctively Unionist it
was also a strong supporter of trade union principles of solidarity. Thus in the
Dáil by-election in Dublin South in February 1926 the IPCS placed advertise-
ments in the daily papers urging support for William Norton the successful
Labour Party candidate and leader of the POWU.47 Norton then proved a
staunch defender of the civil service in the Dáil chamber. The CSF in its journal
Iris Seirbhise An Stáit[Journal of the State Service], maintained a close watch on
political changes and was not afraid to publicise its grievances.48 In Dáil debates
Major Bryan Cooper (ex-Unionist), Thomas Johnson (Labour) and T.J.
O’Connell (Labour) often reflected the Federation viewpoint. O’Connell was
the invited guest speaker at the annual general meeting of the CSCA in May
1925.49 With the election of Norton as a Labour TD the POWU had a powerful
voice in the Dáil.
Following the split in the Sinn Féin movement, and facing a hostile govern-
ment in Cumann na nGaedheal, the civil service associations came to identify
with and support the Irish Labour Party. The clerical officers had been
members of the ILPTUC since 1920 and their first full-time general-secretary,
Archie Heron, was a son-in-law of the executed 1916 leader James Connolly, a
former IRB man and a prominent Labour Party activist. The POWU had, of
course, William Norton the later leader of the Labour Party, as its first full-time
general-secretary. Given that there were significant differences in the status and
labour power of civil servants and the working class the links between them
were surprisingly strong and the civil service union motions for debate at
Congress were generally supported.50 The Irish Federation also affiliated to the
international organisation of civil service trade unions, the International
Federation of Public Officials.51
However, although the energy that the civil service displayed in organisation
is impressive, the form of that organisation can be questioned. The failure of the
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Cumann na nGaedheal government to escape from the British State model was
mirrored by the failure of the civil service to escape the model of organisation
inherited from the British associations. The Irish departments and grades were
too small to accommodate the complex organisational structures of the British
service. Deference to British norms and habit reproduced the British model of
organisation but the total membership of the Irish association was often less
than that of a single branch of its sister organisation in Britain. In 1932, when
the civil service had experienced eight years of retrenchment and a ban on pro-
motions, the total number of administrative, executive, clerical, secretarial, pro-
fessional and technical civil servants was 6,403. Yet this small service had sixteen
representative associations.52
These civil service unions faced the task of mobilising membership on two
opposed fronts. On the one hand they had to fight to defend the interests of
recently appointed civil servants and civil servants who opted to remain with
the Free State while on the other hand fighting for the best terms possible for
those who wished to retire under the Treaty provisions. As could be expected
any concentration on the rights of those who were ‘deserting the ship’ led to
tensions and disagreements with those who remained on board.53
‘Economy’ and cuts in civil service pay
Justifiably proud of its success in stabilising the State and enacting the consti-
tution, the Cumann na nGaedheal government increasingly relied on its ability
to prudently manage the meagre State finances to assert its legitimacy as a gov-
ernment to the electorate. Relentless economic retrenchment became a form
of ideological compensation for the retreat from the inspirational policies that
had led the national revolution. Also, despite the efforts of the Labour Party to
mount an active opposition to these policies, the more significant opposition
influence on the government came in fact from the right-wing farmer and
business parties that pressed for even greater cuts.54 In May 1923, as an inves-
tigation into the financial position of the Irish Free State revealed a deficit of
£1.2 million for the current year, the departmental heads were instructed
to find economies.55 In pursuit of a balanced budget, and fearful of the
hyperinflation that was sweeping Germany, the Cosgrave government cut old-
age pensions, blind pensions and teacher salaries.56 In this pursuit of an aridly
conservative economic strategy the civil service was an obvious target for
reductions in expenditure.57
The Department of Finance’s review of the budget position late in 1923
identified the civil service as being ripe for ‘economy’. The review identified a
two-pronged approach to lower costs by, firstly, scrapping inessential services
and ending the ‘unnecessary multiplication of departments as an obvious source
of waste’ and, secondly, by cutting the cost of the services then remaining. The
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objective of the review was to ensure that the costs of the public services would
reflect the diminution of work that was necessarily consequent on the ‘exclusion
of the six-counties’.58 As economy in the public service emerged as an insistent
theme of government it was linked to the cost of compensation for civil servants
dismissed or resigned under Article 10 of the Treaty.59 The Labour Party sug-
gested withholding superannuation payments from the retired officials of the
former British administration, saving money that would be better spent on
social needs.60
In 1924, as part of its economy drive and also to assert control over the civil
service, the government substantially reduced the basic salary scales and
annual leave for new entrants to the clerical and executive classes. It also intro-
duced a new differentiated scale between married and unmarried civil servants,
with an additional children’s allowance.61 This was a pet project of Blythe’s.62
Blythe’s marriage differential was carefully designed so that a single woman
would not reach the maximum of the scale before forty years of service, that is
retirement age. The unmarried man would begin to notice the differential at
about the age of twenty-three to twenty-five, the age when he ought to think-
ing of marriage.63 It would thus operate as a social engineering mechanism,
encouraging marriage in young men while using women to replace single men
as cheaper labour. A complicated scheme, it required departmental heads to
keep track of their officers’ marital status and procreation. For fear of estab-
lished officers going out under Article 10 it was applied to new recruits only.64
P.S. O’Hegarty, never lost for an opinion, strongly supported Blythe and
denounced ‘the modern women’s movement, disguised as a movement for
equality, [which] is a movement to shirk wifehood and motherhood because
independence looked more pleasant’.65
With the enforcement of the differential there were in fact two completely
different salary schemes in the civil service. For the transferred civil servants
protected by Article 10 there was a continuance of the old scales, with the
new lower scales being applied to the new entrants. However, the government
imposed a ban on promotion and, after 1926, introduced university graduate
entry (male only) for the top administrative grades.66 For civil servants tied to
definite salary scales the only avenue to prosperity was promotion. Without
promotion the lower grades became dead ends. These changes, introduced
without any negotiation, tended to drive experienced officers out from the
service protected as they were by Article 10 of the Treaty and to create resent-
ment between the old and the new civil servants.67 The AEO picked holes in the
scheme in a series of carefully crafted questions which included whether the
child allowance was equal for each child and was it paid from the date of birth
and whether a civil servant on the maximum of his scale would be promoted
to the next scale on receipt of an allowance for an extra child that brought him
into that grades’ pay range.68
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A civil service representative council
As we have seen, in May 1922 Collins had assured a delegation of the civil
service that though he could not commit any future government to acceptance
of the Whitley Councils he did accept the need for some consultative body to
establish the relationship between the new State and the civil service. The
Whitley Joint Committee was abolished but the departmental councils were
allowed continue and an ad hoc consultative council of official and staff sides
was established for the transition period. The consultative council had six staff
side and six official side representatives. All matters that ordinarily came before
the Whitley Committee were to be dealt with by the consultative council. It met
first on 20 September 1922 and monthly thereafter.69 While the staff represen-
tatives saw this arrangement as a temporary substitute for some future form of
reinstated Whitleyism, Collins and the Provisional Government saw this as a
purely temporary arrangement to facilitate the transition from British to Irish
rule. Though the CSF was willing to work the consultative council the POWU
and IPCS were suspicious as it was clear that as a purely ad hoc and temporary
body it was no substitute for the Whitley Committee.70 The CSF continued to
hope for a Whitley-like body on which ‘representatives of official and staff sides
meet, not for mere ventilation of grievances but to give both sides co-equal
interest and power . . . a body for action not talk, fostering and developing in
the staff that spirit of co-operative responsibility which was the guiding prin-
ciple in the Irish-Ireland movement’.71 Thus the civil service was still thinking
of the relationship between it and the State as different to that with the former
Castle regime and one that would be bound by a shared and equal commitment
to national renewal. The government would recognise and value the cohort of
expertise and commitment that the civil service represented and would invite
it to engage in addressing the problems that faced the new State.
A year later, with the transition period complete and the Civil Service
(Regulation) Act in force, the civil service associations continued to demand
the reinstatement of something like the departmental Whitley Councils. In the
Dáil, deputies Bryan Cooper’s and Johnson’s repeated questioning of
Cosgrave and Blythe on the Whitley Councils got vague and non-committal
replies. Within cabinet, however, and eventually in a statement to the Dáil,
Cosgrave took the view that sole power to determine pay and conditions
within the civil service lay with the government and therefore only a  con -
sultative body could be allowed.72 However, early in 1924, the Whitley
Committee was formally abolished with the government offering, at a meeting
with civil service representatives, nothing more than a promise to establish
new machinery ‘more suited to Saorstát Éireann conditions’.73 This rhetorical
flourish might have seemed promising to the more nationalist members of the
civil service, but few were convinced and most of the associations continued
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to press for a restoration of a Whitley-type committee. Ideally the service
would have preferred that a panel of ministers and other politicians, along
with a non-governmental representative but with no senior civil servant,
would constitute an official panel.74
In December 1924 Blythe issued without discussion or consultation a
scheme for a purely consultative representative council for the civil service
made up of official and staff sides, composed of civil servants, with no politi-
cal representative. The chairman of the council was to be a nominee of the min-
ister but with no vice-chair nominated by the staff side, as had been the case
with the Whitley Committee. The chairman had full control of the agenda and
also the report of the proceedings to the minister. The minister also forbade
any non-service members, thus thwarting the recent decision of the POWU
and the CSCA to appoint full-time general secretaries and professionalise their
representation. In every aspect the ministerial proposal was a rejection of the
Whitley system and its implied equality between State and civil servant.75
At this point the civil service was organised in three main blocs: the CSF, the
POWU and the IPCS. Unhappy at the retreat from the Whitley Councils, a
meeting with the Minister of Finance was requested. Initially the joint
approach worked well. When the minister, predictably, refused to meet them it
was pointed out to the government that it had already broken a pledge to
consult the service and that any scheme drafted and put into operation by one
side only lacked the first element of conciliation, agreement by both sides.76
Within a few weeks however the unity of the service associations was broken.
The CSF, assured by the minister that the council’s mechanisms could be
revised to remedy any defects that might emerge once it was working, agreed
to give it a trial. In fact the Federation, as the largest and most nationalist
organisation in the civil service, had come under considerable pressure to work
the government scheme. The CSCA, after a divisive debate, agreed to work the
scheme but only under protest.77 The POWU and the IPCS decided to stick
with the decision that the scheme was completely unacceptable and both
protested at the Federation’s decision to break ranks with the rest of the service.
Confident that the other associations would eventually have to come on board
the government pressed ahead and the Civil Service Representative Council
(CSRC), without either the POWU or the IPCS, held its first meeting on 15
March 1926. The fragmentation of the civil service organisation is evident in
the range of associations on the CSRC. The only general service classes repre-
sented were the executive officers (AEO) and the clerical officers (CSCA). The
rest of the staff side was made up of fourteen associations, many with less than
a hundred members.78 The POWU description of the scheme as ‘utterly worth-
less’ proved correct. While the civil servants might have continued to refer to it
as a ‘conciliation’ council the minister, correctly, referred to it as a ‘representa-
tive’ council. From the beginning the CSRC proved unsatisfactory and the
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‘recognised’ associations within the CSF unanimously pressed an unconvinced
minister to accept that the constitution had to be revised.79
The civil service search for a united front
The year 1927 was crucial in stabilising the Free State as the republican Fianna
Fáil party entered Dáil Éireann to form a constitutional opposition. To the civil
service associations Fianna Fáil seemed to be more sympathetic to their com-
plaints and with the government facing two elections in 1927 they tried once
again to build up a single service voice. In February 1927 the Federation called
for a conference between civil service associations to rebuild cross-service
unity.80 The IPCS and the POWU proved equally dismissive. In truth neither
the POWU nor the IPCS were interested in joining what was clearly a sinking
ship.81 By the end of the year the clerical officers had seceded from both the CSF
and the CSRC and so therefore, as the Federation broke up, the so-called
‘Representative Council’ now represented a minority of civil servants.82
It has to be admitted that the efforts of the various civil service associations
to unite and defend the interests of those civil servants who chose to remain in
the civil service of the Irish Free State bore little fruit. The expectation that a
shared nationalism and a shared enthusiasm for the possibilities of independ-
ence would be sufficient to establish a new relationship between the State and
the civil service had failed. In terms of influence and solid gain the most
effective organisation that the Irish civil service had ever generated was the pre-
independence GCICS. That committee had recognised that the civil service
of the State had, despite departmentalisation and complex grading, a single
employer with unique power to shape their working conditions. It followed
that the civil service ought to be associated in a single organisation to speak as
one in dealing with the State. It was when the civil service turned to defend the
gains won by the GCICS that it discovered the unity and success that previously
had eluded them. In defending the contractual rights of those civil servants
who chose to retire under Article 10 of the Treaty the civil service unions built
and maintained cross-service unity and achieved a defeat of the government
that re-opened the whole Treaty debate and brought into question national
sovereignty. Described by Thomas Johnson as ‘the turning point in the whole
constitutional relationships between Great Britain, the Irish Free State and the
British Dominions’, this was the Wigg-Cochrane case.83
The Wigg-Cochrane case
The IPCS were dissatisfied at its lack of representation on the Wylie commit-
tee and continued to demand a right to represent members during its deliber-
ations.84 Unhappy at many rulings of the committee, the IPCS council began
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looking for legal advice on challenging it in the courts. The main question
centred on how the ‘bonus’ was being included when calculating the pension.85
Originally, thinking that the wartime inflation was a temporary difficulty only,
the British Treasury in introducing the bonus in 1916 explicitly stated that it
would not count for pension or gratuity payments under the Superannuation
Acts. As the war bonus became in fact a regular part of the pay of civil servants
pensions emerged as anomalous and unfair. In April 1919 this was temporar-
ily addressed in a memorandum of agreement between the Treasury and the
civil service associations. Under this agreement subsequent pension awards
would include a bonus-related supplementary pension. In the post-war period
as the bonus, though temporary and fluctuating, had become in reality part of
the pay of civil servants the National Whitley Council for the civil service
turned its attention to the continuing problem of pensions. The council agreed
that in addition to the normal calculation of pension there would be added
three-quarters of the bonus paid at the time of retirement and that in calculat-
ing the lump sum gratuity the bonus would be added on. The Treasury, without
agreement or legislation, then decided that the part of a pension of retiring civil
servants that was based on the bonus would, just like the bonus itself, be subject
to periodic quarterly adjustment based on the cost-of-living calculation, and
would be subject to an over-riding maximum. This Treasury minute intro-
duced a notional maximum for the bonus element that would allow the bonus
to fluctuate downwards but prevent it fluctuating upwards beyond a certain
percentage. The notion of a ‘maximum’ was introduced to prevent the total
annual sum payable in pensions exceeding the statutory proportion of the total
salary on which civil servants pensions were calculated because, it was con-
ceivable, the bonus element of the pension might in time rise to exceed the
actual basic salary paid to a civil servant on retirement.
The legality of an Act of Parliament, the Superannuation Acts, being altered
by an order of the Treasury ought to have been queried, but it wasn’t. These
changes were effected by a Treasury minute dated 20 March 1922, that is in the
period between the Provisional Government taking over Dublin Castle on 16
January, when Collins forbade any alterations in personnel or conditions, and
1 April 1922 when the civil service in Ireland was formally transferred. Justice
Wylie, at the first sitting of the compensation committee, indicated that he
intended to allow this Treasury minute to govern the compensation payable
under the Treaty, that is to say to take the view that the transfer of the civil
service had occurred on 1 April 1922.86 Curiously enough the Civil Service
Committee set up under the 1920 Act, which had been blocked in its operation
by the civil service associations and by the Provisional Government, had agreed
that the compensation payable under the 1920 Act would be subject to a vari-
able element related to the current rate of bonus on the salaries of serving civil
servants. This was intended to act as a disincentive to voluntary retirement
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because of the danger of a diminishing pension in the future. Had the
Provisional Government allowed the committee to function it may never have
faced the difficulties it was about to encounter.87
By early January 1923 the IPCS council, dissatisfied with some of its deci-
sions, decided that it would have to fight the Wylie committee in the courts and
instructed the member associations to forward to the council a list of the cases
past and pending in the committee. These were then carefully monitored.88
Meanwhile a ‘Treaty Pensioners’ Association’ was formed to act as the organisa-
tion of the civil servants affected. This association, funded by the civil servants
in the IPCS who remained in service, travelled to London to lobby the British
government on the issue of compensation and pensions.89 At their request the
House of Lords attempted to insert into the ‘consequential provisions’ an
explicit guarantee that the British government would undertake responsibility
for the pensions under Article 10 if the Irish government reneged, but this was
rejected by the Commons.90
It is ironic that the 1920 Civil Service Committee, had it functioned, would
have had an absolute authority to determine ‘fair compensation’ and so there-
fore would not have been amenable to judicial review. The Provisional
Government, determined to assert its sovereignty, made the Wylie committee
a purely advisory committee. As an advisory committee its decisions, though
accepted by the government, were neither final nor conclusive in any way.
Advice can of course be rejected, by either side. By autumn two cases had
emerged as promising vehicles to challenge the compensation committee: that
of John Howard Wigg and that of Robert Oliver Cochrane, both of them
members of the IPCS.
Wigg was assistant architect in the OPW in Dublin on a salary of £430 plus
bonus of £232 3s 0d, which, by his date of retirement, had reduced to £119
giving him a salary of £549 on retirement. Wigg had, on 1 April 1922, seven-
teen years of service. The pension awarded to Wigg was £200 on his basic salary
plus a supplementary bonus of £103 0s 9d subject to a maximum of £88 6s 5d.
This gave him a pension of £288 6s 5d. Cochrane was a chief executive officer
in the OPW on £415 plus bonus of £194 5s 6d with twenty-six years’ service on
1 April 1922 giving him a final salary of £609 5s 6d. Robert Cochrane had actu-
ally served on the executive of the 1893 civil service committee that had drafted
the code on civil service compensation rights. Cochrane was awarded £206 5s
0d basic pension plus a supplementary bonus £106 5s 2d subject to maximum
of £91 1s 7d giving him a final pension of £297 6s 7d. In both cases the pen-
sions were calculated in the normal manner, taking account of years of service
and added years. However, following the Treasury minute of March 1922, the
awards carried the conditions that the supplemental pension would be subject
to quarterly reassessment based on the cost-of-living figure and that at no time
would the supplemental pension exceed its prescribed amount at the date of
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retirement, the ‘over-riding maximum’. Had the 1920 terms been applied the
basic salary and bonus would have been considered together as ‘pay’, the
pension would have had no periodic reassessment and the over-riding
maximum would not have applied.
On 15 November 1923 Wigg-Cochrane issued a writ in the High Court. In
their writ Wigg-Cochrane asked that the High Court declare that the compen-
sation awarded them was not ‘fair compensation’ inasmuch as part of the com-
pensation was put on a sliding scale, the quarterly cost-of-living reassessment,
which would not have been the case under the 1920 Act. The central argument
hung on the words of Article 10 of the Treaty, ‘the government of the Irish Free
State agrees to pay fair compensation on terms not less favourable than those
accorded by the Act of 1920 . . . to public servants who are discharged by it or
who retire in consequence of the change of government’. Wigg-Cochrane
argued that terms less favourable than those accorded by the 1920 Act were in
fact being imposed by the Irish government because in 1920 there was no
‘maximum’ and no adjustment of the bonus element of the pension. What they
wanted was the courts to declare that the ‘bonus was part of the salary formerly
enjoyed and that in calculating the superannuation allowance a fixed award
should be made, and that no part of such allowance should be put on a sliding
scale’.91 They also asked for a declaration that the Treasury minute of 20 March
1922 did not apply because they were at that moment under the authority of
the Provisional Government, not the Treasury. The three-month gap between
the handing over of the Castle to the Provisional Government, when Collins
ordered that there should be no alteration in conditions, and the transfer of
authority on 1 April opened up the question of where the authority of the State
lay for that period. If the Irish government argued that the Treasury minute did
apply then they argued that the Provisional Government was not a State, it
was only an administration empowered by the British and the talk about the
‘surrender of the Castle’ was no more than empty rhetoric.
As the question was contested far bigger issues began to emerge from the
dreary arguments about dates and definitions. Looming behind the molehill of
pensions was a mountain of constitutional confrontation with implications for
the entire British Commonwealth of Nations. The government defence was
that the Minister of Finance of the Irish Free State had inherited the authority
of the former British Treasury. Under that authority civil servants were
employed at pleasure and had no legal right to a pension. The decision as to the
amount of any pension, which lay formerly with the Treasury, lay now with the
Minister of Finance. Therefore the action of Wigg-Cochrane was not sustain-
able and ought to be dismissed. In the High Court, however, the judgement,
delivered on 18 July 1924 by Mr Justice Meredith, former president of the 1920
Dáil Éireann Supreme Court, found not only that the pensions of Wigg-
Cochrane ought to be calculated under the 1920 Act as they argued but, more
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importantly, that their pensions, and by implication those of all transferred
civil servants established or temporary, were guaranteed by the constitutional
incorporation of the Treaty. What was at issue was not pension entitlements
but constitutional guarantees. Rights that were secured in the constitution
could not be governed or qualified by a Treasury minute, or by a decision of
the Minister of Finance, or even an Act of the Oireachtas. The pensions of dis-
missed or retiring transferred officers were not a gift of the Minister of Finance
but a constitutional right and therefore enforceable in the courts whose task it
was to defend the constitution.92
The State immediately appealed to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile Wylie,
once his authority was questioned, resigned from the committee to take up a
position as judge of the High Court. Initially the government was not unhappy
at these developments and may well have welcomed them, confident that their
interpretation of the rights of the transferred civil servants would stand. The
official side at the Wylie committee had been taking a much more aggressive
line and had circulated a letter to all applicants demanding an explanation as
to why and not merely a statement that he was ‘retiring in consequence of the
change of government’. They would no longer simply accept the statements but
would forcefully interrogate all applicants on the basis of their stated reasons
for retirement.93
The decision to abolish the Whitley Councils and the stubborn refusal to
establish any replacement arbitration scheme made civil servants uneasy and
more willing to take the money on offer and resign. The Free State government
had immediately discharged 454 civil servants. But, in July 1924 just before the
High Court delivered its judgement, Blythe revealed that a further 864 civil ser-
vants had resigned ‘in consequence of the change of government’ costing a
lump sum of £208,870 and an annual pension of £124,666, and there were still
many hundreds of applications in the pipeline. These payments to dismissed
and retired civil servants were being made against the background of cuts in
old-age pensions and teacher salaries.94 By the end of 1925 the cost of com-
pensation under Article 10 was running at £254,785 per annum in payments
to 1,851 former civil servants with a further 2,139 still pending.95 Even before
the High Court case Blythe described Article 10 as ‘the worst article in the
Treaty’.96 The High Court decision and the resignation of Wylie allowed the
government to suspend all the pending cases and halt the flow of resignations.
Civil servants who wished to retire were now in a limbo as the government
refused to process any claims until the courts clarified the position.97
For the civil service associations the purpose of the Wigg-Cochrane case was
not to enforce the rights of retired former civil servants, but to compel the gov-
ernment to reinstate some form of the Whitley Councils, to determine pen-
sions in the first instance but ultimately to re-establish arbitration as a
permanent part of the transferred civil service industrial relations and compel
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the government to treat the civil service with some respect.98 The civil service
made a direct connection between the rush of resignations, 600 in six months,
and the aggressive attitude of the government, saying ‘it will not do to tell us
we have no right to strike and deny us at the same time adequate conciliation
and arbitration machinery for the settlement of legitimate grievances’.99
The initial hope was that with the High Court decision in the associations’
favour the government would not appeal but would look to establishing what
was the true objective of the litigation, a properly constituted statutory arbi-
tration scheme. When the government did decide to appeal the decision of
Meredith to the Supreme Court, and the case made its slow progress toward
that appeal, it was noted with anxiety that the government was not bothering
to replace Wylie and was refusing to name a date for the reconstitution of the
compensation committee.100 The financial implications for the civil service
associations of a further appeal were a worry, but unavoidable, once the
 government decided to go to the Supreme Court.101
Early in 1925, as it became clear that the government was going to pursue
the case of Wigg-Cochrane all the way to the Supreme Court, the civil service
associations combined to form the Transferred Officers’ Protection Association
(TOPA).102 The object of TOPA was to ‘safeguard the rights of members under
articles 77 and 78 of the Constitution of Saorstát Éireann and Article 10 of
the Treaty’.103 The driving force behind TOPA was William Norton, general-
secretary of the POWU and later leader of the Labour Party. It was Norton who
drew up the initial memorandum detailing the decline in service conditions
under the Free State government and inviting the other associations to join
forces.104 The twelve-member executive of TOPA was made up of four
appointed by the POWU, four by the CSF and four by the IPCS.105 Thus TOPA
was a much more unified organisation of the civil service than the Federation
and, as most civil servants in the Free State were ‘transferred officers’, might
well have proved a base to build cross-service unity but, as we shall see, it
never became more than an organisation to fight the Wigg-Cochrane case.
Nevertheless, as such, it was an undoubted success. It is therefore ironic that
the civil service unions and associations that had failed to build a unified plat-
form to negotiate on behalf of those civil servants staying in the Free State came
together to fight the cause of those who were retiring.
Civil servants who were going to stay in the civil service of the Free State, or
recently recruited civil servants, were understandably reluctant to finance a
court case that would benefit those who were retiring and create hostility to
those who remained. It was alleged that TOPA was solely concerned with those
civil servants who intended to retire under Article 10 but had not got a chance
to go because the Wylie committee was hamstrung since the court case and the
resignation of the chairman. It was also alleged that TOPA was being run by
people whose sympathies were British rather than Irish and that TOPA was
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motivated by a desire among ‘the usual garland of Poppies sustained by
Freemason wires’ to humiliate the native government.106
In the Supreme Court the government won and so it might have seemed that
that was the end of the case.107 The decision of the majority of the court was
that, bluntly, a civil servant under the Treaty had no pension rights as such
which are enforceable by law and that the Minister of Finance was the sole
authority to determine matters between the State and the civil service.
Consequently a civil servant must accept whatever the minister offered and had
no right of action against the minister whatever. This was consistent with the
British tradition under which all civil servants were employed ‘at pleasure’ and
had no rights, properly speaking. But, in a dissenting judgement, one of the
three judges raised the question as to the status of the Treaty and the other
 legislation establishing the new government. While the other two judges,
O’Connor and Fitzgibbon (a former leading Dublin Unionist) accepted the
government argument for continuity of authority, and therefore superannua-
tion and compensation powers, the third, Justice Johnston, dissented. He
argued that the Treaty had completely displaced the Act of 1920 and had
‘brought to an end the whole existing administrative, executive and judicial
machinery of the country and made suitable provision for the substitution of
something different’.108 In his view the case of Wigg-Cochrane was not about
the power to determine superannuation but about fundamental constitutional
rights as guaranteed by the Treaty agreed with Great Britain by Dáil Éireann
and the constitution that it subsequently enacted. If the government, he
argued, could disregard Article 10 of the Treaty then it could equally disregard
any other article of the Treaty, the constitution and the orders transferring
authority to the Free State, making them no more than so much waste paper.
In a paradoxical reversal therefore the government of the Free State was now
arguing that what had taken place was not a revolution whereas the civil ser-
vants were arguing that it was. Breaking through the question of pension rights
was the status of the Treaty itself.109
The appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
Even before the High Court judgement the civil service associations had dis-
cussed the possibility of invoking a controversial and contentious avenue of
appeal if the decision went against Wigg-Cochrane. This was an appeal to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the British House of Lords.110 The
appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not mentioned in
the Treaty, but had been included in the Irish Free State Constitution (article
66) at the insistence of the British government.111 Article 66 of the constitution
implied wrongly that there was an existing right of appeal; there wasn’t, but it
was decided that it would not be wise to reveal that error and to allow the article
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to stand as first written.112 The British government viewed the appeal to the
Privy Council as a vital expression of Commonwealth unity and British  judicial
supremacy within the Dominions.113 It derived from the Judicial Committee
Act of 1844, which gave statutory validity to the right of the Crown to hear
appeals from any colonial court.114 The British government wanted the Privy
Council to be seen, and act, as the supreme court of the empire and domin-
ions. Collins and Griffith had objected to the appeals procedure on the grounds
that three of the judges of the Privy Council were vehemently unionist and
opposed to Irish self-determination: Lords Carson, Sumner and Cave. Judges
who already expressed strong views on the Irish constitution might be invited
to interpret that constitution. The British government had offered an assurance
that in any controversy of a political nature on Irish appeals these judges would
be considered as disqualified and stand aside.115 A further assurance was
offered that in an Irish case the procedures would follow the more restrictive
South African rather than Canadian precedent; that is an appeal to proceed
would require that it be permitted by the Irish Supreme Court and would be
only in cases that affected a great number of people.116 Around the time that
TOPA was being formed the judicial committee had already breached these
understandings by hearing the case of Lynham v. Butler, which dealt with the
powers of the Irish land commissioners.117 At the 1926 Imperial Conference the
appeal to the Privy Council came under fire from both Canada and the Free
State.118 The existence of such an appeal, and its exercise, was considered an
insult to the Irish Supreme Court and the competency of the Irish judiciary. By
appealing the Supreme Court decision to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council the civil service of the Irish Free State was asking a British court to
overturn the Irish Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 10 of the Treaty,
thereby undermining the Irish Supreme Court and Irish national sovereignty.
The appeal to the Privy Council, heard by Lord Cave (despite the assurances
offered in June 1922) along with Lords Haldane, Dunedin and Shaw (all three
of them Liberals) and the Scottish Unionist Finlay, went even better for the civil
service than could have been imagined. The Privy Council decision, delivered
3 May 1927, overturned the Supreme Court decision and gave Wigg-Cochrane
the compensation and pensions they had demanded by agreeing that the rights
of the transferred officers were constitutional rights. The claims of the civil ser-
vants rested on the Treaty, the Transfer of Functions Order of 1922 and the
Constitution of the Irish Free State, and not on any superannuation Act. In
response to the government argument that the Civil Service Committee had
never been established and therefore the power of the committee reverted to
the Minister of Finance, the judges found that the powers in fact reverted to the
courts, which were the proper authority to determine constitutional rights.
The judges also found that the Treasury minute of March 1922 was not binding
as the civil service had been transferred to the Provisional Government by that
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date. As a coup de grâce the judges also found that the over-riding maximum
was unfair as it allowed a pension to fluctuate downwards but limited its
upward movement.119
This judgement sent shock waves through the governments in Dublin and
in London. Under the British administration civil servants were by law
employed ‘at the pleasure of His Majesty’ and status and pensions were by gift
rather than by right. It was also the British view that the Irish Free State was
not the creation of revolution but was a devolved government, created by
Westminster legislation, continuous with the former administration. The Privy
Council decision implied that the Irish Free State was in fact a break with the
former British administration. Far more seriously, from a financial point of
view, the decision also meant there was now a group of civil servants within the
British and Irish system whose status and security were far superior to their col-
leagues’ and were in fact under-pinned by constitutional guarantees. The Law
Lords had determined that transferred civil servants now benefited from a
status far better than any they would have enjoyed had there never been a
Treaty and were now entitled to more favourable treatment than they would
have received had they remained under the British administration or had they
been recently recruited in the civil service of the Free State. The British associ-
ations were themselves intrigued by civil servants successfully suing the State
and extracting explicit legal guarantees as to their rights.120
For the Dublin government the decision of the Privy Council was the last
straw. The Wigg-Cochrane decision was now far more than a dispute about
pensions. In fact most of the civil servants that had applied to retire under
Article 10 had accepted the decision of the committee and there were only
about 400 disputed cases outstanding.121 The right to resign as a consequence
of the change of government had a seven-year limit and would run out in
December 1929. There was a reasonable fear that the civil service might now
see a rapid collapse over the next year as officials seized upon the Wigg-
Cochrane decision to retire on what were extraordinarily favourable terms.
But the main objection to the Wigg-Cochrane decision was on constitutional
grounds. The Irish government had already objected at the Commonwealth
conferences to the claims of the Privy Council to act as an imperial supreme
court. By the Wigg-Cochrane decision the Privy Council, dominated in the eyes
of the Free State government by the most reactionary of the Tory legal estab-
lishment, now claimed an authority to interpret the Treaty itself against the Irish
Supreme Court. The government’s argument that the Treaty, in the words of
Michael Collins, gave the ‘freedom to achieve freedom’ now rang hollow. Even
before the decision of the judicial committee Blythe announced that the gov-
ernment had no intention of complying with the decisions of a ‘bad, useless and
unnecessary court’ while other deputies attacked the ‘disloyal, unpatriotic and
rapacious civil servants’.122
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However, constitutionally eccentric as the decision may have been,
neither the British nor the Irish governments could simply ignore it. Blythe’s
response was uncharacteristically terse: ‘The judgement in the Wigg-
Cochrane appeal raises not merely financial but constitutional questions,
and I think a quick decision is not to be looked for.’123 While the Irish gov-
ernment was primarily engaged on the constitutional aspects of the decision
the British government was itself quite alarmed at the Privy Council decision
that some civil servants would be better treated and have definite rights as a
result of the Treaty. Clearly it was to the advantage of both governments to
come to an understanding on the way of retreat from the decision. Both gov-
ernments were also trying to ignore the fact that the compensation terms of
Article 10 of the Treaty and the eighth schedule of the 1920 Act were not in
any sense part of the superannuation code, which of course remained the
responsibility of the Treasury or Minister of Finance, but were part of the
Treaty.
The Irish civil service, through TOPA and the CSF, looked for assistance
from the British civil service organisations, though it might have preferred that
the British Confederation did not express its support with such an enthusias-
tically imperialistic resolution:
That this meeting of the executive Committee of the Civil Service Confederation
accords its full support to those ex-British Civil Servants who are resisting the
action of the Irish Free State Government and the British Government in seeking
to avoid the consequences of the Privy Council judgment in the Wigg-Cochrane
case. It is of the opinion that such action raises the following vital issues:
(1) The effect of such legislation on the constitutional legal fabric of the British
Empire.
(2) The question whether the parliament should usurp the power of the Courts
in interpreting Statutes.
(3) The denial of justice to those who adopt the ordinary legal procedure of the
Empire.
(4) The refusal of the rights under the Treaty to Civil Servants; and that for these
reasons the contemplated action should not be proceeded with by the respec-
tive governments.124
On 22 February 1928 Blythe announced to the Dáil that the government’s
response to the decision of the Privy Council was to reconstitute the Wylie
committee as a statutory rather than an advisory committee, to apply the con-
troversial Treasury minute and to make its decision absolute.125 In short the
government would ignore the decision of the Privy Council. The next day
Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for the Dominions, in a statement that pre-
cisely echoed that of Blythe’s, told the House of Commons that it was clearly
inequitable that the transferred civil servants of the Irish Free State should
receive more favourable treatment than if they had remained in the British civil
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service and, as the decision of the Privy Council did not reflect the intention of
those who made the Treaty, it would co-operate with the Irish government’s
intent to change the law so that the decision of the Privy Council would be
avoided. This was an extraordinary statement as the interpretation of statute
law (the Treaty was statute law) lay with the courts and not parliament. The
British civil service associations continued to take a keen interest in the strug-
gle between the courts and the government, touching as it did on the author-
ity of the Treasury over the salaries and conditions of the civil service.126 The
CSF took up the Wigg-Cochrane case with the British Labour Party, which was
actually rather wary of the issue and would go no further than saying that the
Irish civil service must be no worse off as a result of the Treaty, which was pre-
cisely the view of the Irish government.127
At this point the Irish government, instead of pressing ahead with this
agreed strategy, allowed itself to be drawn into a farcical pantomime the point
of which was to allow the British government to escape the consequences
of defying the Privy Council decision. Carson, the former Ulster Unionist
leader, took up the cause of the civil servants. What offended him was that the
two governments were clearly conspiring to alter the terms of compensation
without consulting the aggrieved party, the civil servants themselves. In April,
in an acrimonious debate in the House of Lords on the decision, with sharp
exchanges between Carson and the Law Lords, Lord Birkenhead (F.E. Smith,
one of the British signatories of the Treaty) solemnly announced that the
recently deceased Lord Cave, who had delivered the controversial judgement,
had summoned the prime minister to his deathbed and confessed to him that
the judgement in the Wigg-Cochrane case was wrong in law and that his con-
science could not allow him to die without discharging the painful duty of
admitting his error. The Marquess of Reading then rose to suggest that the
Privy Council be asked to reconsider the opinion expressed earlier and thus
allow the error to be corrected without the necessity of legislation and
debate.128 Cave had indeed been troubled about the Wigg-Cochrane case, not
because it was wrong but because a draftsman had made an error in the
written judgement referring to the question of the mode of calculating the
bonus and the date on which the civil service had actually been transferred.
On the essential point of the rightness of Meredith’s judgement, Cave had sig-
nalled no doubts whatever. But, having died in late March, he was not there
to contradict Birkenhead.129 Rather than insisting that the law in the Irish
Free State is that of its Supreme Court the Irish government allowed itself to
be persuaded to return once again to plead in a court it had already rejected
as bad, useless and an infringement of national sovereignty. Once again the
Privy Council heard the case and once again, contrary to the naive expecta-
tions of both governments, it found for Wigg-Cochrane and against the Irish
executive.130
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The first revision to the Treaty
The government might fulminate that the civil servants were not going to get
a farthing more than they were entitled to under the Supreme Court decision
but clearly the pension entitlements of transferred officers needed to be taken
out of the courts and dealt with by legislation. Any legislation would have to be
agreed between the Irish government, the British government (because any
new law on Article 10 would be a renegotiation of the Treaty) and the trans-
ferred Irish civil servants (to persuade them to abandon further litigation).
Finally, reluctantly and with bad grace the Irish government sat down to nego-
tiate with, rather than bully, the civil service.131
Complex negotiations began between the Irish government and TOPA and
between the Irish government and the British government.132 The result of
these negotiations was the Civil Servants (Transferred Officers) Compensation
Act, 1929. This act was paralleled by the British Irish Free State (Confirmation
of Agreement) Act, 1929 [20 Geo. 5, c. 4]. These two Acts were, in constitu-
tional terms, a renegotiation of Article 10 of the Treaty by the British and Irish
governments by which the Irish government conceded the better terms won by
the Wigg-Cochrane case and the British government agreed to repay to the
Irish government the additional moneys involved.133 This little-known case
was in fact the first revision of the hitherto sacrosanct Treaty.
Under the 1929 Act a statutory committee of a judge, representatives of the
Minister of Finance and representatives of the transferred officers, was estab-
lished with sole jurisdiction to determine compensation under Article 10.
Written into the Act were the retirement conditions of the 1920 Act, thus secur-
ing the better terms of the 1920 Act for civil servants. Picking up the cost of
these higher awards was the British government who agreed to compensate the
Irish government for the ‘excess’.134 Thus honour was saved and the Irish, if not
the British, public purse left no lighter after nearly ten years of litigation and
frustration. Finally a definite resolution had emerged to the whole vexed issue
of civil service pensions but it left a residue of hostility to the civil service within
the Dáil and public opinion.135
The Wigg-Cochrane case spurred on the government to mount a consistent
attack at the Commonwealth conference on the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council as a court ‘obnoxious because it is an extra-State institution exer-
cising judicial control over the internal affairs of the State without any form of
democratic sanction’.136 During the debate on the Civil Service (Transferred
Officers) Compensation Act Blythe had argued that the bad decision in the
Wigg-Cochrane appeal illustrated the anti-Irish bias on the English bench and
that it ‘has become more and more clear every day that this appeal to the Privy
Council is an anomaly’.137 The British government refused to yield to demands
to abolish the appeal to the Privy Council, the last institution that made the
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Commonwealth a legal rather than simply a diplomatic unit and it was a
Fianna Fáil government that finally abolished the right to appeal in 1933.138
The compensation panel finally assembled in early January 1930 under Judge
Cahir Davitt, the son of the Land League founder and a judge in the revolu-
tionary courts of the 1919–22 period. The tribunal expected to deal with about
1,600 cases, many of them of civil servants who had retired but whose com-
pensation and pensions had been delayed by the Wigg-Cochrane case.139 Blythe
appointed Messrs Boland, Doolin, Redmond and Leydon to represent the
Department of Finance. A panel of twenty-five nominees represented the civil
service trade unions and organisations.140 In dealing with any case the court was
limited to five members, two each for the department and the civil service along
with Davitt the chairman. The very first case was the high profile Drennan, the
secretary of the Land Commission. Judge Davitt treated his case with great
courtesy and care. However, as the months dragged on and the cases of the lower
ranks of the civil service were being dealt with, the tone of Judge Davitt became
more caustic and sneering. As he was a government appointee there is no reason
to doubt that in this he was faithfully reflecting the official mind.141 Lowly
postmen and junior civil servants, many of them women, had to endure
sarcasm and heckling from Judge Davitt. He rubbished the logical argument
that as the Fianna Fáil party were committed to destroying the Treaty, and as
they were likely to form the next government, it was reasonable to assume that
the guarantees contained in Article 10 would not long survive such a change of
government.142 Davitt was particularly sneering when dealing with the stock
claim made by nearly all applicants (who echoed mantra-like the phrase of
Article 10) that their wish to retire was ‘in consequence of the change of gov-
ernment’. The national and provincial press picked up and echoed his hostility.
The Clare Champion editorialised against the ‘lickspittle British-backed civil
servants’ as offering gratuitous insults to the elected representatives of the
‘unfortunate people who will have to pay out to them money that has not been
earned’.143 It was true most of the applicants simply wanted to seize an oppor-
tunity that few would let pass, to retire early on a decent pension and enjoy a
life of leisure. However, there was also a general feeling that the service had
become degraded, supervision stricter (if not bullying), hours longer and pay
shorter under the Free State with every sign that the future under Fianna Fáil
would be worse. As one inarticulate woman telegraphist, who simply wanted
out, put it ‘it is atmospheric conditions’.144 Davitt was ruthless in interpreting
the terms under which retirement was claimed and the civil service unions, who
had bought in, could not opt out. By the end of March the court had heard 461
cases and allowed only 250, rejecting 160 with 51 withdrawn. Thus nearly one
half of all cases ended up either withdrawn or rejected.145
The complaints of the civil servants at the Davitt court reflect the transfor-
mation of the Irish civil service from an informal, casual and poorly supervised
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collection of boards to a centralised and ruthlessly driven State machine. The
nostalgia that many felt for the old days of the British regime was, however,
misplaced for those days had long passed in Britain as well. The Whitley
Councils were far less successful than the Irish civil service liked to imagine.
Meetings were either chilly gatherings of the mute or red hot rows due to
official side resistance to the whole concept of negotiation.146 Nor was the gain
of a civil service arbitration board any more useful than the Whitley Councils.
In 1922 the ‘Geddes Axe’ that aimed to secure cuts in government costs simply
and unilaterally abolished the arbitration board.147 It was restored in 1925 after
a political campaign by the civil service unions, but without official side appro-
bation it proved ineffective.148
The time and effort of the Wigg-Cochrane case had the effect of identifying
the civil service organisations with those civil servants who were retiring and
making them seem of little relevance to the vast majority that were staying on.
The CSCA, which was the largest organisation of the lower grades, virtually
ignored the judgement. Civil service organisations had won the battle on the
rights of retiring civil servants, but lost the war on the rights of those who con-
tinued to serve. As soon as the case was won the pillar upon which civil service
unity had been built collapsed, undermined by the extent of its success. The
Privy Council awarded the civil servants all of the costs incurred in fighting the
case. The Irish Treaty Pensioners’ Association, which had initiated and first put
up funding for the struggle, accused TOPA of pocketing the award of costs
and allowing the Pensioners’ Association share to ‘go west’. The IPCS in turn
 sneeringly described the Pensioners’ Association as a bankrupt organisation
dependent on the ‘serving service’ to find the money to establish its right to
jump ship and retire on pension.149
Notes
1 Laffan, The Resurrection of Ireland, pp. 420–2.
2 Of the 153 seats in Dáil Éireann Cumann na nGaedhael won 63 in 1923, 47 in June
1927 and 62 in September 1927.
3 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 4, col. 1168, 20 July 1923.
4 NAI, G1/1, minutes of the Provisional Government, 20 Jan. 1922.
5 NAI, G1/2and 3, minutes of the Provisional Government, 21 Apr., 26 Oct. 1922;
Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 2, cols 1654–5, 23 Feb. 1923; vol. 3, col. 2455, 26 June
1923; NAI, Department of Finance, E109/43/32 and E114/1/29, ‘Victimised civil
servants’.
6 NAI, Department of Finance, E109/43/32.
7 NAI, Department of Finance, ‘early E files’, E85/116(iii), ‘Reinstated civil servants’,
circular 54/23, 18 Dec. 1923.
8 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 5, col. 1743, 14 Nov. 1923.
9 Ibid., vol. 5, col. 1218, 23 Nov. 1923.
Cumann na nGaedheal, 1923–32 195
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:10  Page 195
10 NAI, G2/2, executive council minutes, 8 May 1923; Iris, 1:6 (June 1923).
11 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 4, cols 1507–10, 26 July 1923.
12 Ibid, vol. 5, cols 1233–48, 23 Nov. 1923.
13 Ibid., vol. 6, col. 1464, 27 Feb. 1924.
14 NAI, G2/3, executive council minutes, 9 Jan. 1924.
15 Donal O’Sullivan, The Irish Free State and Its Senate: A Study in Contemporary
Politics (London, 1940), pp. 208–9.
16 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 10, cols 194–5, 13 Feb. 1925.
17 UCDAD, Fitzgerald Papers, P80/1057.
18 NAI, G2/3, executive council minutes, 21 Jan. 1924.
19 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 5, col. 1500, 6 Dec. 1923.
20 Ibid., vol. 5 col. 919, 16 Nov. 1923.
21 Ibid., vol. 5, col. 1021, 21 Nov. 1923.
22 Seanad Éireann debates, vol. 2, cols 1096–103, 19 Mar. 1924.
23 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 5, col. 1389, 5 Dec. 1923; Seanad Éireann debates, vol. 2,
col. 1100, 19 Mar. 1924.
24 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 5, cols 1634–64, 11 Dec. 1923.
25 Ibid., vol. 5, col. 1661, 11 Dec. 1923.
26 Regan, Counter-revolution, p. 200.
27 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 5, col. 1525, 6 Dec. 1923.
28 Ibid., vol. 5, col. 1649, 11 Dec. 1923.
29 Ibid., vol. 5, col. 1651, 11 Dec. 1923.
30 Treasonable Offences Act, 1925, section 3, sub-section (1) (f).
31 NAI, Department of Finance, E125/13/27.
32 J. Anthony Gaughan, Thomas Johnson 1872–1963 (Dublin, 1980), p. 225.
33 NAI, Brennan Commission, BC/1, ‘3 Nov. 1932’.
34 NLI, Brennan Papers, MS 26,313.
35 UCDAD, Patrick McGilligan Papers, P35a/31.
36 NAI, Department of Finance, E109/30/46 [2002/57/155], ‘Notes on British gov-
ernment publications’, Aug. 1946.
37 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 5, cols 1233–48, 23 Nov. 1923; vol. 13, col. 244, 12 Nov.,
cols 503–43, 18 Nov., cols 859–902, 25 Nov. 1925.
38 Ibid., vol. 8, cols 1401–47, 16 July 1924, committee on finance, estimates.
39 Ibid., vol. 12, cols 1382–1410, 19 July 1925, for Blythe’s comments on the civil ser-
vants in finance during the estimates debate.
40 Sweeney, In Public Service, p. 33.
41 IPCS, executive council minutes, 13 and 17 Feb., 21 and 27 Apr., 8 Aug., 6 Oct. 1922.
42 Iris, 2:4 (April 1924).
43 Iris, most editions through 1923 and 1924 record the loss of an officer in the lead-
ership of an association.
44 NAI, Department of Finance, ‘early E files’, E18/7, ‘Gregg to President’, Apr. 1923.
45 UCDAD, Kennedy Papers, P4/238(1); NAI, Department of Finance, ‘early E files’,
Wylie committee register.
46 NAI, Department of Finance, ‘early E files’, E2/58; E18/21; Gallagher, ‘Memoirs of
a civil servant’, pp. 84–5.
196 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:10  Page 196
47 IPCS, council minutes, 10 Feb. 1926.
48 E.g. Iris, 2:4 (Apr. 1924), ‘Statement for the information of members of the
Oireachtas’; 2:6 (June 1924), ‘Circular to members of Dáil Éireann’.
49 Iris, 3:6 (June 1925).
50 Irish Labour History Museum and Archive (ILHS), ILPTUC, annual report and
conference, 1920–27; WUMRC, Customs and Excise Federation, executive
 committee minutes, 19 Jan. 1922.
51 Iris (June–July 1925).
52 NAI, Department of Taoiseach, S.6247/FO/1, ‘Memo on civil service by
Department of Finance’, Apr. 1932.
53 John Campbell, ‘A loosely Shackled Fellowship’: The History of Comhaltas Cána
(Dublin, 1980), pp. 126, 141.
54 Mary E. Daly, Industrial development and Irish National Identity, 1922–1939 (New
York, 1992), p. 14.
55 NAI, G2/2, executive council minutes, 12 May 1923.
56 NAI, G2/3, executive council minutes, 27 Oct. 1923.
57 NAI, FIN1/826/2, reply to circular F4/PMG.
58 Ibid., FIN1/826/5–6, financial statements, 5 Oct., 2 Nov. 1923.
59 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 1, col. 1367, 6 Oct. 1922.
60 Arthur Mitchell, Labour in Irish Politics 1890–1930: The Irish Labour Movement in
an Age of Revolution (Dublin, 1974), pp. 181–2.
61 NAI, G2/3 and 4, cabinet minutes, 15 May, 10 Oct. 1924.
62 NAI, Brennan Commission, BC/1, ‘Evidence of H.P. Boland’, 24 Nov. 1932, p. 9.
63 NAI, Department of Finance, E101/7/25.
64 UCDAD, Blythe Papers, P24/376, ‘Differential in pay of women in the civil
service’.
65 NAI, Department of Finance, E101/7/25, ‘PSO’H to HPB’, 30 May 1925.
66 NAI, Department of Finance, E100/3/26.
67 Civil Service Federation, Statement Concerning Proposed Alterations in the
Regulations Governing the Employment of Saorstát Civil Servants (1924).
68 NAI, Department of Finance, E101/7/25.
69 WUMRC, Customs and Excise Federation, executive committee minutes, 25–6
Oct. 1922.
70 Iris, 1:4 (Apr. 1923); IPCS, council minutes, 23 Feb., 23 Mar., 12 Apr., 2 and 14
May, 23 June 1923.
71 Iris, 1:4 (Apr. 1923).
72 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 8, cols 1028–9, 10 July 1924, cols 1540–2200, 17 July
1924.
73 NAI, Department of the Taoiseach, S.6247/FO/1.
74 Iris, 2:1 (Jan. 1924).
75 NAI, Department of Finance, circular 48/24; Iris, 3:1 (Jan. 1925); UCDAD,
McGilligan Papers, P35a/31.
76 Iris, 3:2 (Feb. 1925); Civic and Public Services Union (CPSU), CSCA, executive
committee minutes, 23 Jan. 1925; IPCS, council minutes, 3 and 17 Feb., 23 Mar.
1925.
Cumann na nGaedheal, 1923–32 197
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:10  Page 197
77 CPSU, CSCA, executive committee minutes, 5 June 1925.
78 NAI, Department of Finance, E107/12/25, ‘Circular no.10/26’.
79 Iris, 3:5 (May 1925); IPCS, council minutes, 23 June 1925, minutes of 6th AGM, 20
Apr. 1926; Sweeney, In Public Service, pp. 45–8.
80 CPSU, CSCA, executive council minutes, 4 Mar. 1927.
81 Ibid., 15 July, 12 Dec. 1927; IPCS council minutes, 7 Jan., 14 Feb., 4 Apr. 1927;
Sweeney, In Public Service, p. 46–8; NAI, Department of the Taoiseach,
S.6247/FO/1.
82 NAI, Department of Finance, E107/12/25; NAI, Brennan Commission, BC/1,
‘Finance memorandum section vi’, 20 Jan. 1933.
83 Seanad Éireann debates, vol.13, col 27, 20 Nov. 1929.
84 IPCS, council minutes, 6 and 25 Oct. 1922.
85 Ibid., 6 Dec. 1922; 17 Jan. 1923.
86 Iris, 1:1 (Jan. 1923); Wigg and Another v. Attorney-General of the Irish Free State,
No. 29 of 1926 in the Privy Council, pp. 46–102.
87 NA, T158/7, ‘Waterfield to Cole, Whitehall, 20 Jan. 1922’.
88 IPCS, council minutes, 22 Jan., 23 Mar. 1923.
89 Ibid., 11 Jan., 4 Oct. 1923.
90 Irish Treaty Pensioners’ Association, Pensions and Compensation Guarantee of the
British Government (Dublin, n.d. 1923?).
91 Wigg and Another, writ of summons, 16 Nov. 1923.
92 Ibid.; Iris, 2:8 (Aug. 1924), ‘AEO notes’.
93 Iris, 2:8 (Aug. 1924), ‘Compensation committee notes’.
94 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 8, cols 1249–50, 15 July 1924.
95 NAI, Department of Finance, E109/13/26, ‘Superannuation payable under article
10 as at 1 Dec. 1925’.
96 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 5, cols 877–8, 15 Nov. 1923.
97 Ibid., vol. 11, 14 May 1925, Questions.
98 IPCS, council minutes, 4 Oct., 5 Nov. 1923.
99 Iris, 1:7 (July 1923).
100 IPCS, council minutes, 3 Oct. 1924; 17 Feb. 1925; Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 9, cols
642, 1394, 4 and 21 Nov. 1924; vol. 11, 14 May 1925, Questions; vol.12, cols1390,
1403, 19 June 1925.
101 IPCS, council minutes, 25 Nov. 1924.
102 ILHS, MS 10/TOPA/1–3 [TOPA records are part of the deposition of the
Communications Workers’ Union]; IPCS, council minutes, 17 Feb., 23 Mar., 9
Apr. 1925.
103 ILHS, MS 10/TOPA/1; Iris, 3:5 (May 1925).
104 ILHS, William Norton Papers, ‘Rough drafts of a constitution and circulars for a
treaty officers association’.
105 ILHS, MS 10/TOPA/1.
106 Iris, 3:11 (Nov. 1925).
107 Niamh Brennan, ‘Compensating southern Irish loyalists after the Anglo-Irish
Treaty, 1922–32’ Ph.D UCD1994, chapter 4.
108 Wigg-Cochrane, judgement of Mr Justice Johnston, 1 Apr. 1925.
198 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:10  Page 198
109 ILHS, MS 10/ TOPA/, ‘Opinion of counsel A. Alfred Dickie’; Iris, 3:6 (June 1925),
‘Article 10 of the Treaty’.
110 IPCS, council minutes, 14 June 1924; CPSU, CSCA, executive council minutes, 10
July 1925; Iris, 3:8 (Aug. 1925), ‘CSCA notes’.
111 NA, CAB 43/1, S.F. (B) 30th conclusions; ‘Conclusions of a meeting of the British
signatories to the treaty . . . 15 Jun. 1922’.
112 HLRO, Bonar Law Papers, 114/1/43, ‘Memo on IFS constitution’.
113 NA, CAB 23/30, ‘Cabinet 31(22) 1 June 1922, Irish situation’.
114 D.W. Harkness, The Restless Dominion: The Irish Free State and the British
Commonwealth of Nations 1921–31 (London, 1969), p. 9.
115 NA, CAB 23/30, cabinet conclusion 32(22) 2 June 1922; CAB 43/1, ‘Conclusions
of a meeting of British signatories, 10 Oct. 1922’.
116 Oxford, Bodleian Library, Curtis Papers, MS 90, fols 24–8.
117 Douglas, Memoirs of James G. Douglas, pp. 123–4.
118 Harkness, Restless Dominion, p. 81.
119 Times Law Reports, 1926–27, vol. XLIII, pp. 457–60.
120 WUMRC, MSS 232, Civil Service Confederation, annual reports, 1927–28, 1928–29.
121 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 18, cols 727–8, 23 Feb. 1927, Questions.
122 Ibid., vol. 18, col. 385, 8 Feb. 1927.
123 Ibid., vol. 19, 20 May 1927, private notice questions.
124 WUMRC, MSS 232, Civil Service Confederation, seventh annual report 1927–28.
125 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 22, col. 109, 22 Feb. 1928.
126 Red Tape, 17:199 (Apr. 1928).
127 WUMRC, MSS 232, Civil Service Confederation, half-yearly report 1928.
128 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 70:25, cols 808–55, 25 Apr. 1928.
129 R.V.F. Heuston, Lives of the Lord Chancellors 1885–1940 (London, 1964),
pp. 440–3.
130 Irish Law Times and Solicitor’s Journal, 62 (16 Feb. 1929), pp. 109–15; WUMRC,
MSS 232, Civil Service Confederation, eighth annual report 1928–29; Irish Times,
14 Nov. 1928.
131 Seanad Éireann debates, vol. 13, cols 26–35, 20 Nov. 1929 for Senator Johnson’s
caustic and ironic history of the government’s actions.
132 WUMRC, MSS 232, Civil Service Confederation, eighth annual report 1928–29;
IPCS, council minutes, 9 Mar., 11 Dec. 1928; 12 Apr., 17 June 1929.
133 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), vol. 229, no.11, cols 1218–24, 11 July 1929;
Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 31, cols 928–33, 11 July 1929; NAI, Department of the
Taoiseach, S.5459; NAI, CAB 1/2, 26 Mar. 1928, Wigg-Cochrane case.
134 ILHS, MS 10/TOPA/1–3; Parliamentary debates (Commons), vol. 229, no. 11, cols
1218–24, 11 July 1929.
135 NLI, Thomas Johnson Papers, MS 17,171, ‘Irish civil servants compensation
1928’.
136 Harkness, Restless Dominion, pp. 178–9.
137 Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 13, cols 45–7, 20 Nov. 1929.
138 Deirdre McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s
(New Haven, 1984), pp. 128–35.
Cumann na nGaedheal, 1923–32 199
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:10  Page 199
139 UCDAD, Kennedy Papers, P4/1228(1).
140 UCDAD, Fitzgerald Papers, P80/963; Irish Times, 7 Jan. 1930.
141 Irishman, 1 Mar. 1930.
142 Irish Times, 28 Feb. 1930.
143 ILHS, TOPA files, newscuttings, Clare Champion, 15 Mar. 1930.
144 Irish Independent, 21 Feb. 1930.
145 Ibid., 29 Mar. 1930.
146 WUMRC, MSS 296, National Whitley Council (staff side) minutes 18th meeting,
25 June 1923.
147 NA, CAB 23/29, ‘Cabinet conclusion civil service arbitration board, 20 Jan. 1922’.
148 Mortimer and Ellis, A Professional Union, pp. 26–33.
149 ILHS, MS 10/TOPA/1–3, letters between Scales of the ITPA and Irvine of the IPCS,
11 May 1928–12 Jan. 1929.
200 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:10  Page 200
6Fianna Fáil and the civil service, 1932–38
Introduction
F ´  the Irish electorate a synthesis of radical eco-nomic, social and constitutional change. It came to power as a republican
party with a mandate to dismantle the Treaty as the constitutional basis of the
Irish Free State, advance the gaelicisation of Irish society and secure the
national economy through an autarchic policy of national self-sufficiency. In
what was now in fact a two-party system Fianna Fáil was also seen as less hide-
bound than the Cumann na nGaedheal party and more ready to take radical
action against the poverty and economic decline that was undermining public
morale. The civil service had particular reason to welcome a Fianna Fáil gov-
ernment as the party deliberately courted its support with promises of an arbi-
tration system to address its grievances. The promise of dynamic State action
also signalled a central role for the civil service under a Fianna Fáil government.
At the very least the Fianna Fáil party did not indulge in the anti-civil service
rhetoric of the Cumann na nGaedheal government. The civil service could rea-
sonably hope for a new, less confrontational relationship binding it to the Irish
State.
The renewed campaign on pay
The year 1931 was one of reinvigorated organisation and protest in the Irish
civil service. The renewal of campaigning was a response to economic depres-
sion, the example of successful agitation by British civil servants and the
prospect of a general election in which the pay and conditions of civil servants
would be an issue. In 1931 the economic situation in Ireland was bleak. The
1929 Wall Street crash had become a global depression cutting off emigration,
then running at 33,000 a year, thereby raising unemployment. A bad harvest,
stagnation in trade and a decline in tax revenues led to fears of a budgetary
crisis. The Department of Finance urged reductions in pensions and in the pay
of teachers, civil guards and the army both as a step toward a balanced budget
and as a signal to employers to reduce pay and salaries in the private sector.1
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In Britain, in response to civil service agitation, the Labour minority gov-
ernment elected in 1929 set up the Tomlin Royal Commission to inquire into
and report on the structure and organisation of the civil service, its recruitment
and remuneration; on differential rates of pay for men and for women; on arbi-
tration machinery; and on conditions of retirement from the civil service.
While the Tomlin committee investigation continued the Chancellor of the
Exchequer agreed to postpone the reduction in bonus due when the British
cost-of-living figure fell from sixty-five to sixty. Many of the Irish civil servants
still looked to the British service, from which they had been severed for less
than ten years, as the standard for comparisons in conditions and the model
for organisation. Hence the Tomlin Commission was followed closely and its
conclusions examined.2 Tomlin’s report, published in the summer of 1931, to
the bitter disappointment of the British civil service, rejected almost all of their
claims. However, on the issue of the war bonus Tomlin accepted that analogous
employments outside the civil service did not have their salaries fluctuating in
accordance with changes in the cost of living and that there was no good reason
for continuing to fix the wages of the civil service on a basis different to that
generally adopted in other employments. He recommended that the bonus
system should be abolished and the bonus and basic pay be consolidated into
a single salary. For civil servants in Ireland watching the British agitation this
in itself was a significant advance and one they were determined to achieve for
themselves.
The renewed agitation within the Irish civil service was driven by William
Norton of the POWU, Archie Heron of the CSCA and T.J. Hughes of the CSF,
who all jointly led the cross-service Cost-of-Living Bonus Joint Committee.
More than anything else it was the campaign for a fairer bonus that forged
unity and fighting spirit across the civil service. Archie Heron, a northern
Protestant, republican veteran of 1916 and a Labour Party activist married to
James Connolly’s daughter Ina, was appointed the full-time general-secretary
of the CSCA in December 1928.3 The appointment of Heron was in response
to the subtle, and less than subtle, intimidation visited on the CSCA executive
by H.P. Boland. It was felt that a permanent general-secretary would be free to
talk as an equal with the senior civil servants. The CSCA also decided to publish
a monthly journal as a vehicle for information and to heighten its profile.4 The
journal, An Peann, was a quality production with regular reports on branches,
executive council meetings, and meetings with officials, coverage of Dáil
reports, updates on the fortunes of civil service in other countries, pieces in
Gaelic and regular reports of civil service sports activity.
Together Norton, Hughes and Heron adopted a more confrontational and
public campaign against the government. They organised a mass demonstra-
tion by the civil service in opposition to the government cuts in the cost-of-
living bonus.5 In December 1929 Norton invited Heron and Hughes, along
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with the IPCS, to join together in a new permanent Joint Council of Civil
Service Organisations.6 The emergence of Norton and Heron as leaders marks
a new strategy for civil service agitation. In the absence of an arbitration forum
they decided that the issue of the cost-of-living bonus would be politicised by
lobbying TDs to support the single demand for a new calculation of the bonus
figure. Blythe was to be harassed by the constant questioning of sympathetic,
well-briefed Labour and other deputies. An Peann urged all civil servants to
question candidates in the next general election on their attitudes and policies
on civil service pay, an action that was censured by the cabinet as overtly
 political.7 At the same time a publicity campaign on civil service pay and con-
ditions was launched aimed at the newspapers to educate public opinion. The
Department of Finance was sufficiently alarmed at this very public washing
of dirty linen to caution the civil service representatives not to write to the
press on official matters. This clumsy attempt at censorship was immediately
 published in the civil service journal Iris.8
In August 1930 a cross-party deputation of TDs and senators met the
Minister for Finance to urge that he meet the cross-service Joint Committee.
The delegation included Peader Doyle and T.P. Hennessy from Cumann na
nGaedheal, Sean Lemass and Gerry Boland from Fianna Fáil, and T.J. O’Connell
and Senator Johnson of the Labour Party.9 Blythe, while indicating a willing-
ness to discuss these issues with the civil service, stuck by his refusal to meet any
representative of the civil service who was not himself a civil servant. The
problem was that Archie Heron and William Norton were both full-time union
organisers, and not civil servants. Blythe maintained that as non-civil servants
they would have access to confidential information but would not be bound
by the rules of secrecy and disclosure that ordinarily covered public servants.
The more pressing reason was that, as was becoming evident, both Heron
and Norton were gifted organisers and skilled negotiators.10 H.P. Boland,
who clearly had a fetish about controlling access to the minister, had suggested
that the service representation might be recast on the model of Northern
Ireland. There the departments directly elected their delegates, emasculating the
associations.11
The campaigns around which the civil service was successfully building a
new cross-service unity concerned, firstly, the operation of the ‘war bonus’ and,
secondly, the demand for an arbitration board. When the bonus had been first
determined in 1920 it stood at 130, that is the purchasing power of £100 in 1914
was represented by £230 in 1920. However, only the lower civil service salaries
were fully compensated for this inflation by a bonus of 130 per cent. As part of
the contribution of the civil service to restoring the national economy, higher
officers had their bonus reduced therefore forgoing full compensation. Only
the first £91 5s 0d of a civil servant’s salary attracted the full 130 per cent bonus;
the next £108 15s 0d received 60 per cent and the next £300 0s 0d received 45
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per cent. These rates had been further cut by the ‘supercut’ of September 1921.
The bonus had risen initially but with the onset of the post-war depression, and
especially as prices collapsed after the Wall Street crash, the bonus had fallen.
A civil servant on a basic salary of £300 had, in July 1920, an inclusive salary of
£537 because of the application of the war bonus. By July 1925 that had fallen
to an inclusive salary of £467. A civil servant on a basic salary of £500 in July
1920 got an inclusive salary of £831. By July 1925 this had fallen to £733. Thus
civil servants’ actual income had declined year on year since the foundation of
the State. This decline had initially been most severe for those on higher salaries
because of the ‘supercut’ of 1921 but since then the application of periodic per-
centage cuts, rather than lump sum cuts, had particularly hit the lower paid. In
addition the civil service, since the foundation of the State, had to accept the
general increase in income taxation and longer hours of work with shorter hol-
idays.12 An extraordinary innovation was introduced in 1925 when the gov-
ernment imposed a differential scale for married and unmarried civil servants
whereby single men and women were paid less than married men, who also got
an additional allowance for any children.13
In March 1931 the Labour deputies Richard Sidney Anthony of Cork
Borough and William Davin of Leix-Offaly brought to the Dáil a motion ‘that
in view of the discontent prevalent amongst the lower grades in the Civil
Service, the Dáil is of the opinion that the Executive Council should set up a
Commission of Enquiry to investigate and report on the present method of
computation of the cost-of-living bonus and its application to civil servants’
salaries and wages’.14 Fianna Fáil had straddled the fence in the populist anti-
civil servant campaigns being driven by provincial newspapers, farmer organ-
isations, chambers of commerce and some local authorities, by combining
attacks on the pay of higher civil servants with sympathy for the lowly pay of
the clerical staff under them. In February 1929 the party newspaper the Nation,
while insisting on the absolute necessity of reductions in the size and cost of
the public service, using 1914 as the datum line for numbers and salaries, was
sure that cuts of a general application were more welcome than ‘the dismissal
of some poor struggling, perhaps temporary, officials’.15 In the Dáil debate on
the Anthony and Davin motion it was the Fianna Fáil speakers who made the
best speeches. Anthony tended to ramble off the subject and be repetitive in his
speech though he did manage to make the point that the fundamental problem
was the absence of any acceptable form of conciliation and arbitration within
the civil service. MacEntee and Lemass spoke on the Fianna Fáil side in
speeches that were sharply focused and well researched. MacEntee made the
point that an inequitable method for calculating the government’s cost-of-
living figures had an impact on the industrial relations between all employers
and employees throughout the country and not just within the State service.
He then went on to discuss the historic roots of the cost-of-living figure to show
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that it never had any scientific or defensible method for its calculation, that it
was based on the household accounts of a few unrepresentative working-class
families, that a representative budget from the household of a civil servant had
not been attempted and that the demand that it be re-examined was therefore
eminently reasonable. Lemass in turn attacked the fact that the minister, by
refusing to deal with the service in a reasonable manner and create acceptable
forms of arbitration, had forced the civil service into public agitation and
allowed the question to be politicised. Both Fianna Fáil speakers drew a dis-
tinction between what MacEntee called the ‘privates and corporals in the
cuff and collar brigade’ and the higher civil servants. Lemass, pointing out
thatthough the lower grades were being shabbily treated many of the higher
civil servants were being paid far too much, explicitly gave it as party policy that
the party would seek to level out salaries. Blythe and Gilligan, the Minister for
Industry and Commerce, spoke for the government. Blythe, perhaps still
smarting from the Wigg-Cochrane case, insisted that the cost-of-living bonus
was part of the inherited conditions of the transferred officers and that any
attempt to change it would simply unravel the whole issue of their Treaty
rights; good or bad they were stuck with it. That the Whitley Councils and the
arbitration board were also inherited conditions was ignored. The government
ministers both drove home the point that the civil servants’ real objective was
the restoration of the Whitley Councils or some equivalent empowering body
and this they were not going to get. The motion was defeated but the grievances
of the civil service got a good airing and Fianna Fáil gave every sign that a better
deal could be expected from them.16 The civil service demand for an investiga-
tion into the cost-of-living bonus and for an arbitration board had received a
degree of notice in the national newspapers.17 What the debate had failed to
clarify was that the objection of the civil service was not to the method of cal-
culating the bonus but rather to its application. In particular they objected
to the diminution in the upper end of salary scales by the reduction in the
 proportion of salary entitled to full compensation.
The civil service joint committee decided to step up the campaign against
the bonus cut through well-publicised mass meetings of the civil service.18
With the end of the seven-year transition period the Treaty right to retire ‘as a
consequence of the change of government’ had ended. The threat of mass res-
ignation, however unlikely it might have been in reality, was no longer avail-
able. The contractual relationship between the State and the civil service that
was enshrined in the Treaty was approaching the end of its useful life. If the
civil service was to achieve some control in laying a foundation for the rela-
tionship binding it to the State in the future it would have to create a united
campaign to make it a political issue. This was despite a consciousness of the
danger that political campaigns would pose to civil service traditions. The only
basis for such a campaign was pay. Pay, it was hoped, would open the door to
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reconstituting an arbitration board, restoring some measure of power over
their conditions to the civil service. With the Labour Party being supportive
and with the Fianna Fáil party not being hostile, it seemed achievable.
The plan for the agitation included high profile public meetings of the
impoverished wives and families of civil servants with advertisements in the
press, placards, sandwich men and handbills. With a further cut in the bonus
due at the beginning of September a mass meeting of civil servants was called
at the Metropolitan Hall in Abbey Street, Dublin. The meeting, addressed by
Norton, Hughes and Heron passed the motion that, ‘having regard to the hard-
ship involved, especially in the case of the lower-paid classes, calls for the sus-
pension of the impending reduction in the cost-of-living bonus and an
immediate inquiry into the cost-of-living index figure and its application to the
Civil Service’. The meeting also proposed that ‘steps should be taken to insti-
tute suitable conciliation and arbitration machinery for the Service’.19 The
journal of the CSCA, An Peann, maintained the campaign, carrying articles
and letters critical of the government record on pay and promotions and
urging members to come out in support of the Labour Party in the next general
election. The campaign focused on the demand for an inquiry into the war
bonus and the method of its calculation. It would have wiser, as we shall see, to
have concentrated on the application of the bonus, rather than its calculation.
Fianna Fáil in power
In November 1931 Blythe proposed to meet a projected deficit of £900,000 by
a combination of increased taxes and cuts in the salaries of the public service.
Before the cuts could be implemented the government dissolved the Dáil and
called a general election. The combined civil service associations sent a letter
to all the Dáil candidates asking whether, if elected, they would support
 arbitration for the civil service subject to the over-riding authority of the
Oireachtas. The governing Cumann na nGaedheal party campaigned on a
shrill law and order platform. Fianna Fáil on the other hand campaigned on
economic development, an end to emigration and full employment. As part of
this strategy of concentrating on economic problems, Fianna Fáil introduced
the threatened cuts in civil service pay as an election issue.20 In a speech in
Rathmines in Dublin South, a middle-class suburban constituency where
many civil servants lived and where Sean Lemass was the party candidate, de
Valera promised that though public service pay would have to be examined,
civil service salaries below £300 or £400 a year would not be cut. Furthermore
he stated it as his belief that ‘it is only right that there should be an Arbitration
Board for the Civil Service to deal with matters between the Service and
Executive. We would be prepared to agree that an Arbitration Board be set up
and would assent to an inquiry into the basis on which the cost-of-living bonus
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was calculated.’21 Fianna Fáil’s courting of the public service was in part a reas-
suring gesture toward civil service fears (fears that were shared with the army
and the police) that if elected it would be a target for attack by the former anti-
Treaty republicans. But it was primarily a shrewd attempt to win the support
of the massed lower ranks of an increasingly disgruntled civil service. The
threatened cuts in salaries, the generally sympathetic attitude of Fianna Fáil,
along with the promise of an arbitration board meant that most civil servants
welcomed the change of government in February 1932, especially as the minor-
ity Fianna Fáil government depended on the support of the Labour Party, now
led by William Norton of the POWU who was elected in Dublin.22
Speaking in the Dáil, Sean Lemass once described Fianna Fáil as the ‘slightly
constitutional’ party.23 Entry to power was quickly to prove that it was also only
slightly a revolutionary party. Initially de Valera moved to assure the senior civil
servants that he had no intention of dismissing any of them and that Fianna
Fáil were not about to introduce a spoils system into public service employ-
ment. De Valera was at the time under intense pressure from the IRA to purge
the civil service of the old regime.24 However, unlike the Cumann na nGaedheal
government, Fianna Fáil shared with the civil service associations a dislike of
the senior civil servants in the Department of Finance – men described by
MacEntee as ‘intensely hostile to Fianna Fáil . . . unalterably and fanatically
attached to the English interest’.25 In Tod Andrews’ more colourful description
they were seen as ‘a crowd of Free State bastards’.26 De Valera was himself afraid
that the civil service would not co-operate with a Fianna Fáil government and
had prepared a list of former students of Blackrock and Rockwell Colleges, now
in the civil service, on whom he felt he could rely.27 John Moynihan, assistant
editor of the Irish Press and not a civil servant, was brought in to head the pres-
ident’s department.28 But in fact the only civil servant dismissed by Fianna Fáil
was E.P. McCarron, secretary of the Department of Local Government. But
that was not until late in 1936 and reflected personal difficulties with his
 minister rather than with the government.29
Fianna Fáil did move quickly to placate one group, the dismissed civil ser-
vants of the civil war period. After the most cursory examination of their case
a committee reinstated those civil servants of republican sympathies who had
been dismissed or had resigned from the British government, or from Dáil
Éireann, the Provisional Government or the Irish Free State.30 The declaration
of allegiance to the State that had been demanded of civil servants was
dropped. Also the preference that had been accorded to ex-members of the
army in public service employment was discontinued.31 Many civil servants
welcomed indications of the end of the dominance that the Department of
Finance previously enjoyed.32 The May 1932 budget, far from retrenching,
promised increases in road-building, housing, unemployment benefit and
pensions.
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The Johnson and Brennan inquiries
The Fianna Fáil government moved to meet their commitments to the civil
service on the bonus and on an arbitration board. Already it seemed that a
more egalitarian and open relationship between civil service and State was
being created. Two inquiries were announced, a committee to inquire into the
principles and methods of the calculation of the cost-of-living index figure
under Senator Thomas Johnson, the former Labour Party leader, and a com-
mission to inquire into ‘the method by which arbitration can best be applied
for the settlement of questions relating to pay and conditions of service’
under Joseph Brennan, former secretary of the Department of Finance.33 The
Department of Finance had tried to limit the brief of the Brennan Commission
to ‘the machinery for discussion and settlement of questions relating to pay
and other conditions of service’ so the explicit reference to arbitration seemed
to signal a victory for the staff over the department.34
The promise, as it seemed, of a new era of State-civil service relations gal-
vanised the civil service associations. The CSCA now dominated the organisa-
tion of the lower grades. The POWU had of course their own general-secretary
Norton elected to the Dáil. The IPCS April 1932 annual general meeting saw
earnest speeches on the valuable contribution made by civil servants to the
State and a long discussion on the future policy of the Institution. Membership
numbers began to climb again with new members joining from across the
service.35 The IPCS met with the CSF to compare their proposals for an arbi-
tration scheme and bring them both into line so as to ensure the maximum of
cross-service unanimity in meetings with the Brennan Commission. At the
same time the IPCS executive circularised the membership to obtain data on
family budgets and increased costs since 1922 for submission to the Johnson
committee.36
Neither of these commissions lived up to the hopes of the civil service. There
was disappointment that the Johnson inquiry had a narrow brief that pre-
cluded examining the application of the cost-of-living bonus rather than
simply its calculation. Any examination of its application would have to look
at the injustice of the reductions in bonus at the higher salaries. The campaign
by the civil service associations failed to make this distinction clear. Instead
their campaign seemed to suggest that they suffered because the index was
based on a working-class rather than middle-class budget with the attendant
extras of insurance, higher rents and the cost of maidservants.37
At the Brennan Commission hearings Boland worked to keep the discussion
confined to the abstract principle of determining responsibility within the
State for the civil service. He was quite prepared to admit that what he termed
‘the fleshpots of Whitleyism’ were of great value to the civil servant, but he was
also absolutely sure that it was bad for the State. The ability to make decisions
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ought to be reserved to the highest circles of the State (which now included
higher civil servants such as himself) and it would be unacceptable that lower
staff should have a hand in that process. The making of policy was a higher
function, its execution a lower function. It was in this light also that Boland
chose to explain the objection to a non-civil servant acting as a representative
of the civil service; he would be free to speak above his station. Boland also sug-
gested, without being explicit, that Whitleyism was a relic of the former British
regime and that the demand for it was primarily from transferred officers who
pined for the old days.
Boland was prepared to talk at length about the problems that might arise, but
it was clear that the main problem was there was no mechanism by which a non-
civil servant could be controlled by the State. To admit a right to the civil service
to decision-making, or to choosing its own representative, would be a surrender
of the absolute control of the civil service enjoyed by the State.38 Gordon
Campbell, secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce, was dismis-
sive of this abstract argument and was quite clear that the problem was the civil
service having no access to the minister, mainly because of Boland. Boland was
exceptionally autocratic in his attitude and dealings with the civil service. This
may have been a result of his First World War experience in Whitehall when the
Treasury had let control slip away with disastrous results, as he saw it. William
O’Brien, the doyen of the service, tended to agree with Campbell and cited the
view of the customs staff that the reports of the CSRC were always treated with
silent contempt by Boland in finance. O’Brien, who had run a department under
the old regime, felt that the administration of the Free State had become utterly
centralised under finance and matters that would have been decided at depart-
mental level before were now entirely in the hands of finance.39
The staff side representatives, on the other hand, kept their contributions
focused on concrete issues of salary levels and their determination. They
scotched Boland’s assertion that the civil service was well paid compared with
other similar employments, as well as the ‘article of faith’ that civil service con-
ditions were inherited from the British regime and preserved by Article 10 of
the Treaty and any interference would be unconstitutional. The view of the
association representatives was that the State ought to be a model employer.
The main problem so far as they were concerned was the dominance of the
Department of Finance on staff matters, which never looked beyond cost.
Their recommendation was a specialised department of the State should take
over but that the pay and conditions of the civil service should not be in the
hands of elected politicians. The model for arbitration that was available was
the Wylie compensation committee, which in their view worked efficiently and
to the satisfaction of staff and State.40
The civil service associations were thrown by the line of questioning that
they met at the hearings of the Brennan Commission. The terms of reference
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of the commission clearly implied that the principle of arbitration had been
conceded and that the job of the inquiry was simply to arrive at how arbitra-
tion would best operate. Instead the civil service representatives found them-
selves being compelled to argue the case for arbitration in principle. Brennan
in particular repeatedly threw in the point that under the constitution the
Executive Council bore responsibility to the Dáil for the administration of the
public service, a responsibility that could not be taken away, and therefore any
arbitration tribunal that bound the Executive Council to any payment without
the approval of the Dáil would be unconstitutional. In particular the responsi-
bility of the Minister for Finance for the budget would be compromised. In fact
the Brennan Commission had been thoroughly ‘stitched up’ by Brennan and
Boland. Brennan’s own correspondence shows that he and Boland were in
complete agreement that any form of arbitration would fatally undermine the
control that the department had over the civil service. By preparing and
rehearsing questions before the daily sittings of the commission Boland and
Brennan between them developed the strategy of the constitutional block
and used it ruthlessly to destroy the principle of arbitration, despite the prom-
ises of the Fianna Fáil government.41 The commission hearings thus turned
into a pantomime with Brennan and Boland having cosy chats on why arbi-
tration was constitutionally impossible and Brennan then aggressively accus-
ing the civil service representatives of attempting to make the Executive
Council act in an unconstitutional manner.42 It is worth noting that the cabinet
agreed to pay Boland a gratuity of £450 for his services to the Brennan
Commission, which suggests that the cabinet was not unhappy at his success
in undermining a government pledge.43 The IPCS soon recognised the futility
of the effort and decided early in the proceedings to make no further statement
to the commission.44
The Johnson committee proved as disappointing. Limited to the operation
of the cost-of-living figure Johnson was convinced by the argument of the civil
servants that the figure was based on a cost of living of a working-class rather
than a middle-class family. However, such a figure would not in fact alter the
final result of the calculation, the general tendency to fall was simply confirmed
via a different route. He recommended that a middle-class figure might be use-
fully compiled as a reassurance to the civil service and that alcoholic drink
ought to be added to the basket of goods used in reckoning the cost of living.
The Department of Finance was relieved at these findings. The real weakness
of the figure was that it was based on a countrywide computation that made
no allowance for the very significant difference between Dublin and the rest of
the country in, for instance, rent. The fear that Johnson might recommend a
separate figure for Dublin from that of the rest of the country was not borne
out. The department could delay on establishing the middle-class cost-of-
living figure in the expectation that the basic plus bonus salaries of the civil
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service would probably be consolidated into a single figure within ten years.
Effort could now concentrate on ensuring that consolidation occurred at the
lowest figure possible.45
‘No man is worth more than £1000’
The civil service associations did get their face-to-face meeting with the min-
ister, but in circumstances they had not expected. A decision by the govern-
ment to impose salary cuts created an unprecedented unity across the entire
civil service, embracing even their former nemesis Boland. The Irish land
annuities were repayments by Irish peasants of the loans made by the British
exchequer under the 1903 Land Act to facilitate tenants buying out their land-
lords. Under a secret agreement at the margins of the 1921 Treaty settlement
the Irish Free State had agreed to continue collecting the annuities and to trans-
fer the money to London. Fianna Fáil continued to collect the money but then
retained it in the Irish exchequer. The British government retaliated by impos-
ing a tariff on Irish cattle exported to Britain. This launched the ‘Economic
War’ of tariff and counter-tariff that threatened an immediate financial crisis.46
A cabinet committee recommended cuts in public service pay ranging from 2
per cent on a salary of £200 to a staggering 20 per cent on a salary of £1,500.47
These cuts were not simply reductions in the bonus but cuts in the basic
salaries, which had hitherto been sacrosanct. They cuts were not designed to
deliver any substantial savings to the exchequer, nor could they.48 Instead they
should be seen as an implementation of the long-standing Fianna Fáil axiom
of cheap government, frugal comfort and egalitarian poverty as the basis for
national revival. In the Dáil de Valera had threatened to ‘cut off the top hats’
and his belief that ‘no man is worth more than £1000’ was confirmed by the
experience of office. His first act as president of the executive was to reduce his
own and his ministers’ salaries.49 De Valera was a man who liked sacrifice. The
civil service would join the politicians as inspirational examples of frugality in
the national interest. The cuts in public service pay which the Cumann na
nGaedheal government had proposed as an economic measure were revived by
Fianna Fáil but now as a social measure designed to effect a general levelling of
incomes across Irish society.50 All branches of the State service were to experi-
ence reductions in pay. Those civil servants protected by Article 10 along with
the judiciary were to offer voluntary reductions.51
Not surprisingly the proposed cuts, contradicting as they did the whole
tenor of the election campaign and the promise of the Brennan and Johnson
inquiries, met with an implacable opposition from the civil service. Those
opposed included the most senior departmental heads in the civil service who
now found themselves on the receiving end of the rhetoric they had been deliv-
ering to their staff.52 The national school teachers, the police and the army all
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rejected the cuts and the chances of the judiciary volunteering to accept salary
cuts were immediately discounted.
In June MacEntee indicated to the civil service organisations that he would
be available to the CSRC to discuss staff reaction to the cuts if the POWU,
CSCA and the IPCS would rejoin the representative council.53 The three organ-
isations met to co-ordinate a response. The IPCS was very reluctant to re-enter
a representative council that they had already rejected as an inadequate forum
but because the issue of cuts was one that affected the whole service and was
therefore one on which a united cross-service fight was possible the decision
was made to rejoin. The CSCA were tempted if only because the minister had
raised no objection to Archie Heron being their delegate. The POWU, led by
William Norton, was now the only civil service association that still refused to
rejoin the CSRC. But with Norton now in the Dáil and with Fianna Fáil
needing the support of Labour, it may have seemed to the POWU that it had
the better forum for negotiation.54
Predictably the minister was unable to attend, although the presence of
McElligott, not Boland, in the chair did signal that the meeting was being
treated seriously. Hughes, Heron and Brunicardi objected that they had
returned to the CSRC and prepared statements on the assumption that the
minister would be present to hear them. Despite the soothing promises of
McElligott, Heron and the clerical officers’ delegation immediately left the
meeting but the IPCS delegation, while expressing their disappointment that
the minister was not present, decided to stay. Hughes of the Federation led the
attack on the proposed cuts. Sceptical of the assurances that the cuts would be
for one year only, he underlined the inconsistency of the government initiat-
ing two inquiries into the pay and conditions of the civil service while preju-
dicing any conclusion they might reach by imposing a salary cut. Brunicardi
dealt more briefly on the low rates of pay that the professional civil servants
received when compared to those in private practice, pointing out that the only
advantage that the State offered in return was certainty of income. With the
government now proposing to cut salaries this single assurance was now
worthless. What was perhaps surprising to the staff side representatives was the
vehemence with which the official side agreed with them in attacking the cuts,
although this was hardly unexpected as the official side was composed of the
most senior and highly paid civil servants in the government departments.
Henry O’Friel, who had refused to take an oath of allegiance to the Crown in
1918 and had been an active Sinn Féin judge and leader in Dublin County
Council, predicted that it would lead to a loss of the senior civil servants under
Article 10 retirements due to a worsening of conditions. Even Boland joined in
the attack. Boland was, however, still very nervous of the consequences of the
minister meeting the staff side and that the CSCA, an ‘aggressive’ association,
would succeed in its attempts to coerce the minister into future attendance.55
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At the next meeting of the representative council the staff representatives
finally got to meet the minister. With the minister in attendance the meeting
had representatives of the full spectrum of the civil service associations, includ-
ing Heron of the CSCA. The implication of the submission by the associations
was there would not be agreement for a voluntary cut and an imposed cut
would damage the public service and certainly lead to a large number of resig-
nations under Article 10. Again, despite the presence of the minister, the staff
side senior civil servants (including Boland) weighed in with substantial
reasons why the proposed cuts were unjust, unwise and would prove damag-
ing in the longer term. For his part MacEntee insisted that there would have to
be some cuts, ‘intensely distasteful’ as they might be.56
Faced with a wall of resistance the government shelved the cuts and estab-
lished another committee, essentially to gain time, charged with inquiring into
‘the facts and circumstances regarding the pay of each of the services . . . with a
view to definite recommendations being made to government as to what reduc-
tions could be made’ to achieve a reduction of £250,000 in the current year.57
The O’Connell ‘Cuts’ Committee, as it became known, included a cattle dealer
and two farmers, as well as a chartered accountant, Donal O’Connor, and the
chairman Philip O’Connell, director of the Agricultural Credit Corporation.
The civil service associations on the CSRC urged that the O’Connell committee
should meet in public and hear oral testimony from the civil service.58 This was
denied and the O’Connell committee met in private, though it did invite sub-
mission. The O’Connell committee failed to agree on the extent to which the
civil service salaries ought to be cut. The farmer representatives recommended
that the basic salary as well as bonus be cut. In fact they recommended that dis-
contented civil servants be sent to spend ‘some time in the beet fields of Leinster,
the cow pastures of the Kerry hills or the turf banks of the Bog of Allen for £1 a
week’ to bring them to their senses.59 The other members of the committee
reported that the civil servants’ basic salary was already so low that it should not
be cut but that the variable bonus could bear a further cut. So far as the minis-
ter was concerned neither report was useful as neither recommended the level
of cuts already signalled. When the ‘cuts’ committee invited written submissions
from the associations it was decided not to bother. The associations also asked
that the bonus cut due in January 1933 should be postponed until the Johnson
committee could make its report.60 The government agreed that pending the
report of the Johnson committee 50 per cent of the drop in bonus due to begin
in January 1933 should be suspended on basic salaries below £2 per week.61
A Fianna Fáil majority government
By late 1932 the Fianna Fáil government was coming under increasing
 pressure. The anger of the larger farmers hit by the Economic War allied with
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frustration within the Cumann na nGaedheal party led to the creation of the
fascistic Army Comrades’ Association or ‘Blueshirts’. Street fights between the
Blueshirts and released IRA men created a fear of social disintegration. The
government’s attempts to restore control of the budget were being frustrated
by the civil service and teacher resistance. When Norton warned in late
December that his party would not support the public service pay cuts de
Valera dissolved the Dáil during the Christmas recess. In the shortest possible
election campaign, exploiting the disunity in the opposition, Fianna Fáil won
a clear majority of one seat.62
The cabinet returned immediately to considering the cuts in public service
pay. Despite the senior civil servants in the Department of Finance, Boland
most prominently, reminding the minister of the cuts already imposed on the
civil service the cabinet decided to impose percentage cuts on all public service
salaries above £320 per annum ranging from 1 per cent to 10 per cent, to last for
one year only.63 The bill to implement the cuts, the Public Services (Temporary
Economies) Bill was brought before the Dáil on 24 March. Deductions from
civil service salaries began to be applied from 1 April, before the bill had com-
pleted its passage into legislation. The civil service associations co-ordinated a
joint strategy of refusing to discuss or bargain, only offering an emphatic ‘no’
to the bill at the representative council, and insisting that it be brought to arbi-
tration.64 The IPCS invited the CSF and the CSCA to investigate the possibil-
ity of mounting a legal challenge to the cuts. Neither Heron nor Hughes,
however, were interested in legal action, and the IPCS was not interested in any
renewed public agitation. Probably Heron and Hughes were right. As Dickie,
the legal opinion sought by the IPCS, reminded them civil service regulations
gave the minister full authority to set pay and conditions for the civil service as
he saw fit. In the absence of any other strategy the civil service associations all
returned to pursuing the minister from within the CSRC while forwarding
amendments to the Dáil and Seanad to weaken the bill.65
In May the Johnson committee reported on the cost-of-living calculation, rec-
ommending, as we have seen, that a middle-class budget more representative of
the lifestyle of the civil service should be compiled. The CSRC seized upon this
finding (although Boland already knew that it would have no effect on the final
figure) and asked the minister to suspend the cut due in June. Boland warned
MacEntee that the civil service representative associations were trying to draw
him into a situation in which, by constant delay and reductions in the cost-of-
living cuts, the whole system of the bonus would be undermined and consolida-
tion achieved at a higher rate than was correct or justified. 66 The associations
had already achieved a split in the cost-of-living cut in January 1933 when
salaries below £2 enjoyed a lower rate of bonus reduction. At the CSRC meeting
the civil service staff side spoke briefly and to some effect on the uncertainty that
the cuts – 1 January, 1 April and now impending on 1 July – were having on civil
214 The civil service and the revolution in Ireland
M1206 MAGUIRE TEXT.qxp:Andy Q7  12/12/07  11:10  Page 214
service morale and suggested that a delay on imposing the July cut would go a
long way to allay discontent. Despite Boland’s memorandum MacEntee agreed
to defer any further cuts for six weeks to allow the staff associations to consider
the Johnson committee report. He did, however, firmly indicate that all discus-
sions on civil service issues must remain within the CSRC and that the govern-
ment had banned the public meetings that the Federation had planned to protest
against the economies bill.67 The civil service associations accepted this as it
seemed that the door giving access to the minister was now opening to them.
The Lisney case and ‘worsening of conditions’
It was at this point that Article 10 once again came to the rescue of the civil
service. TOPA had been kept in being as the organisation to supply the staff side
to the compensation committee. The right of civil servants to voluntary retire-
ment had lapsed after seven years. But the right of civil servants to retire due
to worsening of conditions had been retained in the 1929 Act. This form of dis-
charge, equivalent to today’s ‘constructive dismissal’, was rarely cited; the com-
pensation board had decided only five cases since its original establishment.
The compensation terms were the same as for ordinary discharge and there-
fore better than for voluntary retirement due to the change of government. In
November 1933 TOPA successfully argued that in the case of Harry Lisney of
the Valuation Office the cut in basic salary, not just the bonus, was a worsen-
ing of conditions. Lisney, who was fifty years of age with thirty years of service,
was entitled to an added ten years of actual service. Lisney, on receiving the
court’s judgement, which under the legislation was not contestable by either
side, went immediately to his office and handed in his resignation. He went on
to employ his skills as a valuer in establishing a very successful auctioneering
and valuation business that continues to this day. The result of the Lisney
judgement was an immediate rush of 132 applications of which 109 succeeded.
Most of these were fromsenior officers, forty-six of them from the Department
of Finance, which was the department to suffer the greatest loss of senior
officers. Neither claimant nor State could contest the decisions of the compen-
sation board. The final cost was an annual pension charge of £29,645 and a
lump sum payment of £48,675.68 The result of the government’s determination
to assert its authority over the civil service was a considerable addition to the
pensions bill of the State.69 The gains of the temporary economies were wiped
out and the cuts were restored the next year.70
When the Brennan Commission report raised doubts as to whether an arbi-
tration scheme for the public service was constitutional, the CSF asked that the
government call a special conference of the service representatives to finalise
their own scheme of arbitration. The government replied suggesting that
the Federation raise the Brennan report at the CSRC, ignoring the fact that
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Brennan had in fact no acceptable proposal for an arbitration board. The
Federation then withdrew from the CSRC, leaving the IPCS as now the only
substantial service association on the council.71 Without any formal decision
the government allowed the CSRC to decline by extending the time between
meetings, or simply failing to hold or call any meetings.72 When the associa-
tions wrote to a minister asking to discuss some contentious problem the stock
reply was always that the issue was one that properly ought to be dealt with by
the representative council, which of course had ceased to have any real exis-
tence beyond the imagination of the establishment division in the Department
of Finance.
The civil service associations had therefore to rely on the Labour Party and
Norton in particular to make the case for less oppressive relationship between
the State and the civil service. In January 1937 the government demanded that
the civil service associations accept the arbitration scheme proposed by the
Minister for Finance and agree to work it. In the absence of such an under-
taking no arbitration scheme would be produced and the existing system
would continue. The government scheme merely formalised the complete
authority of the Minister for Finance over the civil service. The minister would
have authority to appoint the chairman of an arbitration tribunal, determine
what may be discussed at the tribunal, exercise a veto on the delegates of the
associations, prevent publication of any recommendation and retain the right
to reject any recommendation without explanation. The government pro-
posal was a rejection of the fundamental requirements of the civil service asso-
ciations – an agreed chairman, no restriction on the right of the civil service
to employ professional representation, and some role for the Oireachtas in
determining the relationship binding the State and the civil service. The gov-
ernment proposal was in effect an official muzzle on the associations. In the
Dáil debates Norton concentrated on the breach of faith by the Fianna Fáil
government, which was now prepared to abandon earlier promises made
when in opposition. John A. Costello, speaking for Fine Gael, delivered a more
historical and constitutional analysis of the relationship between the Irish
State and its civil service. The political classes in Ireland, unlike in Britain
where they were bred for power, were inexperienced with no expectation of a
political career. They had been propelled to power in a revolution. Such a gov-
ernment required a highly efficient, adequately paid and secure civil service to
compensate for its inexperience. This required also that the civil service
should not fear the minister. The apparently vindictive dismissal of Edward
McCarron in November 1936, the secretary of the Department of Local
Government, had unnerved the civil service. What the State required, argued
Costello, was an independent and expert civil service, not a cowed bureau-
cracy that was a machine in the hands of the minister. MacEntee did not even
reply to the debate. 73
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Bunreacht na hÉireann
In 1937 a referendum approved Bunreacht na hÉireann, the new Irish consti-
tution drafted by de Valera. This constitution was the last stage in the disman-
tling of the Treaty settlement. It described Ireland as the entire island but stated
that pending the integration of the national territory the laws passed would
apply only to the territory of the former Irish Free State. It stated that all power
derived from the people and created an elected presidency as head of State.
Hoping to use the constitutional referendum as a springboard for electoral
success the Fianna Fáil government dissolved the Dáil and called a general elec-
tion for 1 July 1937. The result was the return of a reduced Fianna Fáil now
once again dependent on Labour support to form a government. Included in
the Labour TDs were Norton, general-secretary of the POWU and and Archie
Heron the former general-secretary of the CSCA. The scenes of jubilant cele-
bration by supposedly non-political civil servants in government departments
brought a rebuke from finance at such a breakdown.74 The civil service was now
confident that with Labour pressure the government would have to concede an
arbitration and conciliation scheme. A motion directing the government to
establish arbitration machinery of the civil service was introduced by Norton
and supported by the Fine Gael party. In the debate Costello dealt with the
question as to what extent the civil service of the Irish State was in fact a con-
tinuation of the former Castle regime. He saw continuity in preservation of the
worst aspects of Treasury attitudes and authority in the senior figures of the
finance department. These attitudes had in fact been long abandoned, he
argued, in Britain where the Whitley system of arbitration had empowered the
civil service. In Costello’s view an independent civil service was the best
guardian of democracy and the public interest against corrupt and vindictive
politicians. MacEntee was forced to reply. His defence of his proposed arbitra-
tion tribunal and of the record of Fianna Fáil dealings with the civil service was
ineffectual. The Labour Party motion instructing the government to enter
negotiations with the civil service for a conciliation and arbitration system was
carried by one vote on 28 April 1938. Rather than concede to the Dáil motion
de Valera dissolved the government and forced an election.75 Fianna Fáil
returned with a secure majority of sixteen and now even more determined not
to concede anything to the civil service demand for arbitration.
The final case under Article 10
Article 10 had one last and rather shabby outing in 1938, in the aftermath of
the passing of the new constitution. During the debate on the constitution the
civil service associations had expressed their unease that their rights under the
Treaty and under the Irish Free State constitution would be abolished. This
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would mean that the only protection was that provided by the 1929 Civil
Servants (Transferred Officers) Compensation Act. As this was legislative and
not constitutional protection a government would be perfectly able to alter or
abolish it. Peter Hegarty, an assistant inspector of National Health Insurance,
represented by TOPA, brought a claim to the compensation board on the basis
that the new constitution of Ireland discharged him from the service of the
Irish Free State and that he was entitled to compensation under his retained
rights. At the hearing John A. Costello, representing Hegarty, argued that the
constitution was a revolution in as much as it ended one State and initiated
another. The government found itself having to argue, contrary to its rhetoric
during the constitutional debate, that the constitution introduced no innova-
tion and that Hegarty had the same employer before and after the passing of
the constitution. On 17 August the board found that though Hegarty was not
discharged by the National Health Insurance he was discharged by the govern-
ment of the Irish Free State as one State had been replaced by another State and
therefore he was entitled to his compensation claim.76 The judgement of the
board could be read as implying that the entire civil service had been dis-
charged and therefore might be entitled to compensation. The government
immediately issued an official circular to all civil servants stating that the gov-
ernment would not pay compensation and would introduce legislation to
remedy the situation.77 The circular indicated that these measures would not
affect any claim which was lodged within six months after the coming into
operation of the constitution, that is before 29 June, some forty-two days
before the Hegarty judgement was made public. When the Dáil reassembled
the government moved the Public Services (Continuity of Service) Bill, 1938.
Section 5 of the bill set 26 October 1938, and not 29 June, as the final date on
which the board could have heard and determined compensation. Norton
closely questioned MacEntee as to how that date was arrived at and MacEntee
was clearly uncomfortable and evasive.78 At the heart of the question of the
effective date was the only other case that had been agreed as a consequence of
the Hegarty decision – that of T.J. Hughes of the AEO and secretary of the CSF.
The decision to go to the courts in the Hegarty case was controversial within
the civil service associations. The IPCS objected to TOPA undertaking what
might prove a costly claim without fully consulting the membership.79 On the
other hand the Cork engineering branch of the POWU was very enthusiastic
after the successful hearing and urged Norton to use it to full effect in Dáil
debates. The Cork branch was nearly moribund and it was hoped that the pub-
licity would attract new members.80 The British Whitley Council staff side
offered to help TOPA in whatever way they could, suggesting it might bring up
with the British government the question of the Treaty being unilaterally
altered.81 However, the British government had already signalled to the Irish
government that it had no interest in the issue.82 TOPA was in fact quite in the
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dark on the Hegarty case. Although it had been usual for the executive of the
association to be kept updated on the progress of cases, the Hegarty hearings
had been kept confidential. The compensation board held closed hearings in
June and early August, a practice that was previously unknown to TOPA.
When, on the insistence of the IPCS, a meeting was held Hughes, who repre-
sented the staff side of the compensation board, refused to attend or to divulge
the likely result of the Hegarty hearing. This was despite the momentous
impact it would have on the transferred officers. It was when the reward was
announced that the reason for Hughes’s reticence became apparent. Hughes
had made an application to the compensation board himself for permissive
retirement terms, along with another forty officers. When the likely result of
the Hegarty decision became apparent but before it became public, with the
permission of the board and the Minister for Finance, he withdrew his appli-
cation for permissive retirement and reapplied for retirement on the same
grounds as Hegarty, confident now that he would win. He had been a civil
servant since 1913. He went out with twenty-five years’ service and ten years
added, giving him a pension based on thirty-five years’ service plus a lump
sum. It was clear a sordid bargain had been made. Hughes kept the rest of the
civil service in the dark on the likely positive outcome of the hearing and in
return was allowed resubmit his own application.83 Changing the cut-off date
was to facilitate his application. That is why there were only two civil servants
who succeeded in taking advantage of the last judgements under Article 10:
Hegarty and Hughes. Hughes had in fact applied for and been appointed to
the post of general-secretary of the British Institution of Professional Civil
Servants, worth £750–900 a year. He left the Irish service with a generous
pension and moved to London to take up his new post. It ought to be recorded
that he was not a success in the new post and his contract was terminated in
1943.84
Hughes, secretary of the AEO and of the CSF, was a central figure in civil
service trade unionism since the establishment of the Free State and was clearly
wearying of the struggle. In his evidence to the Brennan Commission he sug-
gested strongly that it would be in the public interest, and not only that of his
members, if the power of the Department of Finance over the civil service was
transferred to another department of State such as Industry and Commerce
where the ability of the civil servant would be recognised. He also felt that the
salary cuts being pursued by the Fianna Fail government had little to do with
economics but had a lot to do with the view that it ‘would be a desirable thing
that people in this country generally should adopt a simpler standard of
living’.85 Hughes had decided that a more useful and less frugal future lay else-
where. As secretary of the staff side of the CSRC he had overseen a decade and
a half of siege warfare. The only significant ground gained by the civil service
unions had been through the courts and not the representative council, using
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a weapon forged by the pre-independence organisation. It was perhaps appro-
priate that he should have been the last to wield it.
The civil service and the state-sponsored sector
The courts had been used effectively by the civil service to gain legal protection
for hard won rights, especially those covered by Article 10 of the Treaty. However,
no progress in actually empowering the civil service to negotiate a new relation-
ship with the State had been made. This is not surprising. Since its foundation
Fianna Fáil had been focused on the need for the Irish government to assert
the sovereignty of the independent State. Dismantling the Treaty, redefining
Dominion status, the 1937 constitution had all been impelled by a drive toward
a strong sovereign State. As a political movement that saw itself as the true inher-
itors of the revolutionary State Fianna Fáil would inevitably view the civil service
as a remnant of the former Castle regime. The civil service was blindly optimistic
in believing that the government would surrender any of its power to another
authority. The very public use of its network of support in the Labour Party to
advance its demands simply confirmed Fianna Fáil suspicions concerning the
good faith of the civil service. It made good political sense to keep them firmly
and visibly under the control of the State. Although the civil service had to wait
another generation for arbitration and conciliation and thus some control over
their conditions, their relationship with the State was actually changing as a
more dynamic Fianna Fáil replaced the passive Cumann na nGaedheal. In fact
de Valera consistently defended the civil service against the demands from within
the party and the IRA leadership for a purge of senior officials.86 Under Fianna
Fáil the State, in the absence of an entrepreneurial class, undertook the role of
developing the national economy. Unlike in Great Britain, where existing enter-
prises had been nationalised, the Irish State had to create an industrial sector
from the ground up. This ideology of a strong State driving national develop-
ment gave a central role to an expanding civil service.87 The civil service found
the channels of promotion that had been closed under the previous government
were being opened up in new and unexpected directions. Departments were
instructed not to block mobility and to allow civil servants to move to ‘whatever
posts their services are most likely to be of the highest value to the State’.88 The
pace of activity in the departments accelerated and soon there were complaints
that the civil service was failing to keep pace with the demands of policy initia-
tives.89 A consequence of the opening up of mobility was greater opportunity of
promotion. The Irish civil service had very few university graduates recruited
directly into the higher administrative class, the equivalent of the former first
division, and higher posts were generally filled through competitive examina-
tions in the lower executive grade. Civil servants of the clerical and executive
classes crowded into the Bachelor of Commerce degree at Trinity College
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Dublin, which was timetabled to cater for their working day. The number of civil
servants rose under Fianna Fáil and opportunity opened up in the new State-
owned companies where the civil service provided the primary leadership of
these innovations in State-directed development. Dr J.H. Hinchcliff was sec-
onded from the Department of Agriculture to take up the chairmanship of
the Irish Sugar Company, raising his annual salary from £950 to £2,000. P.J.
Dempsey, a junior executive officer on £313 was seconded to become the secre-
tary of the state-owned Electricity Supply Board on £750 per annum. The chair-
man of the ESB on £1,700 annual salary, R.J. Browne, was formerly an inspector
of taxes on £850.90 The leading department in this expansion of the State was
Industry and Commerce under Sean Lemass.91 John Leydon, whose substan-
tive appointment was secretary-general of the Department of Industry and
Commerce, was appointed chairman of Aer Lingus, Irish Shipping, the
Insurance Corporation of Ireland and later of the National Bank.92 Not only did
these civil servants enjoy enhanced salaries, they also gained considerable auton-
omy and freedom in running these State-sponsored businesses. Lemass took the
view that civil servants running these enterprises would require wide discre-
tionary powers and would report directly to himself as minister. H.P. Boland was
initially complacent at this new role of the civil servant, taking it as natural that
the civil service was the most likely source of administrative and commercial
expertise.93 However, as the scale of the State-sponsored sector grew he became
very alarmed at the chaotic state of grading and salaries that it provoked. Even
Doolin, his companion in finance, was now amused at Boland’s predictable rail-
ings against change.94 Thus the Irish civil service, apparently in an unplanned
way, achieved the open path to the higher classes and grades that had been the
ideal for the lower ranks and for the old Griffithite Sinn Féin.95
These new State-owned industries were essentially a reinvention of the
unjustly despised boards of the old regime though now on a much more ambi-
tious scale. This developmental leadership also brought the civil service back
to a role that reflected its own view of itself as an executive rather than merely
administrative arm of the State. This new form of State power necessitated a
new image of the civil servant as professional and technocratic and the shed-
ding of the old image of a colonial remnant of routine administrators. It also
represented a reconnection with the traditions of the pre-independence era
when the State viewed the civil service as an engine of social change, to be used
to reshape the Irish society and economy. In this, curiously enough, Fianna Fáil
was the inheritor not only of Griffith but also of the Balfours.
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Conclusion: the civil service, the State and
the Irish revolution
C   State in Ireland provides the point of departure for understanding continuity and change in the civil service and assessing its
response to, and its place in, the process of revolutionary State-formation. The
third Home Rule crisis and the emergence of proposals to partition the
country, the outbreak of the First World War and then the 1916 Rising, were
all State-transforming moments that questioned the relationship between the
civil service and the State in Ireland. The established British tradition by which
a non-political civil service gave an undivided loyalty to the State in return for
permanence was broken. In response to what the civil service saw as a breach
of good faith it began to fight to establish a contractual basis for its relation to
the State. This sustained political campaign by a united civil service organisa-
tion succeeded in transforming their sectional interests into constitutional
rights. The Irish civil service displayed a precocious ability to organise. The
Home Rule proposals transformed organisation, firstly by permitting cross-
class and -grade combination in a unified Irish civil service association, and
secondly by tolerating intensive political lobbying by that association. It was
adept at cultivating political support from both Nationalist and Unionist in
Ireland to counter the dominance of the Treasury in London. This level of
organisation and political activism would, in any other context, have been con-
sidered subversive of the State and been suppressed. The civil service used each
opportunity presented by political division to protect its interests in advance
of changes in the State. The objective was to ensure that any government that
might emerge out of the struggle for control of the State would find it difficult
and expensive to make significant unilateral alterations in the conditions of the
civil service. This organisation was shaped by a growing consciousness of their
essentially colonial and therefore dispensable status, a status that facilitated
unity across departments and classes.
The 1916 Rising revealed the extent to which some civil servants were dis-
loyal though it has been noted that the response of the State was surprisingly
muted. Meanwhile the demands of world war created different influences
within the civil service in Ireland. The marginality of Ireland to the war effort,
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the pressure on civil servants to enlist, the recrudescence of sectarianism in
the higher reaches of the Castle that accompanied the growing power of the
Unionists in government, all served to further weaken the British State in
Ireland. The period 1919–22 saw the final phase of the development of Irish
Statehood that involved the creation of two different Irish States through par-
titioning the former State, while a rival counter-State waged a war against it. It
has been argued that the success of the revolutionary forces had more to do
with the now chronic weakness of the British State in Ireland than with the
actions of the IRA.
Historians of the process of British decolonisation have written with warm
congratulation on the legacy of sound administrative foundations laid down
during the colonial period and the care with which the departing power had
guarded the security of the public servants left behind.1 The terms of transfer
of the public service in the colonies were modelled on the Irish experience, the
first such transfer. However, the security for salaries, pensions and conditions,
which was to prove beneficial to public servants from Ireland to Ceylon, was
the result not of the warm generosity of the departing power but of the sus-
tained struggle of the Irish civil servants themselves. Security was not granted,
it was won.
During the immediate period after the ending of the First World War the
Irish civil service got swept up in the wave of organisation mobilising the
British civil service into trade unions. That meant importing into the relatively
small Irish service the organisationally sophisticated structures of classes and
grades of the very much bigger and more complex British service. Whether this
was an example of ‘colonial cringe’ or simply the force of habit, it was a mistake
that weakened the civil service as a whole in the new independent State. The
newly independent State retained the hierarchical structures of the former
power. Hierarchy was the simplest way to subordinate the inherited bureau-
cracy to the new executive. However, it was not the best or the most appropri-
ate relationship between the civil service and the government of the newly
independent State. Still carrying the pre-independence nationalist contempt
for the Castle bureaucracy, and acquiring the post-war Whitehall view of the
necessity of Treasury dictatorship in dealing with rank-and-file civil servants,
the Cosgrave government failed to recognise the civil service as an agent of
modernity.
The final transformation of the independent State was the accession to
power in 1932 of Fianna Fáil. The party that formerly had denied the legiti-
macy of the State enacted a new constitution in 1937 that established the Irish
State as the expressed will of the Irish nation and not the British parliament.
Under Fianna Fáil the civil service was reinvented as the State institution that
transformed the political aspirations of the governing party into economic and
social outcomes. If the State was to develop the nation then it had to turn to
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the civil service because there was no other institution capable of such a task.
The achievement of a self-sufficient and sovereign Ireland, which was the goal
of the Fianna Fáil party, would be the achievement of the civil service and
would integrate the civil service into the national revolution.
The question of the survival of the civil service in an era of revolutionary
State change has been addressed. Revisionist histories of the formation of the
Irish independent State emphasise the emergence under British rule of the
modern State institutions that ensured success for the new government. These
histories argue that Irish democracy was secured by revolutionaries embrac-
ing institutions moulded and nurtured by the British and abandoning notions
of revolutionary transformation. The government of the newly independent
State is therefore, according to these histories, to be congratulated for embrac-
ing the inheritance of an incorruptible and dedicated civil service derived
from the finest British State traditions. The belief that the new State simply
inherited a thoroughly modernised and reformed civil service, a belief that is
based on a favourable assessment of Waterfield’s reform of the Castle, can be
refuted. Waterfield’s attempt to fit the Irish civil service to the Whitehall
mould created more turmoil than order. The view that saw more of continu-
ity than revolution and that sought to detach the civil service from the revo-
lution has also been challenged. The revolution established a new kind of State
and therefore required a new kind of civil service. The executive, legislature,
army and police force of the new State were all newly formed out of the revo-
lutionary forces. Contrary to statements of anodyne continuity there was in
fact a rapid purge of the personnel of the senior ranks in the civil service, par-
alleled by an even greater exodus through voluntary retirements. New men
were brought rapidly to the fore in a short-lived blossoming of promotions.
The civil service was also reorganised into a centralised and hierarchical struc-
ture of departments under finance control and answerable to politicians. This
was the sort of structure that the British had tried and failed to achieve
in Ireland. Whether that model was appropriate for the new State was not
 considered by the new government.
It may be asked whether Article 10 of the Treaty and its attendant enact-
ments, which created constitutional rights out of the vested interests of civil
servants, operated to block desirable reforms. The answer is a conditional ‘yes’,
with the caveat that the reforms pursued by Cumann na nGeadheal were not
the reforms that were desirable. Instead of seizing the opportunity to create a
civil service more suited to the revolutionary conditions (less hierarchical,
more dynamic) the government attempted to create a cheaper version of the
Whitehall model. This was not the sort of reform that the civil service antici-
pated or that the revolution had signalled, nor was it even desirable. The
Irish civil service was confident of its ability to deliver on radical policies and
was in fact characterised more by enthusiasm and ambition than by fear or
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 hostility to the new State. An opportunity to engage in truly revolutionary State
transformation was lost.
What did the civil service want from the revolution? The demand that was
voiced was actually a modestly negative ‘no worsening of conditions’. The
difficulty with the Irish civil service under the old regime was the persistence
of nepotism and sectarian recruitment patterns, a difficulty that persisted in
Northern Ireland. The leadership of the Irish civil service associations had
become thoroughly nationalist, mainly through the influence of competitive
recruitment and membership of the cultural movements. Their hope was that
these movements would act as the training ground for a new administrative
elite of an ‘Irish-Ireland’ complexion. For them the British model clearly
embodied social and cultural principles that were anathemas. The more
complex the civil service structures, the more hierarchical they are. The Irish
civil service was prepared to embrace a more simplified and therefore more
egalitarian structure. Locked out of the process of decision-making the civil
service adopted a non possumus attitude. The relationship between the State
and the civil service became a matter not of negotiation but of constitutional
law, fought out in the Wigg-Cochrane case that led to the first revision of the
Treaty. However, the hostility of the political classes to the civil service was
purely reflexive and not the result of any coherent alternative vision, after all
they had no difficulty steering their children into the civil service for careers
and employment.
The ability of the State to conceive, plan and execute policies of social and
economic transformation depended on the ability of politicians to shed the
persistent view that the civil service was simply a legacy of British domination.
The despised boards of the British regime, ‘enough to make a coffin for
Ireland’, were in fact effective agents of social and economic transformation.
Irish civil servants could deliver a modernising Ireland, what they could not do
was make British government accepted in nationalist Ireland. Nor could the
civil service of the Irish Free State deliver cheap administration. The Cumann
na nGaedheal campaign to cut salaries and worsen conditions, running the
State as if it were a corner shop, merely antagonised the civil service and drove
a significant number to choose early retirement. However, the Cumann na
nGaedheal governments did resist party pressure to use the civil service as an
instrument of political patronage and avoided party penetration of the State
apparatus and the evil of cronyism that has infected many decolonised States.
Fianna Fáil was able to re-imagine the civil service as an agent of State-driven
change and so begin to reinvent, through the semi-State corporations, the
boards of the British State. Under the Fianna Fáil government, especially in the
Department of Industry and Commerce under Sean Lemass, the civil service
was given the task in which the native entrepreneurial classes had failed, the
development of the nation. This is perhaps best illustrated by the most
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significant plan for State-directed economic change in independent Ireland
being popularly known by the name of the civil servant who drafted it, T.K.
Whitaker.
Note
1 E.g., Sir Charles Jeffries, Ceylon the path to independence (London, 1962), pp. 122–30;
Hugh Foot, A Start in Freedom (London, 1964), pp. 237–41.
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Appendix: Dáil Éireann civil service, January
1919 to January 1922
Dáil Éireann secretariat
Byrne, P.
Harling, Seán.
Hogan, Mary.
McDunphy, Michael.
O’Hegarty, Diarmuid.
Price, Eamon.
Ryan, Mollie.
Department of Finance
Brennan, Miss L.
Farrelly, R.
Fleming, Eamon.
Hoey, Michael.
Keavey, Sean.
Kinnane, Sean.
Lawless, Eileen.
Lynch, Michael.
Lyons, Alice.
Lyons, Miss E.
Mason, Jenny (later married Tom Derrig).
Mason, M. Miss.
McCluskey, Mrs.
McCluskey, Seán.
McGrath, George (Accounting Officer).
McGrath, Seán (Banc ar siúil).
Murphy, Fintan.
O’Donoghue, David [O’Donnchadha, Daithi].
O’Donovan, Dan.
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O’Mara, Miss N.
O’Reilly, J.K.
O’Toole, Kate.
Sheehan, Patrick.
Slattery, Joe.
Staines, Miss M.
Thunder, Frank.
Toal, Miss.
Tobin, Miss S.
Wheatley, Thomas.
Department of Publicity
Gallagher, Frank.
Kelly, Annie (née Fitzsimons).
Madden, P.
Napoli-McKenna, Cathleen.
Department of Foreign Affairs
Austin, Miss.
Bhriain, Maire ni.
Bolger, J.
Carty, J.
Duffy, George Gavan.
Dunnes, J.
Grattan Esmonde, T.
Homan, G.
McGilligan, K.
McWhite, M.
Moore, Wilfred.
Murphy, J.
Murphy, Miss S.
Nolan, P.
O’Brien, Art.
O’Byrne, Count.
O’Byrne, Miss E.
O’Donovan, C.
O’Reilly, Count G.
Power, Miss N.
Walsh, J.P.
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